# The Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia

(A Study in Political Development)

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# FOREWORD

This was a liberation movement of the Russian Turkistani Muslims. The struggle to stop the Soviet's onslaught on Russian Turkistan was spread over a period of 1918-1931. This was not a locally confined reaction of a few disgruntled Amirs of the il-Khanates as the Russians would make us believe. It involved Soviet Russia soon after the October Revolution to the extent of bringing it on the verge of open confrontation with British India. It also dragged Afghanistan and Turkey in the field as they could not escape the effects of the 20th century Soviet Forward Policy as they were in the near vicinity of the melting pot of Central Asia.

Besides the certain local individual pseudo-progressive Committees of labourers and peasants, the Basmachi Movement also confronted the *Jadidists* (Modernists), Young Khivans and Young Bukharans. To the so-called modernist movements arising in the wake of the present day Sovietization specially of Afghanistan, the remnants of the Basmachi Movement still hold their own and serve as a guide and lesson to the Afghans in their present struggle against the Soviet occupation of their father land.

The Basmachi Movement, an eventful political phenomenon, was the first and last struggle of the Central Asian Muslims against Russian 'imperialism and colonialism.' The rank and file of the Movement were out to stop the Sovietization of their land and people, and to keep preserved their rights of self-determination and sovereignty. Their culture was at

stake first at the hands of the Russians and then the Soviets. Naturally with them it was question of life and death. Hence their struggle for physical and cultural survival. Although they could not succeed in preventing the moving wheel of the Soviet Juggernaut in their fatherland yet it was their tough opposition that still haunts the soviets in the Muslim part of U.S.S.R.

The most striking feature of the Basmachi Movement is its relevance to the present-day resistance movement of the Afghan Mujahideen for the freedom of their father-land and restoration of their self-determination. Seen in historical perspective the Basmachi Movement is a beacon pole for the Afghan freedom fighters because in its rise and fall there are glaring similarities between the two. The common ground of the two resistance movements of the same spiritual stock to the same imperialist power is so identical that a mere change of the dramatis personae would make the one look like the other. Even their points of strength and weakness are just similar.

In order to understand the scope and character of the present resistance movement in its true letter and spirit one has got to study the past resistance movement against Bolshevsism and Communism. That is why Abdul Jabbar Sabith, a Research Associate of the Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, and Abdullah Toura, another Research Associate of the same Centre, translated the book in Dari (Afghan Persian) and Uzbaki languages respectively. The Dari translation is entitled "Tarikh-i-Islam-i-Wa-Melli Mussalmanan-i-Asia-i-Miyana Dar

Muqabil-i-Communism-i-Rus" (A History of the Islamic and Nationalist Struggle of the Central Asian Muslims Against Russian Communism). The two Translations made really good reading in their respective spheres.

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# PREFACE

The Socio-cultural relations between Central Asia and Indo-Pak Sub-Continent have been that of the feeder and the fed. Most of the medieval Muslim Indian rulers were of Central Asian stock. Throughout the history, men and movements slipped down the slope from Central Asia to India. The tremors of political developments in Central Asia even now shake the heads and hearts of Indo-Pak leaders. Hence a natural corollary that we could not remain uninfluenced by the Russian advance in Central Asia.

The great power rivalry in Central Asia have already affected us. The wheel of history is still in motion, and we are obliged to appreciate the span and speed of this Juggernaut's wheel. In its very first two decades the Soviet Revolution set in motion and devoured Central Asian principalities one by one. It was the lot of Afghanistan to be its most recent prey. The wheel is too near to be overlooked. The geo-political situation of Pakistan in the land mass of Asia necessitates an intimate knowledge and correct appraisal of dynamics and their resultant situation obtainable in our immediate neighbourhood.

Prior to the Soviets advance it was during the Tsarist domination that as many as fifteen large scale rebellions—religio-political movements—emerged in the area. However, the bitterest and trying times of the local people came under the Bolsheviks. To fulfil their communist objectives, the Soviet dubbed every thing that ran counter to their policy as anti-communist, bourgeoise, reactionary and anti-revolutionary

and ultimately crushed it. When they imposed the Communist Revolution in Turkestan and began depriving the Turkestani Muslims of their religious, political and socio-cultural freedom, the latter rose in rebellion and open defiance against the Soviets. Their resistance movement, known as the Basmachi Movement, was the first ever against Bolshevism and Communism. For nearly thirteen years it held its own against most severe conditions. Why and how this Movement emerged and came to an end is the study of this book. Some technical obstacles concerning the study of Russia require comments. The change from the old style calendar to the Gregorian was made by the Soviet government on February 1, 1918. Many authors, however, both Soviet and Western, date the New style from the day of the Soviet up-heaval; others, with January 1, 1918. Russian documents of 1917-1921 written in areas not occupied by the Soviets were still dated in the old style. These discrepancies inevitably contribute, to some confusion, and occasional errors in dating are difficult to avoid. For the sake of simplicity, I have used the old style through December 31, 1917, and the New Style beginning with January 14, 1918 the first 13 days of that month being cancelled by the Calendars shift.

F.R.K.M.
Peshawar, 1984

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F. R. K. M.

Dated: 27th April, 1984.

*CHAPTER – I*

# THE EMERGENCE OF BASMACHI MOVEMENT

**Jehad is an element of Faith.**
*(Al Bukhari)*

On the eve of the October Socialist Revolution the Russian Central Asia* consisted of (i) the emirate of Bukhara, which under the treaties signed with Russia on May 11, 1868[1] and September 28, 1873[2] was virtually reduced to the status of a protectorate, (ii) the Khanate of Khiva, whose Khan by the treaty of August 12, 1873 had declared himself a "faithful servant of the Russian Emperor" a proe'ge' ruler[3] and (ii) the Governor Generalship of Turkestan.

The Revolution inter-alia posed many administrative and ideological problems to the new rulers of Russia. The whole concept of empire in the first instance ran counter to communist theory, but its retention was also necessary. Secondly, Britain was posing permanent problem and any evasiveness in Central Asia would jeopardize Russia's security. Thirdly, a large number of Russians over two millions had settled for good in the Kazak Steppe region and in other parts of Central Asia which all the more necessitated strong and rigorous policy in the area. And, therefore, communism was presented to the people of Central Asia as a panacea,

*The terms Central Asia and Turkestan are used synonymously in this study.

guaranteeing them freedom, independence with material satisfaction.

Since the establishment of Soviet rule, the Central Asian Muslims realized that "the revolution was a Russian Revolution. It was Russian not only in the sense that it took place in Russia, but also in that it was carried out by people who were Russians in the ethnical or cultural sense."[4] Lenin was himself a Russian in whom, "inspite of his international attitude, there was probably as strong a messianic strain as in any Tsarist statesman."[5] It was also a difficult task for the Soviet Government to implement its policy in Turkestan[6] because the bulk of the population in the former Tsarist colonial border regions was 'illiterate.'* National narrow-mindedness and isolation, accompanied by superstition and prejudice, were wide spread among the population. Minor religious differences, fanned by priests for their own selfish ends, also made for hostility between nations and groups. Muslims in turn regarded Christians as "infidels" who defiled their holy land.

"Lenin thus became the founder of the second Russian imperialism," says Muhammad Emin Bugra, "If there be any difference in terms of atrocity between him and Ivan, the Terrible (1533–1584), the founder of Tsarist Russian imperialism, it lies in the fact that Ivan perpetrated his brutality under "cross" while Lenin did it under "Hammer and Sickles."[7]

Of all the forms of the anti-Soviet struggle on the territory of the Soviet Union, the Basmachi Movement in Soviet Central Asia has strongest life. Among Turkestani

*They were illiterate in the sense that Muslim populace prefered to read in the traditional customary schools attached with Mosques instead of Russian schools.

nationalists, "the Basmachi Movement is known as the Bek or freemen's movement (*Beklar Haraketi*)."[8] Etymologically "Basmalchi," is derived from the Turkish verb "Basmak" meaning "to Press", "oppress", "violate". Hence, in the Uzbek language "Basmachi" means "bandit", robber", violator". And this word, which does not correspond either in idea or meaning to the conception it has come to imply, now designates a wide anti-Soviet movement in Turkestan.

However strange it may seem, this word "Basmachi" has lost, even in Turkestan it-self (of course in a non-Soviet camp), its original offensive meaning, and has become a synonym of the nationalistic rebel – the active participant in the armed anti-Soviet struggle. It has come to have the same meaning as the Arabic word *Mujahid* so extensively used in the Muslim world, and thus the October Revolution has taken a low word "Basmachi" (a bandit) to mean *"Mujahid"* – the holy warrior.[9]

Among the causes of Basmachi movement were: the thwarted desire of the native peoples to exercise the promised right of self-determination, the repressive and irresponsible policies of the Soviet Government, economic crisis and the steadily deepening famine. The practical policy of the Soviet authorities was of a purely negative character. They even did not hesitate to impose a hunger blockade on the people of Turkestan in pursuance of their policy of force. While in one part of Turkestan a famine occured on account of the failure of the harvest, another part of the country, connected by rail with the famine district, had abundant stores of grain. "The victims numbered 800,000 according to official statements. These figures are of particular significance for Mohammadans, as not a single Russian was among the victims. And this tragedy took place whilst the most productive grain district in Turkestan was in the "hands of the Bolsheviks."[10]

Another measure against the Turkestani Muslims was the agrarian policy of the Bolsheviks. It was based on definitely imperialistic lines and is particularly significant in this connection. The country was taken from the native population and divided among the Bolshevik officials. The Soviet rulers explained this policy by the argument that the "Proletarian dictatorship[11] in Turkestan can only be assumed by a Russian."[12] Systematic raids were authorised to seize the cattle and cotton, which was sent to Central Russia. "The reply of the peasants to these forceful proceedings was to reduce the growth of cotton and the raising of cattle to a minimum."[13]

As such the imperialistic measures and in-human behaviour of Bolshevik authorities compelled poor peasants to take arms against them. Among Muslims, every-where in Turkestan the calculated callousness of the Soviet regime stirred revulsion, hatred, and despair. "Will the Russian freedom never come to an end?" became a whispered question in every native village and town.[14] The dichotomy between the old and new cities, between the Muslim country side and the Russian town, sharpened into open hostility and burst into armed opposition, into the native guerrilla warfare which became known as Basmachism.[15]

Basmachi Movement was strongly influenced and shaped by other developments and forces inside and out side the region, including Pan-Islamism,[16] Pan-Turkism,[17] Pan-Turanism,[18] Tatar intellectuals, *Usuli-Jadid Movement,*[19] The Persian Revolution of 1906,[20] The Young Turks Revolution of 1908,[21] Menshevik propaganda and Bolsheviks anti-Islam measures.

Bolshevik policy toward nationalities had been codified in April, 1917 at the Seventh Social Democratic Party

Congress, which recognized the right of nationalities in the empire to choose their destiny, even if this choice involved a final separation from Russia. Yet, the Bolshevik assumption of power changed little of the character assumed by the revolution in Central Asia since its beginning, "it was apparent that the Revolution in Turkestan followed a colonial direction."[23]

"Just as the revolution there had been Russian", says Edward Allworth, "the power there was at first resolutely Russian. Drawn up in opposition to it, indigenous groups, who were definitely disappointed, could choose either local governments or cooperation with an authority which habitually rejected them." Also rising up in opposition to "the Bolshevik regime were Russians hostile to the revolution who tried to base their counter-revolutionary activities on the indigenous movements in rebellion."[24] Both Soviet and Western writers agree that Basmachi Movement's origin stemmed from Tashkent's initial exclusion of Muslims from governmental posts and its later extermination of the Khokand Autonomous Government. Alexander G. Park observes, "Even these acts might not have engendered the rise of a movement as elemental as Basmachism had the Soviet regime not pursued its policies with a savagery and callousness which drove nearly all natives first into opposition and later into armed defence of their lives and property."[25]

According to Mustafa Chokaev*, it should be noted that this second conquest of Central Asia by the Russian

*Mustafa Chokaev (or Mustafa Chokay–Oghlu) (1890-1941) was President of the Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan which was elected by the Extra-ordinary Congress of Turkestan Mussulmans in November, 1917 and which was suppressed as a result of the bombardment of Khokand by troops of the Tashkent Sovnarkom on January 31, 1918.

troops has cost both sides far more than its first conquest in the second half of the last century: and this notwithstanding the fact that during the half century of Russian rule the Muslim population of Turkestan had lost all potentiality for organising resistance, and that the Russian had succeeded within the same period in instilling into us the fear of their might. This power of resistance of the amorphous mass of the Muslim population can be explained by two causes: "firstly, by the relative growth of national consciousness since the period of the independent Khanates; and secondly and more particularly, by the strength of the instinct of self-preservation."[26] He further says, "It is a fact, indeed, that none of the so-called imperialistic conquests" of other nations have been so rich in victims at the expense of the conquered colony as the first two years of the Soviet dictatorship in Turkestan, when the theory that "the bearer of the dictatorship of the proletariat here can only be Russian* was openly practised."[27] This exceptional and un-precedented anti-national and non-class severity of the Soviet regime in Central Asia was the only and undisputed cause of the birth of the Basmachi movement among the Muslims.

Almost all western writers agree and have one and the same opinion about the following points :

(1) The Socialist Revolution in Turkestan constituted nothing more than "colonial expansion." This is "proved" by assuming that since internal preconditions for revolution were absent in Turkestan and revolution was a phenomenon alien to the native population, it could only have been exported from the centre, that is, from petrograd and Moscow, and was carried out by the Russians in their own interests;

*See the Moscow Pravda, June 20, 1920.

(ii) The "Russian" Soviet government crushed the liberation movement of the peoples of Turkestan and all manifestations of national independence. The collapse of the "Khokand autonomy" which was supposed to have expressed the national aspirations of the native population, and the struggle with the Basmachi movement are adduced as "evidence" for this assertion;

(iii) The Economic and cultural policy of the Soviet government has from the very beginning been "colonial" and directed against the interests of the peoples of Turkestan.[28]

In the investigation of the causes of the emergence of the Basmachi Movement, the Soviet writers make a long excursion into the sphere of "Imperialistic exploitation of the Muslim population of Turkestan under the old regime." The extension of 'cotton growing'[29] in Central Asia resulted in the impoverishment of the native peasantry and the Tsar's artificial interference with the development of a native industry which might have absorbed the surplus village population caused the arising of bands of desperate peasants who, having no other option, took to brigandage and crime. "Those peasant-brigands were one type of social phenomenon often referred to as Basmachi. Their sole purpose was to steal enough money and goods to keep themselves and their families from starvation. Though symptomatic of a profound economic and social maladjustment, their activities had absolutely no conscious political import."[30]

The other social phenomenon covered by the same term is also a form of brigandage, "but belongs in its inception to the post-revolutionary period, and is rooted, not in the peasantry, but in combination of the native bourgeois*, feudal and clerical elements disinherited by the Revolution."[31]

*By Bourgeois is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the mean of social production and employers of wage labour.

Khamid Inoyatov is of the opinion that "under Tsarism the Basmachi Movement was far removed from politics, but after the Revolution it acquired a class character, becoming the military and political force of the deposed exploiter classes."[32] There is no doubt that the deplorable colonial policy of the Tsarist imperial regime, reacted in definite manner upon the masses of the population. It would seem that, if these undisputed facts could have served as a direct incentive to the Basmachi Movement, there should have been no rising under the Soviet and against the Soviet regime.

Whereas Mustafa Chokaev is of the opinion that "the very district where the Basmachi Movement began – Ferghana – which was absolutely quiet at the moment of the February Revolution, and the occasion – the destruction of the so-called "Khokand autonomy" – indicate that the Basmachi Movement was a reaction against the activity of the new Soviet power, and not a result of the policy of the old regime."[33] Soviet writers are trying to prove that the "Khokand government" was a "government of national betrayal" and consisted of people least concerned with the independence of Turkestan and Central Asia.

Skalov, the author of an article on "The Social Nature of the Basmachi Movement in Turkestan" writes, "the destruction of Khokand autonomy", the robberies and violations of the "Soviet" partisan detachments and of the *"dashnaks"** the relentless requisitions and confiscations of the last loaf from the *dehkans* (peasants) for the provisioning of towns, railways, workers, armies etc. had convinced the *"dehkan's"* of the unavoidable necessity of the struggle."[34]

*Bands of Armenian settlers in Turkestan who were affiliated to the Dashnaktsutsiun, the social Revolutionary party of the Armenians, the headquarters of which were in Russian Armenia.

Mustafa Chokaev, who was the head of Khokand Government deny the fact that the destruction of "Khokand Autonomy" was responsible for Basmachi Movement, saying "this is not true; Neither the Khokand Government in general, nor I as its President, had anything to do with the organisation of the Basmachi Movement, which could originate, only naturally, in the form it assumed."[35]

Elizbeth E, Bacon, having a unique version about the origin of Basmachi Movement, observes that "the Basmachi revolt, had been started by convicts released from prison at the out-break of the revolution. (It is likely that these convicts had become so when the obligations of customary law ran counter to the laws of the state)."[36]

There are some Soviet writers who endeavour to prove that the Basmachi Movement originated as a result of the delay of agrarian reforms in Central Asia. "This argument is advanced as a confirmation of Lenin's thesis that revolutions in the industrially undeveloped and primative agricultural countries of the East could only be agrarian. The faultiness of Lenin's theory is proved by the example of Turkey and by that of Soviet Central Asia itself."[37]

Soviet historian Vasilevskiy, who begins his narration with familiar Marxist Phrases. "Distintegration of Turkestan in 1914 to 1918, and isolation of the cotton area from the Russian industrial and grain producing areas provoked the uprisings. An army of three hundred thousand jobless farm hands in the Ferghana valley supplied the Basmachi recruits for the famous Iragash*, Madamin-Bek** (Muhammad

*Irghash was one of the most powerful of the Basmachi leaders and commander of the troops of the short-lived Khokand Government.

**Madamin Bek (Muhammad Amin Bek) was a rival and no less powerful Basmachi Chief. His forces were centred on Margelan in the Ferghana Valley.

Amin Bek) and others *Kurbashes* (leaders) of the partisan troops." Besides the economic element, the same author says, "A not unimportant role was performed by the nationalist tendencies of the native bourgeoisie. They had developed an understanding of national aims, yet were still too weak for the independent realisation of these ends."[38]

The socially universal character of the national liberation Movement was confirmed by Vasilevskiy, who observes that the Basmachi ranks were composed of:

a. Feudalist and clergy, aristocracy and official-dom of the Amir of Bukhara (Mir Alim Jan). . . . tribal leaders who played the role of heads *(Kurbashes)* of the Basmachi "gangs"; *Mullahs* were in-charge of propaganda;

b. Native bourgeoisie, aiming towards independence in the capitalist sense of the word. This section of society was ready to conclude business agreements with British imperialism;

c. *Kulaks**, in the villages who supplied the Movement with food, forages and arms;

d. Peasants *(dehkans)*. At the beginning the Turkestanian peasants were so enraged with the Soviet mistakes that they supported the Movement en-mass.[39]

Joshua Kunitz gives interesting reasons about the *Kulaks* and peasants participation in the Basmachi Movement. He says, "the *Kulaks'* support of Basmachi Movement was quite natural; the middle peasants requires explanation. The psychology of the middle peasant the world over is dual. Whereas the rich peasant is predominantly a property owner and an exploiter, and the poor peasant predominantly a propertyless toiler, the middle peasant has some of the

*Wealthy Peasants.

economic and, therefore, psychological characteristics of both. He is not an exploiter, but a property owner who works in his own fields. As a toiler, he naturally gravitates to the poor peasant, the worker and the Soviet regime, but as a property owner he is also drawn to the *Kulak*, the *Bey*,* the *Mullah*, the Basmachi."[40]

The Basmachi Movement, V.I. Lenin remarked, "is a form of the "class struggle"[41] which after the overthrow of capitalist rule, after the destruction of bourgeois state, after the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not disappear (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old social democracy imagine), but merely changes form and in many respects becomes fiercer."[42]

As already stated, there were also powerful outside factors that favoured the Basmachi Movement. Ideologically, the Movement found expression in religious terms. Its struggle, it proclaimed, was waged for the defence of Islam, and unity of Muslims – Pan Islamism. The Muslim clergy, playing on religious sentiments of the people, did their utmost to draw them into the struggle against Soviet rule. Basmach *Mullahs* travelled from town to town and from village to village calling upon the "faithful" to rise against the "infidels" – the Bolsheviks.

The second important outside factor which influenced Basmachi Movement, was Pan-Turkism. The Turks in the Soviet Union retain a consciousness of their common origin with those in the Turkish Republic. These feelings have not been destroyed since the "Soviet Government actively fears combined anti-Soviet action by the Turkish Peoples. This has resulted in a ban on all narratives relating to a common character of Turkestanian epic works. This was also the

*Wealthy man.

reason for preventing the publication of Turkish classics in the Chagatai language and comparative studies on the Turkic and Uralo-Altaic languages. All tendencies showing links between these languages were labelled as an expression of Pan-Turkism."[43]

With the arrival of Enver Pasha* in Central Asia in 1921 and his assumption of command of the Basmachi forces, Pan-Turkism achieved its greatest popularity and "succeeded in winning recruits not only from groups in opposition to the Soviet regime but from native member of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party as well."[44]

To weaken the power of Turkestani Muslims, Bolsheviks applied old imperialistic policy of "divide and rule." They divided a single nation composed of peoples tied together with common language, race, religion, culture and other characteristics, into several small units; made each unit a separate nation, i.e. Western Turkestan was divided into six nations, Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakistan, Kirghizistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and autonomous Province of Karakalpak.

In fact "the aim of the communists was not to provide cultural autonomy (as they claimed) but to preclude the unification of one nationality, the Turkish People of Russian Turkestan."[45]

According to Hostler "inspite of the rivalry of individual chieftains and tribal feuds the Pan-Turkist element in the Basmachi Movement is clear since they grouped tribes and local "sub-ethnical units" of Turkistani's in the fight against foreign oppression. The Basmachi Movement embraced groups of Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirghizs, Tajiks and above all,

*For detailed life sketch of Enver Pasha See Appendix I.

Uzbeks, the most advanced and numerous of the Turkestanian people."[46]

The third important out side factor which organised, helped and activated Basmachis was primarily Britain, U.S.A. and Afghanistan. So far as Western historians are concerned they deny that Britain and the U.S.A. ever entertained aggressive designs with regard to Turkestan and that foreign states afforded military assistance to the Basmachis. Muslim Nationalist Bashkirian writer Zeki Velidi Toghan[47] remarks, "there is no truth in Bolshevik talk that the British are rendering aid, etc., to the Basmachis."[48] Toghan claims that Colonel Bailey,[49] Captian Blacker and other officers of the Anglo-Indian army came to Turkestan and maintained contact with White Guard** organisations with the sole purpose of "countering Turkish and German propaganda."[50] But impartial analysis of the sources concerned prove that Lt. Col. F.M. Bailey set up a fairly elaborated intelligence net-work and was in touch with the White* General Kronilov and with the first stages of the Basmachi Movement under Irgash in Khokand.

Meanwhile, in Kashghar, Percy Etherton Persuaded the Chinese authorities to join him in opposing the Bolsheviks. He rapidly set up an intelligence apparatus which was in contact with anti-Soviet forces in Bukhara and Ferghana and which also searched out and turned over to the Chinese for the imprisonment of suspected Bolshevik agents and

**White Guards were organised by anti-Bolshevik elements or counter-revolutionaries against Bolshevik Red Guards or armed workers Militia.

*The counter revolutionaries or "Whites" (as Bolshevik Reds") divided into many incoherent groups of former official, nobles, military men, Westernized liberals, moderate socialists, Cossacks, and Separatists.

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sympathizers in Chinese Turkestan. Etherton himself led raids on suspected Bolshevik hide outs in Kashghar and in general appears to have assumed many of the responsibilities of government in the city.[51]

In addition to running an anti-Soviet newspaper and propaganda service, the doughty Colonel succeeded in getting a prohibition on the export of Chinese textiles to the Bolsheviks and in turning back several Soviet missions which attempted to establish contact with Chinese authorities in Kashghar. On the assumption that it was supported or at least approved by the Bolsheviks, he also harassed the Lucrative gunrunning trade operated by Afghans and Pukhtuns (Pathans) between Yarkand and the Frontier.[52]

J. Castagne, who can hardly be accused of possessing insufficient information since he himself was active in Turkestan at this time as a spy, states in his book: "the anti-Bolshevist organisation of Turkestan, reinforced by this (British) support, entered into negotiations, with a number of influential native inhabitants of Turkestan and through them formed links with the Basmachi leaders. These talks, in which the British Government participated, took place in September, 1918. They were based on the following conditions:

1. "Basmachi detachments should enter into the service of the anti-Bolshevist organisation of Turkestan. The *Kurbashi* would themselves command the men available to them but would follow directives issued by the Turkestan organisation, which would dispatch instructors to them and remain in constant touch with them;"
2. "The organisation must supply the Basmachis with provisions"; and

3. "The representatives of the British government were under an obligation to furnish an anti-Bolshevist organisation with money, arms and supplies."

Consequently a union was formed and a link forged with both the Basmachi organisations and Mr. Etherton.[53]

This plan was to be carried out in October 1918. The conspirators and foreign intelligence agents headed by Bailey attached paramount importance to the operations of Ataman Dutov's* forces to whom they dispatched Lieutenant Papenhut as liaison officer.[54] The new plan provided for the formation of a 2500 strong insurgent force consisting of Basmachis and the remnants of Russian Whiteguard units in Ferghana, with Britain furnishing weapons and financial assistance.[55] The plan designated the supply bases and two supply routes: (1) Chitral-Kashghar-Irkeshtam-Oas, and (2) Peshawar-Kabul-Bukhara.[56]

Etherton remained in Kashghar through out 1919 and 1920. In the latter year, he was in correspondence with terrified Amir of Bukhara, who offered to cede Bukhara to the British Empire in return for British assumption of responsibility for protecting from the Bolsheviks the Amir's personal assets £ 35 million. In September, 1920 Etherton reluctantly rejected the offer on the grounds that "it had some time since been decided to discontinue assistance hitherto granted to various anti-Bolshevik organisation."[57]

*Ataman A.I. Dutov was an anti-Bolshevik leader of the Cossacks. On October 17, 1917 Dutov and his Cossacks had seized the strategic Orenburg station and halted communications and traffic along the Orenburg-Tashkent Rail road. The Seizure is known in the annals of those years as the "Dutov Cork" or the "Orenburg Cork", Orenburg being the bottle-neck of East-West transport.

Despite his rejection of the Amir's offer, Etherton apparently did not entirely discontinue his operations at that time. Some months later, after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, he commented that he was "placed in an invidious position" because he had not known that the agreement (which called for an end to hostile activities against each other by both parties) was pending, and "therefore had no opportunity of preparing the way for a cessation of the counter-propaganda which I had been directed to carry out."[58] In the Spring of 1918, Tred-Well was appointed U.S. Consul-General in Tashkent.[59] He had entered into contact with diverse counter-revolutionary organisations and anti-Soviet elements who had infiltrated the Turkestan state apparatus. He was closely associated with Bailey who later admitted that he and Tred-Well had "a great deal in common."[60] It must be said that all Western representatives in Tashkent did have a "great deal in common" their hatred for the October Revolution and support of Basmachis.

To sum up, firstly, as a national liberation Movement the Basmachi insurrection went through roughly five principal periods of large scale action: 1918-1922, 1922-1924, 1924-1926, 1926-1931, 1931-1939 and later. Secondly it was a series of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet uprisings by Turkestanis which at times embraced great regions and large number of participants. Thirdly, Basmachi Movement was not solely a local one but was also a kind of counter attack inspired and guided from the out side. In other words, the impact of the Muslims outside Soviet territory on the Muslims inside was much stronger and more effective than any impact of the Soviet Muslims abroad.

## REFERENCES AND NOTES


1. R. Tuzmuhamedov, *How the National Question was solved in Soviet Central Asia (A reply to Falsiefiers).* Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973. P. 69; quote Collection of operating Treaties . . . . ., ST. Petersburg, 1889, Vol. I, P. 324 (in Russian).
2. Ibid. P. 69 quote, 1902 Vol. I. PP 421 – 25.
3. Ibid, P. 69, quote, PP 425 – 27.
4. Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies.* 3rd, ed. London 1935, P. 7 See also Khamid Inoyatov, *Central Aisa and Kazakistan before and after the October Revolution.* Progress Publishers Moscow. 1966. P. 33.
5. Geoffrey Wheeler, *Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia. Institute of Race Relations,* Oxford University Press. London 1960 P. 10.
6. Turkestan is appropriately named because the Soviet part or western Turkestan (which is called Soviet Central Asia today), along with the Chinese portion or Eastern Turkestan, comprise one of the most compact and unified major Turkic language areas in the world. Ethnologically and linguistically, the entire area east of the Caspian sea as far as the Altay mountains and the Lob desert separating the Taklamakan from the Gobi (roughly between latitude $35^{o}$ and $50^{o}$ N), may well be called Turkestan.
7. Mohammad Emin Bugra "Turkestan" *Islam and Muslims in Red Regimes.* Darulfikr, Ichhra, Lahore. 1970 P. 52.
8. Alexander G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan 1917-1927.* Collumbia University Press. New York. 1957 P. 34.
9. Mustafa Chokaev, "The Basmaji Movement in Turkestan" *The Asiatic Review.* London 1928. Vol. 24, P. 273.
10. Paul Olberg "Russian Policy in Turkestan" *The contemporary Review*: London 1922 Vol. 122 P. 344.

11. The dictatorship of proletariat is stubborn struggle-bloodly and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative against the forces and traditions of the old society." (J. V. Stalin problems of Leninism, Peking 1976 P. 41).
12. Olberg, Opcit, P. 345.
13. Ibid. P. 345.
14. Park. Op. Cit, P. 40 quote Safarov, *Kolonial, naia revoliutsiia: Opyt Turkestana,* PP 81-82.
15. Ibid. P. 40.
16. The word Pan-Islamism in its various forms is apparently of European coinage and was probably adopted in imitation of Pan-Slavism, which had become current in the 1870's. In 19th century Muslim Progressive Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1838–97) launched a Movement known as Pan-Islamism, based on the concept "Kullo Muselemun Ikhwatun" for the Islamic Revivalism and Unification of Muslims.
17. Pan-Turkism was based upon the ethnic, linguistic and historical affinities of the Turkish Peoples born under the reciprocal influence of the Eastern Turks threatened by "Russianization, and western Turks exposed to Russian expansion. Pan-Turkism aimed at the unity of all Turkish Peoples.
18. Pan-Turanism (seeking agreement and unity among Turkish, Mongol and Finnish–Ugrian Peoples), followed in the wake of Russian expansion in the Balkans, and was co-related to Turkish and Hungarian experiments in anti-slav collaboration. The seeds of Pan-Turanism, generally unperceived by out siders, grew slowly and evolved into the Pan-Turanian Congress in Constantinople (1913), in which Hungarians, and even Bulgarians participated.
19. In Turkestan people calling themselves *Jadids* (as

opposed to *Qadimi* meaning old) appeared long before *Jadidism* took shape. The word *Jadid*, meaning 'new' was taken from the Persian expression *Usul-i-Jadid* or new method, it was applied to those who organised or supported the new method schools, where reading and writing were taught not by learning Suras of Quran by rote but by the phonetic method. These schools were set up in the second half of the 19th century among the Tatars in the Crimea and the Volga region and in Azerbayjan and in the 1890's in the cities of Turkestan. Its pioneers were a Tatar Abu Nasar al Khursavi (1783–1814) Shihabed-dinal-Marjani (1815–1914) and Aqmet Tursinuli (1873–1937) etc. It was primarily a Muslim reformist Movement with Pan-Turkic overtones, which aimed at modernising the Muslim system of education and also at introducing a uniform Turkic language for use by all the Turkic Peoples in Russia.

20. In 1906 the middle class merchants and democratic elements in Tehran, supported by England, forced the conservative aristocrats and Shah Mohammad Ali Qajar to grant a constitution. The constitution limited royal power and authorized the formation of a cabinet and bicameral legislature composed of an appointed Senate and an elected Assembly.

21. The Young Turks Revolution of July 24, 1908 was a national reaction to oppression, absolutism, and corruption in the regime of Abdul Hamid II. The revolution gave full power to the Young Turks Committee of *Ittihad Va Tarakki* (Union and Progress). After the revolution the Sultan restored the constitution, abolished censorship, released all political prisoners and disbanded his army of 40,000 spies. J.A.R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*. Oxfore: Clarendon Press, 1951 P. 434.

22. The Mensheviks formed a separate group within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at its Second Congress in 1903. In the elections to the Party's Central bodies the Leninists won the majority (bolshinstov, hence the name Bolsheviks), while the opportunist group remained in the minority (Menshinstov, hence Mensheviks).
23. G. Safarov, *Kolonialnaia revoliutsiia Opyt Turkestana.* (Moscow), Gosudarstivennoe Izdatelstov, 1921, P. 67.
24. Edward Allworth, *Central Asia A century of Russian Rule.* Columbia University Press. New York and London 1967. P. 227.
25. Park, Op. Cit. P. 34.
26. Chokaev, Op. Cit. PP. 274-75.
27. Ibid. P. 275.
28. I. Zenushkina, *Soviet Nationalities Policy and Bourgeois Historians: the formation of the Soviet Multinational State (1917–1922) in contemporary American Historiography.* Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975 P. 24 mention the names of all anti-Soviet writers.
29. The introduction of cotton-growing in Turkestan by Tsars as a whole proved disastrous to the well being of the lower economic strata. In the cotton districts of Turkestan, 30% of the entire population were landless, 40% had only one head of cattle per family or no cattle at all, 30% were altogether propertyless and homeless. A vast army of landless peasants and agricultural workers wandered from one region to another in search of jobs. The indebtedness of the poorest section of the peasantry mounted by almost 100% from 1909 to 1911. The pastures of nomad Kazak, Kirghiz and Turkoman tribes in the rest of Central Asia were being taken away from them and settled by Russians from the over populated Central and Southern districts of Russia.

30. Jushua Kunitz. *Dawn Over Samarkand Re-birth of Central Asia.* Calcutta General Publishers Ltd. 126 Vivekanda Road 1943 P. 87.
31. Ibid. P. 87.
32. Inoyatov, Op. Cit. P. 57.
33. Chokaev, Op. Cit. P. 277.
34. Ibid. P. 277.
35. Ibid. P. 278.
36. Elizbeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule.* Cronell University Press. New York 1966. P. 152.
37. Chokaev, Op. Cit. P. 278.
38. Vasilavskiy, *"Fazy basmacheskavo dvizhenya V Sredney Azu* (The Phases of the Basmachi Movement in Central Asia), Novyi Vostok, Book 29, 1930, PP 126–128. See also C.W. Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets, the Turks of the world and their political objectives.* New York 1957 P. 164.
39. Ibid. P. 129.
40. Kunitz, Op. Cit. P. 90.
41. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle. Freeman and Slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master (that is full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild.) and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. (Karl Marx and F. Engles, *Manifesto of the Communist Party.* Progress Publishers Moscow 1975. PP. 40-41).
42. V.I. Lenin Collected works, Vol. 29, P. 389 See also Inoyatov Op. Cit. P. 57.
43. Charless Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviet the*

*Turks of the world and their political objectives,* London George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1957 P. 193.

44. In 1919, a conference of Muslim Communist had opposed, the division of the Turkic tribes" in small individual republics and supported the formation of a unified Turkic Soviet Republic" Georgii Safarov, *Kolonialnaiia Revoliutsiia: Opyt Turkestana* (Moscow 1921) P. 110 A number of natives who occupied positions of trust in the Soviet government and the Communist Party deserted out right the Basmachi. Other established contact with the Basmachi and began to use their officers to sabotage the Soviet regime and to conduct espionage against the Red Army. Georges Aghabekov, *OG. PU, The Russian Secret terror* (New York, 1931) P. 20. A third group, led by Sultan-Galiev, attempted secretly to divert the revolutionary Movement in Central Asia into nationalistic channels by plotting the establishment of an Eastern international aimed at unification of the Turkic peoples within and without the Soviet State. Stalin, Sochinenii, V, 301–6. See also Park Op. Cit., P. 162.
45. M. Rafiq Khan, *Islam and Muslims in Red Regimes,* Darulfikr, Ichhra Lahore, 1970 P. 74.
46. Hostler Op. Cit. P. 165.
47. Ahmad Zeki Velidi Toghan (Validov) was Bashkirian Nationalist. He was driven over to the Bolsheviks during the civil war by the contempt of the "whites" for the claims of the small nationalities, when civil war over, he once more became anti-Bolshevik. He afterwards joined the Basmachis in Central Asia: became well-known Pan-Turanian propagandist and settled down at a German University, returned to Turkey and was condemned there in 1944 for treasonable Pan-Turanian activities, and finally, made his peace with

the Turkish authorities, and published in Turkish in 1942-47 a strongly anti-Russian history of Turkestan. For detailed life sketch of A. Zeki Velidi Toghan see Appendix II.

48. Inoyatov Op. Cit. P. 58.
49. Prior to his arrival in Tashkent Lt. Col. F.M. Bailey was on an intelligence assignment in southern Iran. In the Spring of 1918 he was summoned to Srinagar, India, where he was ordered to go to Central Asia with Major L.V.S. Blacker and Lt. Col. Percy Etherton who had already been there. On the way to Tashkent Etherton was oppointed British Consul in Kashghar to succeed the Consul-General in Kashghar, Sir George Macartney, who went to Tashkent instead of him. On September 14, 1918, Blacker and Macartney left for India, while Bailey remained in Tashkent.
50. Inoyatov, Op. Cit. P. 58.
51. Percy Thomas Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1926 P. 62.
52. Ibid. PP 123, 229-30, 268-71.
53. Joseph Castagne, *Les Basmatchis: Le Movement national desindigeness d'Asie Centrale depuis la Revolution d October 1917 Jusquen October 1924,* Paris 1925, PP 21-22. See also Zenushkina Op. Cit. P. 90.
54. Ibid, P. 24 See also Tuzmuhanedov Op. Cit. 119.
55. I.Z. *"Reminiscences" Solovetskiy"* Isles, 1926 No. 4 P. 68.
56. Tuzmuhamedov, Op. Cit. P. 119.
57. Etherton Op. Cit. PP 169-71.
58. Ibid. PP 216-17.
59. Tred Well's activity is described in: L.M. Land, *American Imperialism: Active organiser of the Anti-Soviet Intervention in Central Asia (1918-1920) (in Russian): works* of the History of the Uzbek S.S.R. Museum (in Russian), Issue III PP 23-37.
60. F.M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent.* London 1946 P. 25.

*CHAPTER II*

## THE BASMACHI MOVEMENT IN FERGHANA VALLEY

**Man is a slave of his motherland.**

(*Abdul Rauf Fitrat*)

The collapse of Romanov dynasty (1613–1917) in February, 1917 was followed similarly in Tashkent*, as it had been in Petrograd** (ST. Petersburg), by a period of dual power which pitted an official Committee, composed of officials and supporters of the Provisional Government and of former Tsarist administrators, against a Soviet of workers, peasants and soliers, 'deputies of more radical complexion, whose president was Broido***. Both these bodies were exclusively Russian in composition and origin and represented conflicting interests within the immigrant community in Turkestan.

Because of the weakness of Provisional Government various unions, groups and parties sprang up in Turkestan. "In

*The administrative centre of Turkestan (Capital of Russian Turkestan) and the home of the largest Russian colony, it was through Tashkent that the influence of Europe was chiefly radiated in Turkestan.

** Former name of Leningrad.

***Broido was an old Bolshevik and was one of the five members of the collegium of Narkomants, and afterwards became director of the Communist University of Toiler of the East in Moscow.

Tashkent alone by the end of March the number of Public organisations had reached forty."[1] The *Qadimists* (supporters of *Usul Qadim* – the old method) and *Jadids* (supporters of *Usul Jadid* the New Method) set up an organisation called *SHURAYI–ISLAMIYA* (Islamic Council) in Tashkent on 17 March, 1917. In the summer the *Qadimists* broke away and formed the *ULEMA Jameti* (Union of Clergy or learned men) headed by Sher Ali Liapin, (a Mullah from Ak-Masjid), in which the clerics were dominant.[2] Both these organisations maintained close ties with former Tsarist official, Pan-Turkist, Pan-Islamists, and were supported by the constitutional–Democrates (Cadets* ) and the Monarchists.** Both *SHURAYI–ISLAMIYA* and *Ulema Jameti* stood for national and religious autonomy within Russia, but the latter was against any reforms. From April 16 to 23, 1917, these organisations convened the first regional Muslim Congress in Tashkent. The 450 delegates, including 93 Russians[3] were to discuss the future of Central Asia in the new Russian State. Their decisions and conclusions lacked certainty because, although they looked to the Provisional Government to erect a new state with a democratic and federal foundation, they did not make clear by what methods Central Asia would choose its course. The only point on which the Muslim delegates took a definite stand was that "their destiny should not be unilateraly determined by Russia."[4] At its last session on April 26, the Conference set up a permanent executive organ, the Turkestan Muslim Central Soviet (*Turkestan Musulman Merkezi Shorasi* or T M M S) later altered to "National Centre" (Milli Merkez),[5] Composed predominantly of Tatars and local *Jadidists*. Their

*Cadets were members of the constitutional–Democratice Party, founded in 1905.

**Members of the Monarchist Party, an organisation formed in Russia in 1905. It championed the absolute Monarchy.

leaders were Mustafa Chokaev-oghlu* (1890-1941), Mohammad Khoja Bekhbudi (1874-1919), a young Bukharite from Samarkand, Ubaidullah Khoja and Asadullah Khoja.[6]

Right from the beginning *Shurayi-Islamiya* tried to rally the local population under its banner. Its news papers** were against the Soviets and often appealed to the population to rally, under the banner of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. *Turkestan Musulman Merkezi Shorasi* set up branches in some provincial towns, all of them headed by *Jadids*. At the head of the Ferghana branch was Nasir Khan Tori, in Samarkand Bekhbudi himself, in Semirechie, the influential Kazak engineer, Tanishbay-uli, in Ashkhabad, a Turkmen aristocrat, Oraz Sirdar, a colonel in the Russian Army.

Re-elections to the Tashkent city council in early August, 1917, resulted in the overwhelming victory of the *Qadimists*. The Muslim *Ulema,* in union with rightest Russian groups, "won 60% of the votes, *Jadids* and other Turkic nationalists from *Shurayi-Islamiya* 10%, Socialist Revolutionaries 25%, the Social Democrates, together with the Blosheviks sent only three delegates (among them one Uzbek), out of a total of 100, to the council."[7]

In September, 1917 on the initiative of the leading *Jadids* TURK ADAMI MARKAZIYAT (Society of Turkic Federalists, Turkic decentralisation) was set up which, unlike *Shurayi-Islamiya* and *Ulema Jameti,* claimed to be a political party. It proposed to unite all organisations which had sprung up from the local population. The Motto of its newspapers was "long live the Federal Turkestan Republic." At this

*A Kazak of the Khivan aristocracy and former Secretary of the Muslim faction in the Duma. See also P. 5.

**_Khurshid_ (Sun), _Tujjar_ (the Merchant), _Vakyt_ (the time) etc.

period papers with a Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkic bias were being published in many towns in Turkestan. TURK ADAMI MARKAZIYAT managed to write the leaders of *Shurayi-Islamiya* and *Ulema Jameti* because of their fear of the advancing socialist revolution, they convened second Muslim Central Asian Conference on September 3, 1917. For the first time there was created a coalition uniting all local groups and parties, "from the *Ulema* to the workers organisations."[8]

The second conference adopted a draft for local autonomy which would organise Turkestan as a part of Russia. The Samarkand, Ferghana, sir-Daria and Transcaspian provinces would form an autonomous Turkestan Federal Republic. "In accordance with the demand of *Ulema,* the local diet would be headed by a Muslim clerical "Senate" *(Makhame-i-Sharia),* presided over by a *Sheik-ul-Islam* (guardian of Muslim orthodoxy)."[9] The conference also urged the union of all existing parties and groups in a coalition organisation, *Ittifaq-i-Muslimin* (union of Muslims),[10] and also "opposed the intensive cultivation of cotton and called for local production of grain so that Central Asia could supply its own food."[11] But like all other plans for autonomy, it was interrupted by the Bolshevik October Revolution.

On September 12, 1917 local radicals elected a new executive committee for the Tashkent Soviet of soldiers, and worker's Deputies, consisting of 18 left Socialist Revolutionaries, 10 left Mensheviks and 7 Bolsheviks.[12] This new body of radicals arrested the local administration, took over command of the demoralised troops and assumed power in the name of "the revolution, the peoples' will and the Soviets."[13]

The *Jadids* and *Ulemas* had been thrown into a panic at events in Tashkent on 12 September, 1917 when radicals

seized power and arrested many functionaries of the Provisional Government. During this time the Kray Committees of *Ulema* and *Shurayi-Islamiya* moved to Khokand and from there carried on the struggle against the Tashkent Soviet. The *Jadidi* enlighteners became supporters of Socialism while the members of *Shurayi-Islamiya* and *Ulema Jameti* stepping up anti-Soviet propaganda, entered into negotiations with the outlaws Basmachis.[14]

With in a few weeks of these events a rising of the Orenburg Cossacks[15] under their Ataman Dutov severed communications between European Russia and Central Asia for the best part of two years. Through out this time European Russia was deprived of the oil and cotton of Turkestan and Turkestan was deprived of essential supplies of grain, so that famine took over large parts of Central Asia.

With these political developments and revolutionary turmoil, the rivalry between Turkestani liberals and conservatives had not disappeared, "and immediately after the Bolshevik revolution the *Ulema Jameti* under Sher Ali Liapin initiated an attempt at collaboration with the new regime."[16] Meanwhile on November 15, 1917 the Third Regional Congress of the Soviets and the Third Muslim Central Asian Conference assembled simultaneously in Tashkent. Congress of Soviets proclaimed the authority of the Soviets over all southern Central Asia and decided on the creation of a Turkestan Council of Peoples' Commissars (Turksovnarkom) for the region. The Muslim conference (entirely dominated by *Ulema*) was presided over by Sher Ali Liapin. Some Muslim Socialist groups also participated, but the *Jadids* and *Shurayi-Islamiya* were not invited.

The conservative majority of the Conference, particularly Sher Ali Liapin made the decision to collaborate with the Tashkent Soviets and also proposed to form with them a

coalition governemt "consisting of 6 representatives from *Ulema,* 3 from the Municipalities, and 3 from the Tashkent Soviet and REVKOM (Revolutionary Committee)"[17]

The Congress of Soviets and REVKOM expressed strong opposition to automomy, and furthermore, opposed Turkestani participation in government.* By a vote of 97 to 17, the Congress of Soviets resolved that :–

"It is impossible to let the Muslims into the revolutionary government at this time, because the attitude of the local population toward the authority of the Soviets is doubtful, and because the indigenous population has no proletarian organisations which the (Bolshevik) group could welcome into the highest organs of the regional government."[18]

Rejected by the Tashkent Soviet Government** *Ulema Jameti* turned to the liberal *Shurayi-Islamiya* for the formation of a unified Islamic organisation, to be called *Ittifak-ul Muslimin* (Union of Muslims). In late November, *Ulema Jameti* and *Shurayi-Islamiya* concened in Khokand the fourth Muslim Central Asian Conference to proclaim the autonomy of Turkestan. The Tashkent Soviet Government would no doubt have preferred to prevent this Conference, but its power was not yet established in all the cities of Turkestan and it was incapable of preventing the gathering.***

*The Congress of Soviets and REVKOM formed instead of Council of Peoples Commissars consisting of 8 left Socialist Revolutionaries and 6 Bolsheviks, headed by F. Kolesov.

**This Tashkent Soviet Government was not purely Communist: Untill January 1919, the Socialist Revolutionaries participated in it. The First Congress of RKP (6) in Tashkent took place on June 17-23, 1918. (Uzbekistan SKAIA PRAVDA, July 10, 1933).

***The authority of the Tashkent Government was recognised in the main cities of Turkestan only in December 1917, in Semirechie, in February-March 1918.

The Conference opened on November 25, 1917, in the presence of about 200 delegates,[19] of the Ferghana Province (in which the city of Khokand was located) provided 150 delegates,** Sir Daria 22, Samarkand 23, Bukhara 4, and Transcaspia I.[20] The agenda of Conference listed four main problems:

(a) The system of administration and nature of relations with the Soviet Government.

(b) The attitude to be assumed in regard to General Ataman Dutov's proposal to severe all relations with the Soviets and enter in to the projected anti-Communist South-eastern union (or state), to consist of the Ural, Orenburg, Siberian and Semirechian Cossack regions, Bashkiria, Kazakistan and Central Asia.

(c) Election of an executive committee.

(d) Creation of a legislature for Central Asia.[21]

The Conference rejected Dutov's proposal for a south-eastern federation, and declined to join the struggle against the Bolsheviks.* They resolved to negotiate with Tashkent concerning their mutual relations and for the autonomy of Turkestan.

Negotiations with Tashkent's Russian leaders, Kolesov, Uspenskie and Poltoratskii, were not pushed very far, so the

** The majority of delegates came from Ferghana, because under the troubled conditions of the moment, travel was difficult in Soviet Central Asia.

*Like the Bashkirs and Tatars, Turkestanies at the Khokand Congress neither completely submitted to Soviet authority nor entered into open conflict with it. Even the Tashkent government no matter how accidently it was composed, it had the support of Moscow—was accepted by the Khokand Conference as an almost legal government.

Khokand Conference set up the Provisional Government of Turkestan Autonomous Republic, known as Khokand Autonomy, in Khokand on 27 November (December 10, N.S.) 1917.[22] The Soviet press alleged that "its task was to create Central Asian *Khalifat* under the sole authority of Britain and government like British colonies in Africa."[23] There is no truth in this version "that the Khokand government was a puppet government under the sole authority of the Britain because the declaration stressed that the Conference proclaimed Turkestan "Territorially autonomous within the union of the Russian democratic republic."[24] So it was the reason that the proclamation evoked no particular reaction either from the Soviet government or from the anti-Bolsheviks. Since, "in their appeals of November 24 to the peoples of Russia and the East,[25] the Bolsheviks had recognised the right of nationalities not only to self-determination but also to complete secession, they could not officially protest the Central Asian's declaration of autonomy."[26] Further more the Tashkent government was too weak (because of "Orenburg-Cork*" ) to take any measures against Khokand.

The Khokand Conference elected members to a new National Council which included 36 Muslims and 18 Russian.[27] The Conference also proceeded to elect an executive Committee of twelve[28] member government, called the Government of Autonomous Turkestan. Each member was incharge of separate department. It was firstly directed and headed by the Kazak leader, Tanishbay-uli** then by another Kazak, Mustafa Chokaev-Oghlu.

*"Dutov Cork" See Chapter I. P. 15.

** In January, 1918 Khokand decided to float a loan which would permit it to hold out, and this loan provoked a domestic crisis in which Tarishbay-uli resigned and was replaced as President by Mustafa Chokaev.

The authority of Khokand government, however, extended less further than Khokand itself. So to strengthen its position Khokand authorities tried to extend its authority to all the Southern Central Asia.

On December 13, on the eve of Muhammad's (peace be upon him) birth day, the autonomy of Turkestan was declared in Tashkent and eleven days later about 40,000 or 30,000 Muslim mass demonstration took place.[29] On that day a virtual sea of White-turbaned Muslims bearing green and light-blue standards surged through the streets in the direction of government Palace. They liberated Muslims and anti-Communist Russian leaders (arrested by the Bolsheviks) from the Jail. With the approval of the crowd, a protest was voted against the dissolution of the Municipal-duma, against searches, violation of house-holds, and requisitions. After a few speeches and the protest, the crowd broke up and the Tashkent Soviet finally mastered the situation.

The first measures undertaken by the "Khokand autonomy" were the promulgation of *Shariat* and re-establishing private ownership of land and enterprises. Bekhbudi, one of the leaders of "Khokand government", openly declared in the December 22, 1917 issue of newspaper *"Hurriat"* that the aim of the "Khokand autonomy" was "preservation of land, property and religion".[30]

Early in January, 1918 the organised Muslim workers and peasants of Turkestan convened a meeting at Khokand to express their support for the autonomy of Turkestan. The Khokand government appealed again to Petrograd "to recognise the Provisional Government of autonomous Turkestan as the sole legitimate government of Turkestan" and to demand the dissolution of the Tashkent Soviet" which relies on foreign elements hostile to the native population of

the country, contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples proclaimed by the October Revolution."[31]

To defend itself, Khokand government desperately sought allies* and money. In the same month (January 1918) Khokand government decided to float a loan which would permit it to hold-out, and this loan provoked a domestic crisis in which Tanishbay-uli resigned and was replaced as President by Mustafa Chokaev. "Although the loan was subscribed within five days, the Khokand government nevertheless failed to find the weapons it needed for defence"[32]

Mustafa Chokaev-Oghlu negotiated with Ataman Dutov in December, 1917 but discussions broke off because of unacceptable demands of the latter. The Alash-Orda** was cool to Khokand's offers of cooperation, and in any case it had no important armed forces at its disposal. "The Amir of Bukhara, hostile to the liberal who predominated in Khokand and anxious to preserve neutrality in the Russian civil war, refused even to receive the emissaries of the Khokand government who had come to ask for help."[33] The newspaper *"Hurriat"* reported that "the Khokand Government received half a million rubles from Britain via Iran."[34] Even early in January 1918, Shukurkhan Khazrat, a member of the *Ulema,* frankly stated at a meeting at the *Jami Medresseh* in Khokand that "the autonomists are not alone; they have

*Ubaidullah Khojayev, the autonomists war minister, was sent to Samarkand to persuade the Cossaks, who had captured the city, to come over to his side. (Toghan Op.Cit, P. 365) Mustafa Chokaev himself arrived in Charjui to welcome the White Cossack' Colonel Zaitsev, former Commander of Russian troops in Khiva and Ex-Commissar of Provisional Government in the Khiva Khanate.

**Alash Orda, the Kazakh radical nationalist party organised in March, 1917 by Bokeyqan-uli, Baytursin-uli, Duwlat-uli, and Qalal Dosmaghmet-uli.

the support of Britain."[35] But really the propaganda of foreign aid, particularly from Britain was not more than propaganda, and it was spread by Khokand authorities to raise the morale of Turkestanis in the trouble days, Mustafa Chokaev himself concedes, "the government had neither money nor arms. We, the organisers of "Khokand autonomy" were moved more by the faith we put in the Russian Revolution, in the sincerity of the revolutionary motives in regard to national "self determination", than by faith in the possibility of organising a struggle against the Russian Central power, which in our eyes at the time was in the hands of "Petrograd".[36] He further says about the reply of Petrogard to Khokand government: "We received an answer from Stalin, the provocatory character of which was evident to every one. Here is its main purport:

> "The native proletarians of Turkestan should not apply to the Central Soviet power with a request to dissolve the Turkestan 'Sovnarkom" (Council of Peoples Commissaries) which in their opinion, lean upon the military section foreign to Turkestan, but dissolve it by force if such is at the disposal of the native proletariat and peasantry."[37]

Mustafa Chokaev asserts that "to recommend to the unarmed Muslim population, who had placed its faith in Soviet national "self determination," to dissolve by force the Turkestan" Sovnarkom" which relied for its support on the Russian soldiers and workers, armed to the teeth, and not recognising the most elementary civil rights of the Muslims, meant, in other words, to provoke a rebellion."[38] Moreover in December, 1917 the Tashkent government declared the *Shariat* to be invalid and had destroyed religious law courts.

On January 23, 1918, Khokand Government telegraphed to the Tashkent Soviet its decision to convoke the "Turkes-

tan constituent Assembly" composed of the elected representatives of every district in Turkestan and "summoned to resolve all the expectations and desires of the people and to promulgate democratic principles in autonomous Turkestan."[39] Unlike the Soviet regime in Turkestan, which had proclaimed the equality of all peoples but had banned Muslims from government posts, the Khokand autonomists reserved one-third of the seats of their constituent Assembly to the non-Muslim population and pledged themselves to enact legislation which would "guarantee the rights of minorities . . . . . and of the labouring peoples."[40]

After this the Tashkent authorities could afford no longer to ignore the challenge so at the Fourth Regional Congress of Soviets, (January 31, 1918) Kolesov saw to it that the counter revolutionary character of Khokand was condemned. Returning again to the thesis of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which had spelled out the principle of self-determination based on class criterion, "he set forth the Tashkent – Khokand conflict not in terms of nationality, but in social ones. To him, it was the conflict of a bourgeois government versus a popular one."[41]

After labelling the Khokand Autonomous Government as "counter revolutionary," "Bourgeois" and "anti-Proletarian", the Tashkent government dispatched military units under" the command of Perfilov* to liquidate a government which, it maintained, was created and supported by British imperialism."[42] Rumours that the Muslims of Khokand were slaughtering Russians and Armenians and had demolished the European quarter of the city served to influence the spirit of the Soviet troops. The Bolsheviks opened fire on the Muslim quarter of Khokand, demanding at the same time

*Perfilov was military Commissar of the Soviet Turkestan Government.

"the immediate surrender of arms (inclusive of hunting guns) and of the leaders of the Autonomy Movement."[43]

The sudden out-burst of the Muslim population was led by Irgash*, who had not long before chosen by the Khokand Municipality for the defence of the Muslim quarter of Khokand.** Joseph Castagne, a member of the anti-Soviet underground agent in Turkestan at the time, characterised this Commander-in-Chief as " . . . . . an out-and-out bandit, who had served a term of imprisonment, he knocked together a formidable band of professional theives and local peasants whom hunger and economic dislocation had driven into Irgash's band."[44] The Khokand government was supported only by some police units and a mounted Kipchak Militia armed with hunting guns, and only in rare cases with rifles of an old pattern, and in most cases with rakes, axes etc, even with sticks.[45] The Khokand government forced to rely on its own resources for survival, entered into negotiations with the organised groups of bandits and out-laws Basmachis, which were active throughout the province of Ferghana because its topography insured security from pursuit.

Making an appeal to the national sentiment of all the highway robbers, and each leader in particular, the Khokand government hoped to enlist the armed support of these robbers for the defence of the Khokand autonomy. These out laws, who had recently been the oppressors of the indigenous population, so thoroughly adopted the "national" ideology at that period both in their words and deeds, that

*An ex-Siberian exile and first commander of Bsamachis. See also P. 9.

** Contrary to the Soviet statements, Irgash was never in the service of the Khokand Government. Formally, untill the coup of February 18, 1918, the "Commander of the Muslim troops" was war minister Col. Chanyshev whom Irgash arrested after the coup. (Tusmuhamdov Op.Cit. P. 83).

they transformed themselves into the champions of Turkestani Muslims. The Turkestan population forgot the former brigandage of the Basmachis. Instead they now viewed these men as their "defenders and liberators from foreign rule."[46] Pointing out that the "national army" of Khokand government of Turkestan consisted of Basmachi, Castagne wrote: "Former bandit leaders are now acting on behalf of the population fighting for a national idea. They are now portrayed as the heroes of a great cause; the Basmachis have become *Mujahids,* that is heroes waging a holy war."[47]

In early February, 1918 the former high-waymen, now consisting the "army" of the Khokand government, were unable to resist the well armed Red Army units besieging the old city of Khokand and compelled to disperse into the mountains. After holding out for three days, the ancient city of Khokand was razed to the ground on February* 11, 1918 by the Red Army units composed of Austrian, German, Czech and Magyar prisoners of war."[48] This event was recorded in the Chronicles of events for 1918 as follows:

> "20th February, Ferghana district; the Autonomous Government of Khokand has been finally liquidated. The troops supporting the Khokand Autonomous Government have been partly disarmed. The fugitive elements are preparing a compaign of political banditism (basmachestov)."[49]

The plundering of the city continued. Shrines, Mosques and other holy places of Muslims were desecrated, libraries were burned, and above all more than 14,000 inhabitants were massacred,[50] and lastly the entire city was set on fire.

*The date of Khokand's capitulation differs in various sources: Zenkovsky Op.Cit. P. 236 gives February 19: Chokaev (in Dni August 25, 1936) gives February 13 and Safarov February 19.

After this Soviet assault, Captain Brun, who visited Khokand in 1918, found the city half-empty,** thousand of skeletons were still in the streets. Brun writes that "the German, Austrian and Hungarian mercenaries who participated in the occupation of the city plundered upto 100,000 rubles each."[51] Khokand is now a city of the dead "wrote a Russian observer Bolirskiy, a few days after the troops loaded with loot, had departed, it resembles a mortuary, from which emanate Odours of mold and Carrion."[52]

The Soviet Government tried to minimize the atrocities that were being committed by Soviet troops, because of the fear that the news of the sack of Khokand would provoke a general Muslim rebellion. The Regional Congress of Soviets ordered on March 1, 1918. . . . The Military Revolutionary Committee "to refrain from active appearances in order to forestall a declaration of war by Muslims throughout the whole region."[53] On the following day the Soviet Military Revolutionary Committee appealed to the population of Ferghana not to believe in rumours "spread by the enemies of the people" that Red forces would bombard Khokand and shoot its inhabitants."[54] But the news of Soviet atrocities could not be suppressed, and the worst was confirmed when Soviet soldiers began to appear in the bazars of other towns offering for sale the plunder taken in the old city of Khokand.[55] Soviet scholar, I. Zenuskhina, observes that only Soviets were not involved in the sack of Khokand, the *"dashnaks** and the Irgash were equally responsible for the crimes committed in Khokand."[56] He further says: "In the course of nine days a large number of robberies was carried out in Khokand. Cunning *dashnaks* resolved to become

**Khokand never recuperated from the event of February 1918. Its pre-revolutionary population of 120,000 dropped to 69300 in 1926 and further to 60,000 in 1936.

*See Chapter I. P. 8.

rich over-night and the town was subjected to an extremely thorough 'clean up . . .After the arrival of the *dashnaks* in Khokand all the grocers, wine, – sellers, butchers and other groups of Armenian traders proved to be ardent' revolutionaries', having flooded into the detachment they proceeded to lay the town waste. All the shops were ransacked and everything that could be carried was taken away to warehouses, the rest was burned. Mass murders were perpetrated."[57] The same author further accept the fault of the government of Turkestan, saying: "if the government of Turkestan is to be faulted at all, it is because it had unjustified political faith in the counter–revolutionary *'dashnak party"*.[58]

The fall of the city spelled the doom of the Khokand government and of native hopes for self-rule. Some of the leaders of the ill-fated regime were arrested by the Soviets and brought to Tashkent, though Mustafa Chokaev managed to escape.* The Tashkent government ordered all cotton, (the chief product of the region) to be confiscated. Moreover, a food blockade was imposed upon the surrounding rebellious territory, which created a famine in the portion of southern Central Asia. Colonel P.T. Etherton reported that "900,000 persons died in the famine and that other thousands fled in to Chinese Turkestan."[59] Travellers in the area reported: "battles over crumbs of bread thrown from train windows, the abandonment of children on the steppe, and the sale of wives and children in the market places."[60]

The Collapse of Khokand autonomy was inevitable, for it had neither sufficient political forces, nor troops, nor means. It was significant not only because it represented the

*Towards the end of the twenties, Chokaev moved to Berlin where, in 1929 being an avowed enemy of the Soviet Union, he was given permission to publish the Turkic-language magazine YASH TURKESTAN.

heartfelt wishes of Turkestani Muslims but it offered the first organised native opposition to the Soviet regime in the name of local autonomy or because it ignited the spark of a later general Muslim rebellion – Basmachi Movement.

National in a form, its essence was the rise of the native middle class and intelligentsia to leadership within the Muslim community*. The sense of nationalism and indignation (which fathered the movement) are clearly expressed in the following complaint which a group of Muslims registered soon after the sack of Khokand: "under the Red banner, dark deeds are now being perpetrated in Russia. The old rude force which dominated (us) before the revolution has been strengthened again and has declared open war on the "small" nationalities who strive to embody in life one of the great achievements of the revolution, the idea of self-determination. It (the Soviet government) has spilled rivers of human blood on the hands of these peoples, has abolished their governments, and by its cruelties toward the weak and defenseless has out-done the old (regime). Recently it sprinkled the streets of Khokand with human blood, razed the old city which is populated by Muslims and looted all their property."[61]

Between the liquidation of Khokand autonomous government and the origin of the Basmachi Movement, "there is here only a co-incidence of time" says Mustafa Chokaev," the connection between the "autonomism" of a group of certain definite political trend and the *Basmaji* Movement disappears. Autonomism simply ceased to exist

*It was not, as one Soviet authority has insisted, a movement whose content was counter revolutionary, aimed solely at the over throw of the Soviet regime, and which chose a national form only because "Autonomy of Turkestan" was the most advantageous slogan for the conditions of the time." (Park Op.Cit. P. 22 F.N.)

and to be the banner of the struggle, while the *Basmaji* Movement, having begun with the motive of the defence of autonomy, found itself deprived of a definite political meaning with the transference of the struggle from the streets of Khokand to the surrounding country-sides."[62]

The spontaneous struggle of the Turkestani Muslims against the "Soviet colonizers*" and the changes which had taken place in Ferghana created sense of unity in the *Jadidists* and *Qadimists*. For time being, joining up together they declared "*ghaza*", holy war, against the Soviet power through the Basmachis and set up various societies and underground organisation. *Jadidists* raised slogans such as "Turkestan for the Natives" and "Turkestan without oppressors". It showed clearly that Pan-Turkism continued to be the main ideological weapon of the nationalists. Independently of each other, each of the chiefs and *"Kurbashi"* of the Basmachi detachments, (whose numbers constantly increased) set before himself his own aim and programme and this was the weak point of Basmachi Movement.

By April, 1918 every village in Ferghana had its Basmachi partisan unit. Formerly, when the battles were fought under the wall of Khokand, all chiefs and *"Kurbashis"* recognised the authority and power of Irgash. He attacked villages and towns from Bachkir which he made his centre. But after Khokand was lost and the Autonomous Government liquidated, there appeared another rival Basmachi band under Madamin Bek (Mohammad Amin Bek), whom the Nationalists had appointed chief of the militia for the area of Margelan.

Both Irgash and Madamin were men of opposing temperament and political views: "Irgash whose powers

*The expression "Soviet colonizers" in regard to Turkestan Soviet Power was first used in the pages of Muslim Pravda.

became a by-word through out Turkestan was a conservative and fanatical Muslim . . . . By September 1918 he controlled enough territory to have himself proclaimed *Amirul-Muslmin** and was enthroned with all the pomp and titual once used by the Khans of Khokand."[63] Madamin was man of wider and more liberal political out-look. "He welcomed Tatar and Bashkir intellectuals to his force. In the past he too had been convict**, though his crime is not known, and in 1917 had become head of the Marglan Soviet Police force."[64] Such was the disunity between the *"Kurbashis"* and Basmachi chiefs. In the summer of 1918 "Irgash forces came to blows with those of Madamin, apparently over a misunderstanding."[65]

According to Mustafa Chokaev "Neither Irgash nor Madamin, nor any other one of the *Basmaji* leaders, was in a position to work or carry out a definite political programme. They were only brave fighters for whom the whole meaning of the struggle was defined by the success they attained in the battles of the day."[68] He further says "Irgash and Madamin, the most conspicuous leaders of the *Basmaji* Movement in the initial period, represent the most striking examples of complete confusion (for which the adjective "political" is not suitable at all) so characteristic of *Basmaji* leaders."[67] Soviet sources usually allege that the Khokand Autonomous Government and the Basmachis were supported and assisted by British and U.S.A. PRAVDA of 10 November 1922, for instance, quotes an agreement allegedly made in "September 1918 between Irgash and Russian anti-Bolshevik group in Tashkent in which it was stated that the British would supply arms and money."[68] The official instructions concerning Central Asia received by the U.S.

*Chief of the Muslims.

** Irgash had ended a ten years sentence, apparently for brigandage.

delegation to the Paris Peace Conference[69] (1919) said in part: "It may well be that some power will have to be given a limited mandate to act as Protector."[70] Colonel House in his intimate papers admitted that "the occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway by U.S. troops was a measure of support for the "autonomous" administrations in South-Eastern Russia, including the Khokand Autonomous Government."[71]

It seems probable that attempts were made by British agents to make an agreement with the Basmachis during 1918 but nothing concrete seems to have been achieved. Colonel Etherton, the British Consul in Kashghar, recalls that "he was in touch with the Ferghana Basmachis but does not seem to have sent them material aid."[72] Zeki velidi Toghan believes that the British did nothing to help the Basmachi in the early days of the revolt and writes that "Madamin's envoy to Kashghar had no success."[73]

On the night of January 18-19, 1919, Osipov*, staged an unsuccessful coup against Soviet Power in Tashkent. All important Bolshevik members of the government and leaders of the Communist Party of Turkestan were arrested and killed. But was lastly defeated and fled to Ferghana with some of his followers. After spending a few months with Madamin he left for Bukhara later in the year.

Monstrov, another important former Tsarist Officer, who was in command of the "Peasant army**" entered into a formal alliance with Madamin in the summer of 1918. Following direct talks between Madamin and Monstrov,

*The war Commissar in Tashkent.

**This force consisted of Russian peasants settled near Dzhalal-Abad who, having been armed by the Soviet Government in November 1918, became discontented with the rigours of war Communism and the harsh policies of Tashkent.

the armed forcess of these "supreme commanders" were united." The 'Peasant army' renamed the 'People army' while Madamin's bands were named the 'Muslim White Army' of Turkestan. *Amir-Lyashkarbashi* (Supreme Commander) Madamin became deputy to Monstrov, who was appointed Joint Commander of these 'armies'"[74] The combined forces captured Dzhala-Abad in August and followed up this success by taking Irkishtam and Osh and by Penetrating into the Pamir where they took Murghab, Kyzulrabot and Raghkul. They totally destroyed the entire railway-line between Andizhan and Namangan. By September Madamin Bek and his allies controlled sufficient territory in Ferghana for them to fulfil the need of a unified and reorganised administration.

Towards the end of September Madamin summoned a *KHRULTAI* or Congress of the population of Ferghana at which "constituent assembly" and provisional government of Ferghana was proclaimed with Madamin Bek as President, and Monstrov, as his deputy.[75] With the aid of Belkin* who became Madamin's chief of staff, military reorganisation was carried out and administrative reforms realized. Through Russian officers Madamin Bek established contact with white Admiral Kolchak and sought aid from Great Britain, Afghanistan and Amir of Bukhara. "The former, on the advice of Colonel Etherton, hesitated"[76] but in November/December Madamin received an Afghan delegation who "offered him arms and financial help and who reconciled him with Irgash."[77]

Muslim Nationalists penetrated scientific institutions, took over schools into their own hands and carried on nationalist propaganda even in Tashkent under the guise

*An anti-Bolshevik Russian.

of mass cultural work. A special secret group of "*Milli Ittihad*"** (National Union) organised Basmachi bands, and "Bekhbudi and Mradonkul were sent to Paris to raise the question of Turkestan's secession from Russia at the peace conference."[78] The Pan-Turkic newspapers appealed to all the Turkic peoples to join up in a single Muslim state and abandon the Soviets and Bolsheviks. The organ of the Tatar *Jadids* living in Turkestan said "the Muslims would not allow the Kray to be ruled by foreign soldiers and workers, constituting only two to three percent of the population."[79] They published an article in the magazine ISHCHILAR DUN' YESI (Workers world), in Tashkent under the slogan "Avoid the ideology of communism", complained that Muslims in general, and Muslim workers in particular had reaped no benefit at all from the Revolution and compared their present state to that under the Tsar."[80]

In January 1919, Madamin Bek's gang attacked "the town of Stary Margelan, sacking two children schools..... carrying off the property of the teachers and threatening that if instruction continued, the schools would be burnt."[81] According to P. Volosov, who escaped from Basmachi capativity, stated: "Madamin Bek is very severe in his attitude towards the peaceful population, demanding their submission and obedience. Some 50 peaceful inhabitants were shot in front of me, because they did not want to submit to him."[82]

In November, 1919 Irgash suffered a severe defeat from the Red Army and in the spring of 1919 made peace with the

*While Khokand autonomy still existed, *TURK Adami Markaziyat* took the name *'Ittihad Va Taraqqi"* (Union and Progress) and in 1919 on the advice of the Turkish leaders, the Turkestan Nationalists changed the name of their organisation to 'Milli Ittihad.'

Soviet authorities. He was allowed by Bolsheviks to keep his troops and continue his rule of the Khokand district where he adopted a neutral position and did not interfere with Madamin. According to Colonel F.M. Bailey "Irgash was killed in 1920."[83] But other report confirm that he was killed during a fight near Margelan in the summer of 1919 and was succeeded by Khal Khoja* who joined forces with Madamin on August 22, 1919.[84] In September 1919, the Red Army defeated the Cossack Ataman Dutov, whose forces had for two years prevented contact between Tashkent and European Russia. Red reinforcements temporarily recaptured Osh and Dzhalal-Abad.

The re-establishment of links between European Russia and Turkestan in November 1919 reopened Communication between Tashkent and Moscow. Central Government sent Turkestan Commission*** under the command of M. V. Frunze** to take over authority in Tashkent. Frunze, arriving in Tashkent in February 1920, admitted publicly that in the past grievous mistakes had been committed as regarded the natives, and promised that "henceforth things would be different."[85] He organised "Soviet Basmachi" detachments,

*Khal Khoja had been imprisoned during the Kerensky period for incitement against the Russians, but had escaped from Osh prison together with its other inmates in April 1918. He along with his 700 followers attacked on Blagveshcenk and Asprk near Dzhala Abad.

***Turkestan Commission was set up by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in October 1919 under the Command of Frunze, after the defeat of Kolchak.

**M.V. Frunze (1885-1925) was a prominent leader of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, devoted follower and associate of Lenin, talented military commander and outstanding organiser of the Soviet armed forces, one of the founders of Soviet military science.

and made attempts to liquidate the rebellion by causing mass defections.[86]

Frunze also set about organising national Muslim units, e.g. the First Uzbek Cavalry Brigade, and the First Kirgiz Territorial Regiment. For the first time mobilization of the Muslim population was introduced, and "in May 1920, 30,000 Muslims between the ages of 19 and 20 were called up, from among whom a number were selected for training as commanders.[87] Besides undertaking a renovation of the party, he took immediate action to win over the generally hostile native population. Local population was encouraged to join the Communist Party and Soviet institutions. Food was distributed fairly between Europeans and natives and throughout Turkestan, bazars were reopened and private trading permitted. A Tatar brigade of the Red Army was sent to Ferghana to win over their co-religionists, the Basmachis as such by propaganda as by military operations.

The first of the Basmachi rebels to be won over by the new policy of Soviet government was Monstrov's "Peasant Army" whose uneasy alliance with Madamin Bek's Basmachis was strained by fear of Afghan influence after the visit of the Afghan delegation and by suspicion of Madamin who insisted on calling his troops a "Muslim Peoples Army" and who had called the Populace to a *Jehad* (holy war). Monstrov started truce talks with Bolsheviks and on January 17, 1920 his conditions, which include "permission for his troops to retain their arms, were accepted."[88] At the same time the reinforcement of the Red Army in Ferghana with well-trained disciplined troops as well as political and economic measures began to take effect.

Almost all the Russian anti-Bolshevik leaders who had been with Madamin now left him, but he inspite of famine and Soviet pressure continued to fight with courage for a

few more months. On January 31, 1920 two petty Basmachi leaders surrendered with 600 armed and 2000 unarmed troops, and on "4th February, Parpi who had been active in the Andizhan area surrendered with 3000 soldiers."[89]

Soviet authorities made peace offers to other Basmachi leaders including Islamkul of Namangan district, Khal Khoja and Aman Palvan.* Each Basmachi leader was offered, (a) the right to retain such territory as he had conquered together with his troops and his arms, (b) further no Soviet institutions were to be set up in Basmachi territory and (c) each Basmachi was to enjoy the status of Soviet Brigade Commander.[90] Red Army attacked Madamin Bek with full might and after some resistance his band was defeated but Madamin himself escaped from the battle field. In March the Commander of the Tatar Brigade opened talks with Madamin and "on 7th March in return for an amnesty, Madamin acknowledged Soviet rule."[91] The surrender of Madamin broke the resistance of the other Basmachi leaders. During the month of March, 1920 all the Basmachi leaders except Kurshirmat or Shir Makhamed Bek** (who proved to be an irreconcilable anti-Bolshevik, and a loyal adherent of 'Muslim Government' for Turkestan), accepted the suzerainty of Bolsheviks.

About the role of Irgash and Madamin Bek Mustafa Chokaev observes, "these two, after a series of successful battles against the Soviet detachments, went over to the Soviet Government in as sudden a manner as they had first taken up arms against them."[92] He further says "as the leaders of the "Basmajis" they demanded from the Soviet Government the restoration of the *Shariat*, and freedom of trade for Muslims, but when going over to the bolsheviks,

*One of Madamins Lieutenants.

**Called also Ker-Muhamed was of the Gharband.

they demanded the recognition of their title *"Kurbashi"* and the right to have their own bodyguard recruited from their faithful *Djigits* (fighters). And as soon as these demands were satisfied, Iragash and Madamin took their positions without a moments hesitation under the Soviet banner, and went against their own former followers as their pacifiers."[93]

On 4th May Madamin set out as Soviet agent on a peace Mission to Kurshirmat—to go over to the Bolsheviks. Their he was treacherously murdered when a guest at a meal[94] by his host, as Soviet agent and traitor.

Shir Makhamed Bek or Kurshirmat now became undisputed ring-leader of Basmachis in Ferghana valley. He abolished Soviet administrative divisions and replaced by the system that had existed under the Khans of Khokand. With the help of other Basmachi chiefs he also set up his own provisional Government in May 1920. Like Irgash, Kurshirmat was a *Qadimist* so he tried to gain more and more support of Muslim clergy. He declared "Turkestan is only for Turkestanis."[95] He sent envays to the Amir of Bukhara to seek his assistant but the Amir, apparently feeling bound by his treaty** with the Tashkent Government, "cast them into prison and refused his aid."[96] Dishearted from Amir side Kurshirmat sent his brother Tas Mekhment (Tas Muhammad) to Afghanistan, where Amir Amanullah Khan, king of Afghanistan (who also endeavoured in 1920 to realise a political dream of both his father and grandfather, Habibullah and Abdul Rahman), Proposed a mutual defense alliance* against Russia.[97] Khurshirmat declined the proposal

**Signed in March 1918 after the failure of the Bolshevik attack on Bukhara.

*The proposed Central Asian confederacy was to include Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva and also the Basmachi–controlled Province of Ferghana.

of Amanullah while the later refused his aid. Kurshirmat rejection of a Central Asian alliance was based cn several important elements: suspicion, jealousy, and ambition.[98]

The new soft policy of Soviets and the appearance of Muslim Red Army (particularly the Volga Tatar Brigade of the Red Army) men in Turkestan had psychological effect on the natives for the time being and to some extent stopped the further spreading of Basmachi Movement, but it did not accomplish everything the Soviet government had hoped. The Basmachis who were enrolled in the Red Army caused continual problems owing to their indiscipline and addiction to plunder and robbery.

After the disappearance of Madamin Bek, native mistrust of the Blosheviks revived. Moreover un-popular measure, such as labour conscription and military conscription (in summer 1920) were introduced and requisitions continued. The repercussion of these measures were that at the beginning of 1921 there were nearly six thousand Basmachis, and "Soviet authority there," to quote a Soviet observer, "maintained, itself only in the form of a few Oasis in the turbulent sea of Basmachestov."[99]

In spite of Muslim resistance and un-popularity of Soviet government in Turkestan, why and how such government continued to exist in Turkestan particularly in Ferghana valley. The first and foremost cause of it was that "the leaders of the Basmaji movement recognised it themselves as a state power with, however, an unsuitable programme for the Muslims; and the Basmaji leaders, in fact, did not at the time demand the expulsion of the Soviet government, but negotiated with the very same government, demanding the change of its "programme" into one more acceptable to the Muslims; that was all"[100] Secondly "It was sufficient for the Bolsheviks to promise the introduction

of *Shariat* courts and to proclaim freedom of trade for the Muslims, for some of the Basmaji leaders to think that the aim of their struggle had been attained, and, if they did not finally lay down their arms, they at least stopped fighting for the time being."[101] Thirdly, "Had they (Basmachi leaders) had a clearly expressed national ideology and a precisely drawn up programme for their Turkestan national state, the defeat of the Bolsheviks, who have already retreated from their Leninite ideology, might not have been very difficult."[102] Fourthly, "the Autonomist movement succeeded in embracing only Khokand and a few towns such as Namangan, Margillan, and Skobelev, (Now called Ferghana town). The rest of the country, although sympathetic to the Autonomous Government, maintained no connection whatever with it."[103] Fifthly, "All the communication lines, railway, telegraphy, post, telephone, were in the hands of the Sôviet power. That is why the loss of the visible aim of the struggle (the fall of the Autonomous Government) discouraged politically the heroic defenders of Khokand, and turned the latter into blind weapons in the hands of extremely crude and adventurously disposed *Kurbashis* of the type of Irgash and Madamin. They not only postponed the general aim of the struggle and failed to establish the unity of front, but they were instrumental in dividing the country, for instance, the Ferghana province was cut up into "independent" commands and "Spheres of influence" in each of which a different *Kurbashi* ruled in his own way, refusing to recognize any other authority except his own will."[104]

Simply, the Basmachi Movement in 1918-1920 maintained itself inspite of the changing loyalties and mistakes of *Kurbashis* and over-changing policy of Bolsheviks.

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*CHAPTER III*

## THE FALL OF KHIVA AND BUKHARA

**An un-Islamic government may last a while,**
**but tyranny cannot endure . . . . .** (*Hazrat Ali*)

Khiva and Bukhara attracted little attention from the communists before their seizure of power in Russia. Lenin had at various times over the years compared the two protectorates to Manchuria, Korea, and French colonies,—the point always being that the Khanates, too, were the objects of capitalist exploitation. As such, they were entitled to the same freedom of secession from Russia as were Turkestan, the Ukraine, Poland or Finland.

In April 1917 Lenin declared in the Seventh Party Conference: "We are for fraternal union of all peoples . . . . . We certainly do not want the peasant in Khiva to live under the Khan of Khiva. By developing our revolution we shall influence the oppressed masses."[1] Given this attitude, the overthrow of the Provisional Government by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, boded no good for Khan Isfendiyar of Khiva and Mir said Alim Jan of Bakhara.

Having re-established a kind of peace in Southern Central Asia and in the plains, the Bolshevik government could at last think about liquidating the last two independent Muslim Khanates,* the Khivan Khanate and Bukharan

*Untill 1920 the principalities of Khiva and Bukhara managed to retain their independence.

emirate, whose strategic importance was considerable. Disposing of them was urgent, because both were for various reasons openly hostile to the Bolsheviks, counter revolutionary centres where the Basmachis found support and tried to negotiate with foreign countries for the arms they needed.

Khiva that actually gave more trouble to Bolsheviks was the first to fall before the guns of Red Army units. This Khanate had been for several years the threatre of persistent struggle between the nomadic Turkmens and agricultural Uzbeks, and this rivalry and strife proved a death-knell for Khivan Khanate.

Even prior to the revolution, the Uzbek town dwellers with the support of their Russian protectors had dominated the social and political scene. In the countryside the best agricultural lands and water sources were in the possession of the sedentary Uzbek farmers, while nomadic Turkmens, who had settled the land later, had had to be content with less desirable shares.

An intertribal struggle and rivalry between Uzbeks and Turkmens, erupted into open conflict when Russian troops evacuated Khiva at the beginning of 1918 and left its Uzbek ruler, Khan Isfendiyar backed by Colonel Zaitsev* to his own devices. On the other hand Turkmens under the leadership of Junaid Khan** began a career of raids and lootings.

In January 1918 Zaitsev and his Russian forces withdrew from Khiva, and left Isfendiyar and his unorganised Uzbeks at the mercy of Junaid Khan who immediately

*Zaitsev was a Military Commissar of the Russian Provisional government in Khiva.

** Junaid Khan (1860-1938), a Turkmenian feudal lord and brigand who had destinguished himself by capturing and holding the city of Khiva for a short time in 1916. For detailed life sketch of Junaid Khan See Appendix III.

established a virtual dictatorship. The Turkmens pre-empted water rights and instituted a reign of terror under which the **Uzbekes were robbed indiscriminately of their livestock, harvests, and even their house hold goods and their women."[2] Junaid Khan proceeded to consolidate his hold on the country by abolishing the *Majlis* (Parliament) and ordering numerous arrests and executions. Among his victims were the *Jadidist* leaders which were already arrested* by Khan Isfendiyar. They were all shot in May 1918. Of the remaining *Jadids,* "who had led an underground existence since June 1917, as many as were able escaped to Tashkent, where they formed a 'Young Khivan**' revolutionary committee in exile."[3]

Junaid established a system of government through *Atli-bashis* (local military commanders), who were directly responsible to him rather than to the Khan. Turkmen peasant were required to arm themselves at their own expense for militia duty, while Uzbek peasants were subjected to compulsory labour service in cleaning the irrigation canals. Junaid Khan even pursued rude and an openly aggressive policy toward Soviet Turkestan. "He regarded the Communists as enemies, not because they were Marxists or revolutionaries but because they, like the Tsarist troops in 1916, stood in the way of his ambition."[4]

Among the dishearted and prostrate Uzbek population of Khiva, there was only the 'Young Khivan' party which

*In 1917 Isfendiyar arrested most of the *Jadidist* leaders including Husain Bek Matmuradov (*Jadidist* leader) out lawed the party and packed the *Majlis* with *Qadimists.* (though *Jadidist* were in majority in *Majlis*).

**The Young Khivan' Party emerged under the influence of the *Jadid* Movement after the Revolution of 1905 and was composed principally of members of the young intelligentsia and the merchant class.

advocated "Political freedom, private enterprise, and the removal of hindrances to the development of capitalism"[5] on the one hand, and on the other was able to oppose the policies of Janaid Khan. The Young Khivan did not represent any prominent section of the population before the advent of Turkmen domination, they gained popularity and attracted Uzbek population to Young Khivan party when they opposed Junaid Khan policies.

While Junaid Khan oppressed his countrymen at home and planned the extension of his power to the right bank of Amu-Daria, the Young Khivan emigres in Turkestan dreamed of his over throw. At the end of 1918 Mullah Jumyaz Sultan Muradov* organised the Petro-Aleksandrovsk** (Turt Kul) Committee of 'Young Khivans'. A group of ten to fifteen expanded with the aid of an increasing flow of refugees from Junaid Khan's fiscal and manpower levies. By the end of 1919 the Young Khivans could boast a party militia of five hundred and an active cell in the Khan's capital. By the beginning of 1919 the 'Young Khivan's party had also communist faction, led by Russians from the Petro-Aleksandrovsk party organisation.[6]

At the beginning of November 1919 Junaid Khan's old rival, Khoshmamed Khan of the Yomut tribe, in alliance with another Turkmen tribal chief Ghulam Ali, launched a new revolt in the Khojeili and Kunya-Urgench region in the northern part of the Khivan Oasis and then "turned to the Russians at Petro-Aleksandrovsk for support."[7] At the same time taking advantage of the disorders the 'Young

*Mullah Jumyaz Sultan Muradov was chairman of the Petro-Aleksandrovsk young Khivan Committee.

** It was a fort on the right bank of the Amu-Daria about 40 miles from the capital of Khiva, for Russia's defence, observation and support vis-a-vis the Khan of Khiva.

Khivan' Party appealed to the Soviet Government for help against Junaid Khan."[8]

Soviet Government accepted the appeals of anti-Junaid elements particularly of the 'Young Khivan's party for intervention in Khivan affairs. The decision to intervene in Khiva was taken on November 18, 1919 by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan Front.[9] G.B. Skalov*, was sent to Petro-Aleksandrovsk at the beginning of December to organise the invasion of the Khanate.

On December 23, 1919 the preparations for attack completed. Skalov declared "Junaid Khan as tyrant, an ally of the counter revolutionary Cossacks and an agent of British imperialism."[10] He further declared "the rescue of the Khivan people from Junaid and his armed brigand was the sole aim of the Soviet troops, after the destruction of the tyrant, the Khivans would be free to set up whatever form of government suited them."[11] By such declarations of Skalov Bolsheviks desired to mobilize as broad a coalition as possible for the attack, including the anti-Junaid Turkmen Chieftains on the right, the Khivan Communists on the left and the 'Young Khivans' in the Centre.

On December 25, 1919 the order to attack was given, and Soviet troops split into two columns, some advancing upon Yangior Khanki Urgench, while the others approached Khojeili. Shaidakov joined forces with Khoshmamed Khan and Ghulam Ali, defeated the Cossacks and Karakalpaks near Chimbai and then Crossed into Khiva, captured Khojeili on December 29 and Khanki Urgench on January 2, 1920.[12]

*The Councils newly appointed representative for Khiva and the Amu-Daria Otdel.

After a two-day battle Takhta and Bedirkent* fell on the evening of January 23, 1920, and Junaid Khan fled into the Kara Kum Desert, where he continued to struggle against Soviet authority on the side of the Basmachis.

The regime of Said Abdullah Khan** (whose power by then was largely theoretical), puppet of Junaid Khan, was overthrown and forced the Khan to abdicate in favour of a revolutionary committee, composed of two Turkmen chieftains, two 'Young Khivans' and one eleric and headed by Mullah Jumyaz Sultan Muradov. In June 1920, Khiva was proclaimed by revolutionary committee a 'Khawarazmian peoples republic.'

The overthrow of Junaid Khan marked the beginning of the Basmachi Movement in the Khwarazm*** Oasis. The allegations that Junaid was a paid agent of the British seem to rest mainly on the fact that he was known to have been in both Persia and Afghanistan and that many of his weapons were of British origin. There is also an unsupported statement by Junaid's former bodyguard who claimed that in 1924-25 he accompanied Junaid twice to Afghanistan "where they were driven round the towns in a British car accompanied by British officers."[13] Further proof of Junaid's involvement with the British is seen in his links with Turkmen bandit Aziz Khan, who proved such a liability to the Transcaspian Government and its British allies in their fight against the Bolsheviks and of whom one of the British participants of the compaign has written that "he has won spurious renown in Soviet historical accounts of the period

*Bedirkent was headquarter of Junaid Khan.

** Brother of Khan Isfendiyar.

***Old name of Khiva.

by being represented as a British agent, a role he certainly never played."[14]

In fact all the evidences shows that Junaid Khan was, as Zeki Velidi Toghan says, "a true nomad by nature and therefore, essentially an individualist who was impatient of all authority and incapable of collaborating for long with anyone."[15]

During February 1920 Junaid's *atli-bashis* and the royally appointed *Hakims* were replaced with local revolutionary committees and Soviets whose members were designated by the new regime. The war minister and prime-minister of the Junaid regime were shot.[16] The property of Khan and his high officials confiscated at the time of attack was declared to be public property.

The first new government of Khiva, presided over by the *Jadid* Pahlivan Niyaz Yusupov, was formed only of Turkestanis, including Baba Akhmed Salim-Oghli, prime-minister Mullah Oraz Khoja Muhammad, foreign affairs minister, Juma Niyaz Sultan Murad, interior, Mullah Begjan, education, Hassan-Oghli, war, Mullah Nur Muhammad Baba Commerce, and Mir Sharaf-Oghli, military commander-in-chief.[17]

The Soviet conquest of Khiva frightened Amir Said Alim of Bukhara. He agreed to give a number of minor concessions, such as permiting Russian citizens free entry into old Bukhara for the first time since Kolesov's attack[18] and banning the importation of British goods via Afghanistan. On March 30, 1920 M.V. Frunze obtained from the Amir an agreemnt to exchange diplomatic representatives and settle all outstanding questions because the Kizil-tepe agreement* however did not give Turkestan (Soviet Turkestan)

*After Kolesov retreat from Bukhara (1918) the Amir was forced to sign an agreement at Kizil-tepe on March 25, 1918.

the necessary security as the Amir moved still closer to Britain after the March 1918 events.

In April and May 1919 several hundred camels loaded with British arms reached Bukhara through Afghanistan. The number of British instructors in the Amir's army reached 600 by the spring of 1919.[19]

The Soviet government, even in its most difficult days, saved Bukhara from financial catastrophe by advancing it a loan of 15 million rubles in the autumn of 1918.[20] But "Amir encouraged the purchase of Tsarist currency at a higher rate and used it in the Indian market."[21] As a result of this the value of Soviet currency fell and this led to complications in the financial relations between Soviet Turkestan and Bukhara.

Above all the Amir now tried very assiduously to strike up a friendship with the new Afghan ruler-Amanullah Khan. The Tashkent government was becoming more and more alarmed at reports of preparations by Bukhara and Afghanistan for a joint attack on Russia. In January 1920 Bukhara opened a consulate at Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and Afghanistan established a permanent embassy in Bukhara. By April reports were flowing into Tashkent that said Alim had fifteen hundred Afghans on his pay roll, who were helping to prepare his army for war against Russia.[22]

During May, 1920 Lenin received urgent requests from both Tashkent and the foreign affairs commissariat in Moscow to send troop reinforcements to protect Turkestan against an expected Bukharan-Afghan attack.[23]

On August 1, 1920 Frunze sent a telegram to Lenin seeking a directive on the Bukharan question. Frunze had envisaged only two courses of action, viz, either to hope and wait for the development of an internal revolutionary process

or to organise revolution with outside help. The first course was very slow, because of poor organisation among the revolutionaries and the backwardness of the masses, so he favoured the second while doing everything to promote the first. The polit-bureau discussed this telegram and recommended the following course of action:

> "To take all measures essential for the protection of Russian people in Bukhara and on the border of Bukhara, never to take initiative in attacking Bukharan territory and Bukharan armed forces, to conduct a wide agitation among Muslims against the counter-revolutionary work of Bukhara in alliance with British agents and Russian counter revolutionaries to create in the process of such an agitation a native army, Bukharan communists also joining it and to convert these defensive measures into an effensive only if a popular revolutionary centre exists in Bukhara and asks for help."[24]

To strengthen the native revolutionary Movement for the coming campaign, the Or-bureau of the Russian Communist Party had already decided to force the Bukharan communist party* and the *'Yash Bukharliar'* or the young Bukharan** liberal-nationalists into a coalition.

In August 4-6, 1920 the 'Young Bukharans' agreed to cooperate with the Bukharan Communist Party in making the revolution and to join the Bukharan Communist Party

*The Bukharan Communist Party was founded in 1918 at Tashkent from a minority of the "Young Bukharans" emigres in Tashkent.

**The Young Bukharan Party was founded during the first two decades of the 20th century by men like Osman Khoja-Oghli, Ahmad Jan Makhdum, Mirza Abdul Wahid Munzim, Haji Rafik, Sadriddin Murad Khoja Zada Ayniy, Mirza Mahitdin Mansur-Oghli and Fazliddin. It was liberal-reformest group composed mostly of young men, who had been inspired by Jadid Movement and Young Turks".

after the Amir's overthrow.[25] Meanwhile in Bukhara itself an atmosphere favourable to rebellion had been spreading. Unrest, arising partly from the repressive policies of the Amir and partly from the increasing tax burden (that maintenance of his large but poorly armed and poorly trained army required) was becoming general. Several of the Amir's soldiers deserted with their equipment to the side of the 'Young Bukharans.' In the country-side, peasant revolts flared up in several districts and cases were reported in which angry mobs attacked official of the Amir's government.[26]

On August 16-19, 1920 a congress of the 'Young Bukharans' and Bukharan Communist Party met in Charjui. Charjui was selected as centre of meeting because, firstly, it was an important Railway station with a considerable number of revolutionary railway workers and secondly the majority of the Population was Turkmen, inimical to the Amir of Bukhara and his preponderantly Uzbek officials.[27] On August 23, revolutionaries seized Charjui and murdered thirty six of the Amir's officials.[28] Simultaneously, Kermin and Shakhriziab, and a number of other cities fell into the hands of the revolutionaries.

On September 1, 1920 an appeal for aid was sent to the proletariat and Red Army by revolutionaries of Bukhara.[29] The appeal was, of course, calculated to appease the nationalist elements in Bukhara by removing the suspicion of Russian invasion. "The response was more than immediate" says Alexander G. Park "Four days earlier Frunze, in his order of the day, already had proclaimed the revolutionary out-break in Bukhara."[30]

The Tashkent government had been particularly careful to present its intervention as a measure both of self-defence against a hostile and aggressive neighbour and of assistance to a genuine revolutionary movement rooted in the native

population of Turkestan. The 10,000 troops to be launched against the Amir were half Muslims, including two regiments of Bukharans.[31] On August 30, 1920 the Red Army attacked on Bukhara and in Tashkent Kuibyshev** ordered the 'Young Bukharans' to arrest the Bukharan Council.[32] After a three-day battle, the fortress of old Bukhara fell and "the Red banner of world revolution streamed victoriously over the Registan*"[33] Cononel Etherton, who obtained interesting information about the Amirs last days in Bukhara from one of the Amir's ministers who visited him in Kashghar, tells us that the revolutionists attack on Bukhara "was so well planned that the Amir only escaped by the merest good luck. He left the Palace disguised as a carter and actually passed through the city gates whilst the insurgents were searching the Palace for him."[34]

The Amir Said Alim fled with some of his high ranking officers and Afghan chiefs and forces** from his capital to Eastern Bukhara***.[35] Here he joined anti-Bolshevik Basmachis and his most fervent supporters, the chief of the turbulent local tribes, of whom the most important were Ibrahim Bek** of the Lokai tribe, Toghay Sary, Ishan Sultan and Dauletmand Bek.

Ibrahim Bek and his followers were Conservative bandits and from the very beginning against liberal *Jadidists*. "According to Toghan" a chieftain of the Lokai tribe in

**V.V. Kuibyshev was chief political commissar.

*A great square of Bukhara.

** These Afghan forces Amir Habibullah Khan had sent as auxiliary reinforcement.

*** A mountanious region with a long history of unrest and rebellion.

**Commander-in-chief of Amir Said Alim and Basmachis. For detailed life Sketch of Ibrahim Bek see Appendix IV.

eastern Bukhara and the head of a Basmachi band, a certain Toghay, once pointed to a pocketful of ears with the comment that these were the ears of *Jadids* killed by him and his men, and promised to cut off more of them."[36]

The revolutionaries victors formed a new Bukharan government in September 1920. It consisted of a Revolutionary Committee and a Council of peoples *Nazirs*, each having nine men.[37] Faizullah Khoja became Chairman of the Council. He honoured his written pledge to the Russian, (to whom he owed his new power) by leading the 'Young Bukharans' into a full merger with the Bukharan Communist Party under the name, organisation, and programme of the Communist group on September 11, 1920.[38] On October 5-6, 1920 the First All Bukharan *Kurultai** of Soviets formally abolished the four century old Khanate and established the Bukharan peoples Soviet Republic.[39]

The Basmachi Movement in Bukhara started in the Lokai valley, located in the Hissar Bekdom and populated by semi-nomadic tribes-Mongyt, Lokai etc. It was here that the Basmachi bands in Bukhara first took on a political colouring, playing the role of defenders of Muslim tradition and the ancient economic and social structure of their tribes. The tribal chieftains sensed that their political power, economic domination and social prestige were menaced by the Bolsheviks. So they raised standards of revolt against the new government. Held firmly by family, clan and tribal ties, noted throughout Central Asia for their splendid horsemanship and military prowess, the Uzbeks of the Lokai valley formed the most powerful Basmachi bands and produced the best Basmachi leaders.[40]

Territorially, Basmachism expanded into the captive Khanates and Ferghana valley. Numerically, it was stren-

*Congress.

gthened by an influx of new adherents from the ruined peasantry, from the ruling classes which had been driven from their places of power by revolution, and from former revolutionaries who had grown dissatisfied with the new order. But the new recruits, in addition to augmenting the size of the Basmachi began to alter the whole character of the movement. "Not only did internal dissension develop, which led to a schism along tribal lines and the rise of a struggle between the Kirghiz and Uzbek Basmachi, but the original nationalistic leaders found themselves displaced by more conservative elements."[41]

The initial Soviet conquest of the outlying parts of Bukhara during the winter of 1920-1921 met with no effective opposition from a population that had little cause to defend the old regime and in any case, lacked the organisation and arms to halt the Russians. A strong Basmachi resistance movement developed in the Central and eastern *vilayets* (Provinces).

Eastern Bukhara became the rallying ground for Muslim intellecutuals driven by choice or by necessity from many parts of Russia. Among them was the Bashkir leader Zeki Velidi Toghan, who arrived in Bukhara in 1921 and set about organising the 'Turkestan National Union' aiming at genuinely national government for Turkestan free from Russian domination. Many Turkish officers (exiles) or former prisoners of war, were also to be found in Bukhara at this time. Having consolidated their rule with Bolsheviks help in Western Bukhara, the Young Bukharans turned their attention to East Bukhara. In February 1921 a Red Army expedition was dispatched to Gissar or Guzar. Amir forces defeated in an encounter with the Bolsheviks. Red forces occupied Denau on 16th February, Dushanbe on 21 February and Kulab on 15th March.

After continued defeats Amir retreated to Baisun and Hissar. "From Hissar the Amir dispatched a mission to Kashghar headed by one of ministers who had escaped with him, conveying letters to the King-Emperor, the viceroy of India, and Colonel Etherton."[42]

In these letters "the Amir recounted his overthrow by the Bolsheviks and subsequent plight, and begged that his state, which he placed unconditionally at our (Britain) disposal, might be incorporated within the British Empire."[43] But Colonel Bailey is of the opinion that "these letters never got through."[44] In Hissar Amir's position was very dangerous and so he moved south to Kurghan-Tube.

Following the 1920 revolution the 'Young Bukharan' dominated government split with the Central Committee of the Bukharan Communist Party, "which urged an immediate start on the transformation of Bukhara into a socialist society."[45] This time Soviet authorities, in the person of Kuibashev, (her plenipotentiary representative at Bukhara) intervened on the side of the government, and a more moderate Central Committee was installed. By April 1921, however, the balance of power in Bukhara had shifted too far to the right for Moscow's taste, with Muhiuddin leading a group that took an anti-socialist and anti-Russian position on such issues as the presence of Soviet troops in the country. Bowing to pressure from Russia, the more moderate members of the regime, led by Faizullah Khoja, replaced Muhiuddin in September 1921 with another Young Bukharan Osman Khoja, former *nazir* (commissar) of finance.[46]

In Khiva, 'the Young Khivans' (Uzbeks all) regarded the Turkmen minority as a potential fifth column in league with Junaid Khan and Basmachis, who were still at liberty in the Karakum Desert.

As early as April 1920 the Young Khivans pressed for the disarming or expulsion of the Turkmen troops who had helped in overthowing the Khan, despite Frunze's plea for an end to ethnic tensions. On September 15, 1920, Pahlivan Niyaz Yusupov's government had its way:" It tricked six hundred Turkmen soldiers into disarming, executed Khoshmamed Khan, without benefit of trial, and arrested and shot approximately 100 other Turkmens."[47] The following month the Young Khivans regime dispatched punitive expeditions against Turkmen villages suspected of aiding Junaid's guerrilla Basmachis.[48]

On March 10, 1921, Valentin Safonov* working with the Red Army garrison in Khiva and the Turkmen tribal leaders, staged a mass demonstration against the government. Yusupov and the other young Khivan officials** bowed to the inevitable and fled. "Some of them, including Sultan Muradov, joined forces with Junaid Khan, whose following quadrupled as a result of Safonov's coup."[49] Basmachis from various places of Turkestan gathered around in Eastern Bukhara, where they organised 'united committee for the National Liberation of Central Asia.' The representatives of the United Committee for the National Liberation of Central Asia, in the persons of "Sadriddin Khan, Kerimov and others made an appeal to the British Consul at Kuldja in 1921 asking for the support of the British Government."[50]

The appeals never reached its destination.[51] The special messenger on his way to Kuldja was arrested by the Bolshviks in the town of Aulieh-Ata and as a result, all the members of the "Committee of Liberation" were condemned. Inspite

*A Bolshevik, former Commandent of troops in Ferghana, and Russian plenipotentiary in Khwarazm.

*The chairman of Central Executive Committee (TSIK) and the *Nazir* of foreign affairs fled to Junaid camp in Karakum.

of the guilt being proved-guilt punishable by death in accordance with Soviet law* -the members of the committee of National Liberation were only condemned to long terms of confinement in prison, but however, they soon escaped.

By February 1921, when the Red Army advance had reached Dushanbe and Faizabad in the upper reaches of the river valley adjacent to the Amir's refuge, Said Alim resolved to abandon his dominions. At kala-wamar, on the Amu Daria, there was still a Bukharan Governor. "The amir wished to reach this place and thence make his way to Gilgit and India,"[52] but flight to India was impossible, for the Bolsheviks were in possession of Kharogh (South of Kala-wamar) and the western Pamirs. Besides the Bolshevik force there was a great deal of snow which made the way almost impossible, so Afghanistan was the only avenue of escape.[53] As Amir found himself cut off from Gilgit, he was obliged to move to Khanabad in Afghanistan, crossing the Amu above the Sarai ferry. In February 1921 the Amir left Khanabad for Kabul, where he arrived in May. Most of his immense treasure had been lost. One gift that Amir did bring to the country of his asylum was a flock of the finest Karakul sheep in the world, who improved the breed in Afghanistan. He brought also a box of Bukharan soil. This he placed outside the house in Paghman which Amanullah Khan gave him, and into it he thrust two silver poles from which flew two Bukharan standards wondrously embroidered.[54]

Amar llah Khan in his welcome speech made promise of support with Amir Said Alim and Basmachis.[55] But

*The Soviet prosecutor based his accusation on the *Shariat.* Was it compatible with the commands of the *Shariat.* and the obligations of Muslims to appeal for help to a country so hostile to Muslims as England is, who desecrated such holy places of the Muslims as Makkah and Medina?

soon at the demand of the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul his personal guard was reduced to 300 men.[56] Inspite of Soviet pressure on Afghan government, Amir continued to take an active interest in the fate of his former kingdom and was in close contact with the rebels of the Eastern Bukhara. In the summer of 1921 a prominent 'Young Bukharan' Muhiuddin Mahzun, went over to the Basmachis. "His desertion" according to Seymour Becker" was an indication of the difficult choice of allies soon to face the republican leaders: either the Russians or the rebels, behind whom stood the deposed Amir."[57] At the same time (summer of 1921) the 'Young Bukharan' government sent Ata-Khoja to negotiate with the Basmachis.[58] On first August he concluded a treaty with some of the Basmachi leaders by which they swore to recognise the new government. In return Ata-Khoja promised not to allow Bolsheviks interference in East Bukhara. But the Russian Bolsheviks refused to ratify this agreement, and Ata-Khoja had failed to win over Ibrahim Bek Toghay Sary and Ishan Sultan, whose fanatical hatred of the *Jadidists* prevented the possibility of any compromise with the 'Young Bukharans'.

In September 1921, Ata-Khoja was forced to withdraw with the Soviet troops to Dushanbe in the face of fierce Basmachi attack. With this attack tension increased between the Soviet Commanders and the Young Bukharan negotiators and in the end of September Ata-Khoja was replaced by his brothers Osman Khoja as Bukharan representative in East Bukhara, and Ali Riza Bek took over command of the Bukharan troops*.

According to Zeki Velidi Toghan "the Russian (Soviet) commander began to intrigue with Ibrahim Bek against the Young Bukharans. Ibrahim Bek encamped near Dushanbe,

*Bukharan troops were posted with the Soviet troops at Dushanbe.

ambushed and tortured Young Bukharans that fell into his grasp, but left the Russians unmolested."[59] In Turkestan situation was such that if the Basmachis of Eastern Bukhara were prepared to use the Bolsheviks as allies in the bitter hostility to the *Jadidists,* those of the Samarkand area were prepared to cooperate with the reformists against the Bolsheviks.

Toghan in his book recounts how he was able to win over Akhil Bek and Jabar Bek, among others, to the ideas of a strong national government free from Russian influence. But Toghan's union failed to win over Abdul Kahbar.* Meanwhile the Basmachi movement gained new vitality in Ferghana. With general armed popular support, the Basmachis won control of all the Ferghana countryside and the towns of Namangan, Mergela and Andizhan. Under the command of Kurshirmat, they destroyed cotton mills and the railway line. Kurshirmat made contact with various Russian anti-Boeshevik groups and with Toghan's National Union. Their ranks were strengthened by the adherence of Muslim intellectuals from many parts of Russia and Turkish officers.

Kurshirmat (apparently felt himself sufficiently strong) sent 500 men under his brother Ruz Mekhmet (Ruz Muhammad) on the request** of Amir Said Alim and later in the year went himself to Eastern Bukhara to meet the Amir at Dushanbe.[60]

In August 1921 truce talks were started by Bolsheviks with Kurshirmat and his deputy the Kirgiz Muetdin, but

*One of the most powerful Basmachi leaders and a staunch Amirist.

**Amir sent letters and presents to Kurshirmat and sought help. Inspite of the fact that Amir had refused Kurshirmat's help earlier in the year.

the Basmachis refused to agree to lay down their arms. Bolsheviks sent two divisions with the new equipment to deal with Basmachis.

On September 1921, Nizam Khodzhayev*, came to negotiate with Kurshirmat. According to Kurshirmats memoirs quoted by Toghan, Nizam Khodzhayev said: "I now embody the government of Turkestan. You may join us and should it be necessary we shall die together;"[61] where upon Kurshirmat asked: "As the Russian military staff in Tashkent with its troops also subordinate to you? "Yes" if that is so, command them to abandon the whole of Turkestan immediately. From that hour I too will enter your service and recognise you."[62] Nizam Khodzhayev hung his head for shame and left with out another word.[63] After the failure of Nizam Khodzhaye, Red Army attacked Kurshirmat. After furious fighting near Mergelan, Kurshirmat was defeated and fled to East Bukhara. Several casualties depleted the Basmachi ranks; among those that fell was the Kirghiz scholar Turakul Dzhanuzakogly**. The Red attack was so successful that only Muetdin was left to carry on the struggle with greatly reduced troops and territory.[64]

In Bukhara, too the Red Army achieved a few successes at first, and the press in Moscow was able to write: "the Amir's territory is constricted from day to day. . . . he now has but a group of some 600 men with him."[65]

Despite the Basmachis internal quarrels, Basmachism had spread and grown-stronger and situation changed quickly in Khiva and Bukhara at the end of 1921 when Enver Pasha came to Turkestan. The details are discussed in the next chapter.

*President of the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan.

**Turakul Dzhanuzakogly was one of the first, to have studied Kirgiz Oral epics and to have written down the great SAGA MANAS.

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39. Ther was some correspondence between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy of India over a proposal of recognition of Khiva and Bukhara put forth by the Afghan Amir. The Secretary of State for India in his telegram P. No. 1784, dated May 6, 1922 took the line of non-recognition. "Till they have stable internal government, His Majesty's Government could not in any case recognise the independence of Bukhara and Khiva and also till they have a definitely independent position vis-a-vis Russia. The Amir of Bukhara won the case over money obtained from the sale of Karakul in London, which was deposited in a Bombay Bank, an amount of Rs. 16 lakhs. There were at that time many rumours about the Amir's intention to come and stay in India. Some Young Bukharan emissaries came to India in 1923 to plead the Amir's case. But as the Soviet power in the Emirate had become stable by then, the British did not deem it politic to intervene. (Kaushik Op.Cit. P. 163).
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*CHAPTER IV*

# ENVER PASHA AND IBRAHIM BEK, THE BASMACH

**"Muslims of the world unite"**
*(Enver Pasha)*

An obscure and interesting part of the history of the Soviet Central Asian interregnum between the fall of Tsarist regime and the establishment of Soviet power is to be found in the dramatic intervention of the western Turkish Pashas, Enver* and Jamal.[1]

It was such a time when Basmachism lacked discipline, coordination and leadership. Moreover, internal jealousy, petty bickering, and the refusal of individual Basmachi chief's to relinquich their prerogatives even for the sake of effective opposition to Bolshevism prevented the achievement of a unified direction. There was no single leader nor single platform until 1921.

When such internal difficulties threatened to upset the freedom movement, Enver Pasha, a "Young Turk", appeared in Turkestan, whose adherence to the Basmachi's gave the resistance movement a short lived international renown.

*For detailed life sketch of Enver Pasha see Appendix I.

A significant feature of Enver's period with the Basmachi movement was that this era represented focal point of the united efforts of a group of Ottoman Pan-Turkist leaders and Turkestanis, in their struggle for the liberation of the greatest portion of the Turkish world. Non-Turkestani's such as Zeki Velidi Toghan, a Bashkirian, joined the movement while Kazan Tatars were already present.[2] The brilliant, handsome Turkish adventurer had a very complex career long before being called by the Soviet authorities to pacify Central Asia.

On July 5, 1919 in Istanbul, Court Martial proceedings resulted in death sentences in absentia for Enver Pasha, Talat, Jemal, and Dr. Nazim. Enver spent the winter of 1918-19 in Berlin,[3] where he visited the Bolshevik leader Karal Radek in jail in August 1919.[4] Since the Entente Powers were demanding the extradition of the "Young Turks", they lived semi-legally; Enver himself adopted the name "Ali Bey" (Professor), which he later used in Russia. Where as Talat Pasha and other civilian leaders centered their political activities on Berlin and Munich, Enver and Jemal proceeded at different times to Russia and then Central Asia, where they were joined by Enver's uncle Khalil[5] and other former associates in a complex web of political manoeuvres.

In early 1920 Enver proceeded to Russia. In Moscow he contacted with the Soviet Foreign Office, with Lenin, with a Turkish nationalist delegation under Bekir Sami who was then in Moscow, and, by correspondence with Mustafa Kamal. With the encouragement of the Soviet authorities, he procalimed the formation of a "Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies" (*Islam Ikhtilal Djemiyyet leri Ittihadi*) and of an affiliated Peoples Council's Party (*Khalk Shuralar Firkasi*), the former intended as Muslim affiliate.

On 1-9 September, 1920 Enver attended the Soviet sponsored Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku with the title of Delegate of the Revolutionaries of Libya, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco. A Kamalist Turkish delegation under Ibrahim Tali was also present. The Bolsheviks realized that one of the mortal blows to world capitalism could be delivered in Asia, and were, therefore, eager to summon all Muslims and colonials to a holy war against Western imperialists; anti-Britain and France, Enver Pasha and other seemed to be useful tools. To plan a mobilization of the Muslim masses the Bolsheviks convened a unique assembly including Zinoviev and Radek, (President and Secretary of the Comintern), and Bela Kun who came from Moscow. It was an odd gathering of 1891 delegates of thirtyseven nationalities. The Comintern's Policy had been outlined by Zinoviev: "the Communist international turns today to the Peoples of East and says to them: Brothers, we summon you to a holy war first of all against British imperialism."[6] Zinoviev hailed the creation of a Red Army in the East which was "to start a revolt in the rear of the British . . . . and cut down every impudent British officer who has been accustomed to being master in Turkey, Persia, India and China."[7]

Narbutabekov* criticised Soviet leaders: "The masses of Turkestan have to fight on two fronts. On one hand, in their own midst, whith the black *Mullahs,* and on the other, with the narrow nationalistic bias of local Europeans. Neither Comrade Zinoviev, nor Comrade Trotsky, nor even Cormade Lenin knows the true state of affaris in Turkestan . . . . We demand a genuine realization of the Principles of liberty, equality and fraternity in life, not just on paper."[8]

*One of the *Jadid* Communist leaders.

Enver Pasha presented a memorandum, denouncing his own role in the First World War and pledging the Communists his support in the struggle against "Western imperialism."[9] Enver also declared that he "hated and cursed German imperialism and German imperialists as much as he did British imperialism and British imperialists."[10]

The arrival of Enver Pasha in Baku Conference gave rise to numerous demonstrations of the Azerbaijanians, who hastened to show both their pleasure and their grief-Pleasure on account of his presence in Baku, and grief on account of his sojourn in the country of the enemies of the Azerbaijan independence.

According to Mustafa Chokaev "the appearance itself of Enver Pasha in the hall of Congress caused an unusual sensation. . . . At the entry into his box Enver was welcomed by the Muslim delegates standing on their feet, and welcomed as a leader of the Young Turks—the bell of the President calling them to order being completely dis-regarded. Enver himself amidst the Bolsheviks, and realized that he was not in his right place. And here begins the turning-point in the disposition of Enver himself."* [11]

At this conference Enver learnt from the mouth of the Turkestani delegates of the Bolshevik atrocities in Turkestan "during the three years." From the mouth of Zinoviev himself he learned that in Turkestan the Soviet agents "incite one section of the population against the other, offend the native peasants, depriving them of their land. . . .continue to regard the local population as of lower race."[12]

*Enver had come to this conference in the name of "the Union of the Revolutionary Organisations of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia and Hindustan."

Mustafa Chokaev is of the opinion that "this naturally caused Enver to regret his association with Bolshevik Moscow and brought him to Central Asia."[13]

"Enver's greatest disappointment came," says Joshua Kunitz, "When on March 16, 1921, the Bolsheviks actually signed the peace treaty with his bitterest enemy—Mustafa Kemal. Seeing his hopes of displacing Kemal with Bolsheviks help, smashed, Enver resolved to leave the Soviet Union."[14] But really a close acquaintance with the Bolsheviks, and other Muslims of Central Asia, however gradually raised doubts in Enver's mind, and the Soviet treaty with Kemal no doubt decided him to change his allegiance.

In the fall of 1921 the Soviet government wished to exploit Enver's popularity among Muslims to send him to Turkestan to help fight the Basmachis. Experience had shown that much success could be achieved by employing one-time Turkish officers to win the sympathies of natives for the Soviet cause.[15]

Olaf Caroe says, "Enver's aim, as announced, was the same as that which Jemal had failed to reach—alliance with Bolshevism in the fight for Islamic ideals against the so-called imperialism."[16] Aghabekov in his memoirs claims that he was sent to Bukhara in 1922 to capture Enver Pasha about whom he writes "Enver Pasha. . . . by an agreement with Lenin after his first Congress of the peoples of the East at Baku was to go to Turkestan to pacify these bands (i.e. the Basmachis), to unite them in one group and, under the slogan of the liberation of the peoples of the East, to advance through Afghanistan to India. . . ."[17] He asked Lenin to give him the opportunity of rousing the peoples of Turkestan who were kindred of the Turks and lead them through Afghanistan to India. Lenin agreed. "Each was pursuing his own aim. Enver hoped by organising the movement to alarm the

allies and to prevent the division of Turkey. Lenin supposed that a rising of Eastern people would widen the sphere of Bolshevik influence and undermine the power of Britain. Enver did succeed in uniting the Basmachi but he directed this army against the Bolsheviks, not the British colonial regime."[18]

It is still a debatable point whether Enver Pasha was in fact sent to Central Asia by the Soviet government to combat the Basmachis. Writers like Zeki Velidi Toghan, Aghabekov and Castagne* affirm that he was sent for the very purpose.

On July 30, 1921 at a time when the Greek offensive toward Ankara was in full swing, Enver proceeded from Moscow to Batumi, where a Secret Enverist Conference had been called for an uprising against the Kemalist Government. The Bolsheviks, not aware of Enver's real objective and machinations, did not interfere with his freedom of movement. However, "when a protest came from Kemal, directing the Soviet government's attention to the secret conference in Batumi, a close watch over Enver was instituted, and when, shortly after the conference, Enver tried to escape to Turkey, he was gently intercepted and detained by the Soviet authorities."[19] Enver undermind all this and did not even appear angry. He would like to go to Transcaspia to meet Jemal Pasha, who was returning from Kabul and then to Bukhara for a rest or perhaps for hunting trip. His bland manner and his apparent, approved of their handling of the national minority problem, deceived the authorities, and he was permitted to follow his heart's desire.

In October 1921, Enver accompained by Kushdjubashizade Haji Sami of the former special organisation and others

*Joseph Castagne the author of Les Basmatchis. Paris, 1925.

arrived in Bukhara via Ashkabad and Merv apparently "on a Mission of Peace" to the Basmachis. Shortly after his arrival Enver announced in Bukharan National Union to assist in freeing the Bukharan emirate from the Russians. He also intended to "mobilize eastern Turkish resistance, particularly the Basmachi's against the Soviets, and to set up an independent state in Central Asia."[20] At first the National Union leaders strenously endeavoured to dissuade him, pointing to the famine conditions still ruling, but at heart swayed by their belief that the time was inopportune for anything but conspiratorial measures.

In Bukhara Enver learned of the situation in Eastern Bukhara and held discussions with nationalist leaders. Zeki-Velidi Toghan reports his first meeting with him at which Enver discussed his plans for uniting the Basmachis and the Nationalists. Toghan attempted to dissuade him arguing that Russian's were now in position to concentrate all their Military strength in Turkestan, that the country was suffering an acute famine, that the Ferghana Basmachis had been much weakaned,[21] and that no understanding had yet been reached between the Amir and his supporters and the *Jadids.* Toghan urged Enver to go to Afghanistan where his services would be more valuable, while Haji Sami (a Turkish officer who accompanied Enver) urged him to join the Basmachis.[22]

Enver was undecided for somedays but his cold reception by Yurinev* decided his course of action. It did not take him long to perceive that he could achieve greater glory by joining the native dissidents than by continuing his ambivalent and uncertain role as communist admirer. He soon engaged in efforts to mobilize various groups and factions of rebels into common resistance against Soviet rule. The major political groupings that he encountered in

*The Soviet representative in Bukhara.

Central Asia were, i) the 'Young Bukharan' party under Osman-Khoja, which in revolution with Soviet support in September, 1920 had deposed the Amir of Bukhara, ii) the Khivan Basmachis were led by Junaid Khan, iii) those of Samarkand district by Akhil Bek, Karakul Bek, and several other Kurbashis, chieftain named Hamdan ruled the district around Khodzhent, iv) the Ferghana Basmachis, v) Amir and his chief lieutenant, Ibrahim Bek, claimed full authority in Eastern Bukhara.

Basmach units of different ethnic origin were at times as busy warring with each other as they were fighting the communists. "Especially bitter was the hostility between the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks, and between the Turkmens and Uzbeks."[23]

Zeki Velidi Toghan and Muhiyiddin (Enver's aide) have given a moving description of Enver's last night in Bukhara, sitting cross-legged on the floor in his uncomfortable Turkish uniform, and making his decision as a *Mujahid*,* with tears in his eyes feeling he was in the cradle of the Turks (Turkish race). saying :—

"I have decided I must go to eastern Bukhara. If we succeed we shall be *ghazis*,** otherwise we fall *shaheeds* (Martyrs) on the battle field. We must fight for Turkestan. Did we fear death ordained by fate, and choose the life of a dog, we should merit the curse of our ancestors and our descendants. But if we can bear to die for freedom, we shall have ensured the freedom and happiness of those who follow us."[24] Muhiyiddin recalls that Enver dreamed of creating a Turkic Kingdom in Turkestan.[25]

Next morning (early in November 1921) Enver rode out of the city of Bukhara with party of twenty four closest

*Islamic equivalent of a Crusader.

**Victors for the faith.

adherent ostensibly on hunting expdition.[26] Enver made his way to Eastern Bukhara, together with Khasanov* to the remote Kurghan-Tepe (south-west of Dushanbe) Bekdom, where he joined the powerful Basmachi Chieftain Daniar Bek and then travelled through Karshi to Termes where he was joined by Osman Kharvuash, head of the Shirbad militia, with about fifty men. Enver forces grew to about 100 men.

Khalil, the deputy chief of police in Bukhara, went in advance to Dushanbe to warn Ali Riza (interior minister) and Osman Khoja of Enver's approach. In the sudden arrival of Enver, Osman-Khoja saw the hand of the fate, as it was So he entered into a secret agreement with Enver Pasha because the Bukharan Revolutionary Government itself showed lack of uniformity in its political conduct in its relation with Moscow.** Osman Khoja found himself in opposition to the policy of Moscow. With him also took stand Abdul Hamid, the war Commissar of Bukhara, and many other noted representatives of the local Soviet Power.[27] Osman, at the head of six hundred men, deserted the revolution and joined Enver Pasha. The "Allies" issued a proclamation to the people wherein they accused the Bolsheviks of nationalizing women, destroying religion and similar horrendous crimes. The concluding paragraph was an almost hysterical call to the "Faithful" to "standguard over Islam."[28]

*Khasanov was a Bolshevik war Commissar but suddenly turned renegade with arrival of Enver Pasha.

**After the capture of Bukhara by the Soviet troops, the treasures and wealth of the Bukharan Exchequer were exported to Moscow as "a gift from the grateful Bukharan people". This alone was enough to cool down the Young Bukharan's who had been brought to power by the Bolsheviks.

Joshua Kunitz says that "Enver Pasha's kinship with the Turkish Caliph, a personage holy in the eyes of every good Muslim, his sympathy with the Afghan Pan-Islamists, and the cordial reception accorded to him by the Bukharan intelligentsia, enabled the reactionary clergy to focus popular attention on him as a "Savior of Islam" a leader of the "Muslim war of liberation."[29]

At Dzhilikul, Enver Pasha met the Basmachi leader Toghay Sary who commanded some 2,000 men and who warned him not to make contact with Ibrahim Bek Lokai the most staunchly loyal to the deposed Amir. Mir Said Alim in his autobiography writes "During the siege* of *Wilait* Hissar*, Enver Pasha *Ghazi* accompanied by other 27 Turks appeared from Eastern Bukhara. When they reached near the *Mujahiden* army in Korghan*** area, *Mullah* Ibrahim Bek was informed about their arrival. He also informed Said Alim."[30]

Olaf Caroe observes that "Ibrahim . . . held Enver captive as the man who had broken the power of the Ottoman Sultan and started the Young Turks** Movement."[31]

Similarly Central Asian Review and Encyclopaedia of Islam reports that Ibrahim interned Enver and his men for six weeks (Ist December 1921 to January 1922) and were released through the intervention of another Basmachi group Ishan Sultan.[32] Richard Pipes gives another version, saying that the Basmachis at first received Enver coolly, fearing a communist snare which accompanied him.[33] However, Mir

*Hissar Fort was besieged by Ibrahim Bek prior to Enver's arrival.

***Korghan, south-west of Dushanbe.

**Ibrahim Bek disapproved of Young Turks revolutionaries as much as he did of Young Bukharans.

Said Alim is silent about the differences of Ibrahim Bek and Enver Pasha, saying:

"According to my (Amir) *Firman* (notification) *Mullah* Mohammad Ibrahim Bek mustered up his armies, received Enver Pasha with respect and dignity, summoned him and asked about his purpose. Enver Pasha disclosed his desire to serve the Muslim *Ummah* (Muslim community), and started his services alongwith Ibrahim Bek. Meanwhile the said *Mullah* Ibrahim Bek attacked the *Wilait* Hissar and succeeded, whence he got a lot of weapons and treasury. Declaring that place his centre he proceeded towards the Upper Sherabad Qarshy, and apprised me of his conditions in detail."[34]

Mir Said Alim selected *Mullah* Abdul Qahar (Aide-de-camp of the Amir) as Basmachi Chief. He picked up for himself some persons from every group to serve "Bukharan devoties" and at the same time the Amir issued a *Firman* (Notification) that *Mullah* Abdul Qahar was advancing with his permission. *Mullah* Abdul Qahar set out towards Eastern Bukhara and met Ibrahim Bek, then he proceeded to Bukhara via Ajzwan in order to meet volunteers' group.

Meanwhile Haji Sami had travelled to Dushanbe, enlisted Osman Khoja and Ali Riza and staged a coup against the Russians. The troops at Dushanbe, (as already mentioned in the previous pages) consisted of 600 Uzbeks commanded by Ali Riza, and a small number of Russians. Instead helped by Ibrahim Bek, the Russians, however, offered stubborn resistance. On 21 December Ali Riza was forced to surrender the town and hotly pursued by the Russians and Ibrahim Bek's Lokais.* He fled with Haji Sami and

*As earlier stated that Ibrahim Bek was Conservative (*Qadimist*) and was against Young Bukharan *Jadidist* (Modernists).

Osman Khoja** to Afghanistan. Ibrahim Bek allowed Enver Pasha to join Ishan Sultan at Gissar. Establishing himself in the mountains region of Bukhara, he began to gather around himself some of the independent chieftains operating in that area.

At the end of January 1922 with small force of 2000 poorly armed Tajiks Enver advanced on Dushanbe. At the first attack Enver captured 120 rifles and two machine guns. He besieged the town and by 8th February the Russian had lost 100 men and 88 had deserted to Enver. On 14th February the town was surrendered and Enver persued the Russians to Mirtybe. Later in February, warned by an impending Russian attack, he withdrew to Kafirnigan. With the capture of Dushanbe his prestige heightened, so more and more Basmachi leaders joined his force. Early in March Kurshirmat sent his brother Ruzmekhmet (Ruz Mohammad) to join Enver Pasha.

In April, 1922, Afghan Volunteers, recruited by Haji Sami and Osman Khoja in Kabul, joined Enver bringing arms and money Mayskiy says "Enver was supported by certain representatives* of the Afghan government and in particular by the Afghan Ambassador in Bukhara. When it was confirmed that the latter had a part in conspiracy against the Bukharan government he was expelled from the Bukharan republic.."[35]

** According to Olaf Caroe, Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. (Soviet Empire, The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. New York 1967. P. 243,) But perhaps he is now dead.

*One representative of Afghan Government was Mohammd Gul Khan Mohmand (who was well versed in Turkish language) and the other was Ata Mohammad Khan Toky (well aware of Central Asian Geography) whose father was with Amir Abdur-Rehman Khan during his exile in Tashkent. (Oral interview with Shams-ud-Din Mujroh Ex-Minister and Ex-Ambassador of Afghanistan in Egypt during Zahir Shah's regime. Peshawar, January 4, 1981)

According to William Zeild. K. Coates and I. M. Reysner "Enver had 100 Afghan Volunteers in his force,[36] and established contact with the Pathan tribes of the North West Frontier Province, with the object of using Afghanistan as a base of operations for a revolutionary movement in India.[37] Enver had received the Afghan title of *Sardar* at the beginning of 1921 and was so much popular that at one conference of Indian Muslims the question arose as to who was in fact to command the Indian army once India won her independence, the almost unanimous answer was heard: of course Enver Pasha."[38]

In the middle of April at meeting of rebel leaders at Kafirnigan Enver was declared to be their political and military leader and he took the title of "Commander of the Muslim and Bukharan Armies". He appealed to the chauvinism of the upper classes and religious fanaticism of the masses by urging the principle of 'Central Asia for the Central Asians' and by evoking visions of "A Great Central Asian Muslim state". As against the Communist slogan: Workers of the World Unite" Enver ingeniously coined the analogous slogan: "Muslims of the World Unite."[39]

At the end of April Enver sent emissaries to other parts of Turkestan to unite the resistance movement. He appealed to Turkmen leader Junaid Khan who was still showing strong resistance in the Karakum desert. Ali Riza was sent to make contact with Turkmen and to win support there.

Ibrahim Bek came in May to make his apologies, but he still mistrusted Enver and took no part in the fighting. Optimism grew among the Basmachis. By May Enver's troops had grown to 7000. He was joined by the former President of Khokand government, Adil Dzhan (Adil Jhan) by 70 years old Haji Hakim who had been formerly in the service

of Yakub Beg*** at Kashghar, by the Azerbaijani scholar and reformist, Akhund Yusuf Talibzad and most significant of all, by the Bukharan minister of war Abdul Hamid Arifov. In a message to T. Akchurin, who then served in Baisun as the representative of the Soviet Government of Bukhara, Enver Pasha demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Red Army. The message, signed by "Enver the Vice Caliph,*" by Ibrahim Bek and two other Basmachi leaders, read as follow: "To the representative of the Bolsheviks in the city Baisun.** We, the representatives of the peoples inhabiting the territory of the real independent Bukhara, declare to you, that after crossing the Baisun river, we have reached a unanimous decision to keep up our fight untill we have forced you to evacuate our country. . . We hesitate to spill human blood. But we deem it our sacred duty to fight those who have broken into our country against the wishes of our people. We shall be happy to shed our own blood and to die as martyrs fighting for our cause."[40] When no reply received to Enver of his message to T. Akchurin, he advanced on Baisun with an army of several thousand men, but despite numerous charges he could not capture it. Meanwhile the Basmachis around Samarkand who worked closely with the National Union gained control of most of the country side. But Enver does not seem to have had much success in uniting them with his own forces. He was merely another war lord, ruling a small territory and engaging in fights with neighbouring Chiefs. Of the 16000 rebels active in Eastern Bukhara no more than 3000 owed him allegiance.[41] The other written

***Yakub Beg was (1867-1877) ruler of Sinkiang or Kashgheria.

*Enver actually was a son in law of the Caliph, having married prior to World War I the daughter of the Sultan, who was recognized as Caliph by the Sunni Muslims.

**Baisun, the fortress which commanded the approaches to western Bukhara.

Basmachi document sent as a reply to the representative of the Bukharan Government, by three important Basmachi leaders, Karry Abdullah, Nurkul Batyr and Danial-Bek Ollik Bashi, one of whom had at one time been a prominent *Jadidi* and a valiant fighter against the Amir's regime: "..... for a mere piece of bread you have sold out to the cursed Russians your religion, your faith, your conscience.... One of the old Bukharan revolutionists, the hero Osman Khoja, despite his having been President of the Bukharan Republic, declared open war against the Russian consul and you. He could not bear the yoke..... We side by side with the true sons of our sweet father-land, will fight against you, communists, for independence and prosperity. We are not brigands, but true and humble servants of your nation. . . . if you wish to be at one with the soldiers of Islam, chase the Russians out of our sweet land. Then we shall work together for the glory of our father land. This is our only wish."[42]

In March 1922 Basmachis besieged Bukhara. This attack is frequently ascribed to Enver but in fact he seems to have had no part in it. "On 19th May he sent an ultimatum to the Soviet government through his friend Nariman Narimanov***, in which he demanded that all Russian forces and all Soviet institutions should be removed from Turkestan, Khiva and Bukhara within the fifteen days of the receipt of the ultimatum,[43] offering in return to assist the communist in their Middle Eastern activities.

In May 1922 the Basmachis were so strong around Samarkand that when S. Eliava* and Ordzhonikidze** visited

***Chairman of the Government of Soviet Azerbaijan.

*Shalva Eliava was an authoritative Bolshevik and erstwhile member of the Turkestan commission.

**G.K. Ordzhonikidze was chairman of the party's Caucasian Bureau and ruthless conqueror of Transcaucasia.

Ulugh Bek's* observatory they could do so only under a strong guard.

In April 1922, a ten-men Soviet peace delegation arrived in Baisun to negotiate a truce. But Enver's reply was uncompromising: "Peace is only acceptable after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkestan soil. The freedom fighters, whose commander I am, have sworn to fight for independence and freedom untill their last breath."[44] Zeki Validi Toghan wrote to Enver urging him to accept the peace offer as he had news from Moscow that the Soviet Government intended to send 100,000 men to Turkestan if the offer was rejected.[45]

In July 1922, Enver Pasha organised various groups of Basmachis under the command of following chiefs:

1. Asil Bek of Nayman, a commander of Samarkand and Zarafashan with 1300 fighters. Kari Kamil and Acil-Toksaba were also active chiefs in this area.
2. Karakul Bek of Kurghan with 1500 volunteers.
3. Behram, a Tajik, had 100 follower. Magyan Farab and Halim Kul had 50 fighters with them. Other chiefs in Samarkand were, Hemrah Kul Bek, Abdul Halim Kari Mohammad and Esad.
4. Akbar Bek Saray had 100 volunteers.
5. Haji Abdul Kadir of Urgut was supporter of Bolsheviks, but in April 1922 with one of his friend Sukru entered into one of the forts in Urgut and made way with weapons and became Basmachi.

*Ulugh Bek (1409-1449) was an eminent Central Asian ruler and scholar, who built an observatory in Samarkand and made a Catalogue of stars which was considerably more accurate than European Catalogues compiled a century after his death.

6. Mamur Niyazi Bek and Turab Bek, former of Yoldaslar tribe and latter of Beyler tribe. Both were educated and learned chiefs having 200 supporters.

7. *Mullah* Hemrah Kul of Jazakli had the honour of first Basmachi. He had 50 followers.

8. Hamid Bek, Abdul Majeed, Syed Ahmad Khan and Esrar Khan were all the chiefs of Macha tribe. Yusuf Bek and Nusrut Bek were the chief commanders of Enver Pasha.

9. Khalbutan was another Basmachi chief with 500 volunteers.

Soviet Government did not reply Enver's ultimatum, but massed its troops for an attack. Intrigues started between the Russians and the Amir's followers. Former officials of the Amir were taken into service of the Young Bukharan Government and made contact with emirist Basmachis and thus learned of the rebels movements. The Amir's supporters started to attack the Basmachis who were of more liberal out look. Prominent Basmachi chief Abdul Kahar's band attacked and murdered twelve Bashkir officers who had come to join the Samarkand Basmachi. Famous emirist, Evliyakul Toksaba attacked Jzhebbar Bek and then deserted to the Russians with 400 men.[46] Another chief Ishan Sultan attacked and disarmed the forces of Fuzayl Makhdum, a staunch supporter of Enver Pasha, in Karategin.

Relations between the headquarters of Enver Pasha located near Dushanbe, and those of Ibrahim Bek, situated among the Lokai (a Turkic group, settled among the Iranian Tajiks), came near the breaking point.[47] Ibrahim Bek and his Lokais continued to harry, and in July 1922 Enver was forced to send Dauletmend with a strong force against them.[48] Enver Pasha was in close contact with the Amir

and urged him to use his influence among his followers, but whether from inability or from disinclination the Amir did nothing.

Joshua-Kunitz is of the opinion that "Enver's phenomenal success in unifying the Basmachi forces began to overthrow the achievements of Ibrahim Bek. This made Ibrahim Bek feel rather resentful. Moreover, Enver's strength was such that he had become the virtual ruler of Eastern Bukhara. This naturally made the Amir feel rather uneasy. . . . Ibrahim Bek kept on complaining to the Amir about his rival, while the Amir distrusting yet fearing Enver, pursued a double faced policy. On the one hand in his official communications to Enver he was ordering Ibrahim's unqualified submission to the "Commander-in-Chief", on the other, he was issuing secret orders to Ibrahim to keep close watch over Enver Pasha's activities and to hinder him from gaining excessive power. Continuous friction between the two leaders finally resulted in an open clash. At one time Enver seized Ibrahim and kept him under arrest for five day."[49]

In mid June 1922 the Red Army launched a decisive counter offensive, captured Nurata, a strong hold of the Samarkand Basmachis, and in July advanced into East by the seizure of Denau, Dushanbe, Kurghan Tube, Kulab and Boldzhuan. Enver with his depleted forces retreated east. In July the Afghan volunteers who were with him were ordered back to their homeland, as a result of rappro chement between Moscow and Kabul.[50] On 4th August Enver, with small band of his most devoted followers was celebrating the feast of sacrifice at a village near Boldzhuan and despatched last letter to his wife, writting: ". . . . . Believe me, I have not left you and motherland to collect wealth or to gain kingship (as my enemies have propagated). . . .I am here far away from you to fulfil the duty which Allah has bestowed

upon me. It is a sacred duty of every Muslim to wage *Jehad* (holy war), to liberate the oppressed from the oppressor. . . . I am thankful to Allah that I am fulfiling this duty of mine not theoritically but practically. . . . Please be particular in your prayer and should not pray to God for my safety because it will be selfishness. . ."[51]

Warning came that Russian force of 300 men was approaching a hill above Bolzhuan. Without waiting for the rest of his soldiers to collect, Enver immediately left his companions and rode against the enemy with 25 men, reaching the top of the hill at the same moment as the Russians mounted it on the other side. Taking advantage of surprise, he succeeded in disarming a body of 75 strong, and again advanced with drawn sword against the remainder, thrown into confusion by this onslaught. With him were fivemen only, the Turk Cherkes Hussain, the Kazanli Kerim, Enver's Afghan groom, the Cossack Rayev and the Kazak Ishmurad. The other soldiers under Dauletmand Bek were now coming on the scene, but fortune was against a reckless man, as it had been earlier on the Caucasian front by Sarikamish.* [52] After furious hand to hand fighting, suddenly Russian soldier with machine-gun bullet fired from a rock above the gorge (where the fighting took place) and shot Enver through his heart.[53] Dauletmand Bek also was killed while coming to his rescue. Ibrahim Bek survived and fled with his follower to the wild Sarsariak mountains across the river Vakhsh. When the battle was over, Enver's body, riddled with bullets, was found lying under his wounded horse.** Both Enver and Dauletmand Bek were buried at Ceken (Cheken) by their men on the following day.

*The name of Lake.

**His personal possessions can now be seen in the Military Museum at Tashkent.

According to Olaf Caroe twenty thousand** of the tribesmen around gathered weeping on Enver's funeral, many kissed the dead man's hands and feet, and took hairs from his beard in memory.[54] A lament ran through the Muslim World. His death was celebrated in famous songs and poems of the Uzbeks. Osman Khoja mourned Enver's death with following words:

> It is our misfortune that an arrow of death pierced his chest.
> With utmost sincerity of purpose he gave away his life on the 10th of Zilhaja.

Toghan condemns Enver for posing as a redeemer with a mission beyond his strength to unite the resistance movement. But the contemplation of a warrior who of his own will has made final sacrifice moves the historian beyond measure, and he ends by acclaiming him as the "hero of an epic which will resound so long as Turks are Turks." He calls him a "great idealist, who ignored daily life and facts."[56]

Enver appears indeed in the story as a sort of young pretender, a herd for Turkestan to acclaim as was Shamil* for the caucasus, the embodied Pattern in these latter days of Turkish heroism and ideals. Among the tribes support for Enver came from the recognition that he stood for that ancient ideal of Turkish chivalry, and the intellectuals believed in him because, with all this, he had proved himself an innovator.[57] Zeki Veldi Toghan proceeds: "Enver was before his time. yet his death sowed a seed. I said to him at Bukhara

**According to some sources fifteen thousand people gathered at Enver's funeral.

*Imam Shamil (1798-1817) leader of Muslim mountaneers of Dagestan and the chechen country, whose fierce resistance delayed Russia's conquest of the Caucasus for 25 years.

'we are not ready for it yet, Enver replied: 'And it will be some time before you are ready for it.' And he was right. Many years have now gone by since we first laid the charge that is to explode when Russia's internal and external situation becomes difficult, and we see it is not yet ready to go off. If Enver Pasha had taken no part in developments in Turkestan the rising would have faded without memory; he gave it a new form, a new significance."[58] Toghan further says, "Nor did he (Enver) dream of pan-Islamism or even of Pan-Turkism. He considered indeed that the interests of the Turks in Western and Central Aisa were identical, and that it was the duty of clear thinking man to make known in Turkestan the reality of such interests. But he said to me at Bukhara: 'Osmanli will never become the common language of Turkestan: a native Chaghatai must be invented. This has become obvious to me since, having been in Russia, I have come to Turkestan.' He himself never expected his movement at that time to succeed, so he adopted the watchword-victory or death in the field. By his death on Turkestan soil he offered the supreme sacrifice for that country and for the history of the Turks."[59]

A Turkish historian of today has compared Enver with the Seljuk Kilich Arslan,* who smote the Crusaders. To such men Enver ranks among the Deli Dumrul – the epic heroes of the Turks.

Thus it can be said that officially Enver came as a friend of the Soviets and as enemy of Great-Britain, who was fighting the communists and who had destroyed the

*Kilich (Qilich) Arslan (1092-1107) was Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia who confronted with the first Crusade and defeated Crusader bands at Nicaea (1096). He succeeded in capturing Mosul but was defeated by the forces of his kinsman of Aleppo and drowned in the Khabur (Habor) river (1107).

Turkish empire. Unofficially, he planned the re-establishment of the kingdom of Timur and saw himself the ruler of a realm embracing Chinese Turkestan, Russian Turkestan, Kazakhistan and Afghanistan. Like Alexander the Great, he contemplated marching through the Khyber Pass into India and striking a mortal blow at the British empire. It is difficult to determine which played a larger part in his failure: his unwise handling of the Amir, or the struggle between the Conservatives (*Qadimists*) represented by the Amir, and the progressive *Jadidists,* of which he had become an unwitting victom.

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1. With Turkey's defeat at the end of 1918, Jemal Pasha gravitated towards the Bolsheviks with the hope of taking revenge from Britain. He had made great effort to allay the Afghans distrust of Russia and to convince them that Russia could help Pan-Islamic cause in the East. He set up an "Islamic Revolutionary League", the professed object of which was to free India from British rule. At the sametime, he undertook to train an elite corps of the Afghan Army for King Amannullah. He also established contact with the forntier tribes, still smouldering after the third Anglo-Afghan war, and met a group of Wazir *Maliks* in Kabul in January, 1921. He subsequently visited the tribal area secretly and may have supplied a limited number of arms used in the fighting in Waziristan in 1921-22. According to British source he had been given Rs. 1 million by the Bolsheviks for this purpose (*Parliamentary papers*, 1927) Cmd, 2895 (Russia No. 3, PP. 10-11) J.W. Spain, *The Pathan Border Land,* Hague 1963. P. 253 R. Pipes in his book *"The formation of the Soviet Union (Communism and Nationalism) 1917-1923.* Cambridge 1954 P. 257 says "that Bolsheviks sent Jemal probably to prevail on the Afghan authorities to stop the Amir of Bukhara and other Turkestani refugees from using that country as a supply base for the Basmachis."
2. Charles Warrn Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets the Turks of the world and their political objectives. New York 1957. P. 165.
3. Even in 1911 to 1912 the Germans established a special Pan-Islamic Centre and Enver Pasha was one of the leaders of this Centre. ("I have found no evidence that this is true" says Hostler op.cit. P. 119) Enver

occupied at that time the post of Military Attache in Berlin. The German Pan-Islamist Centre issued publications and organized a vast net of agents in Turkey, Iran and the Muslim areas in Russia.

4. Edward All-Worth, *Central Asia. A century of Russian rule.* New York 1967. P. 252. See also, The *Encyclopaeda of Islam.* New edition Vol. H, London 1965 P. 700.
5. Enver was confident that the Soviets would support nationalist movements in Turkey and other border states. To this end he asked (in October 1920 in Berlin) Khalil to secure approval from the Soviet Foreign Office for a plan whereby two cavalry divisions, to be formed among Ottoman war prisoners and Muslim residents of the Caucasian region, would under Enver's command, join the Anatolian resistance movement. Enver himself, meanwhile was trying to purchase arms in Berlin.
6. Hostler, O.Cit. P. 154.
7. J.W. Spain, *The Pathan Border land.* The Huge 1963. P. 249, quotes *Pervyi Sied Narodov Vostoka,* Baku, 1-8 Sentiabria 1920 g. Stenograficheskie Otchety (The first congress of the peoples of the East, Baku, September 1-8, 1920, stenographic report) Moscow: n.p., 1920, extracted in Eudin and North Op.Cit. P.167.
8. Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia,* Cambridge 1960. P. 250.
9. Richard Pipes, *The formation of the Soviet Union (Communism and Nationalism) 1917-1927.* Cambridge 1954, P. 256-7. See also Hostler, Op.cit. P. 154.
10. Joshua Kunitz, *Dawn over Samarkand Rebirth of Central Asia.* Calcutta, India 1943, P. 130.
11. Mustafa Chokaev's "The Basmaji movement in Turkistan" *Asiatic Review,* Vol. 24, London 1928, P. 285.

12. Ibid. P. 286.
13. Ibid. P. 286.
14. Kunitz, Op.Cit. P. 130.
15. D. Soloveichik, *'Revoliutsionnaia Bukhara,' Novyi Vostok,* No. 2 (1922) P. 277 (as quoted in Pipes Op.Cit. P. 257).
16. Olaf Caroe, *Soviet-Empire the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism.* London 1953. P. 123.
17. Georges Agabekov was a member of the O.G.P.U. (obe "edinennoe Gosudarstvennove Politicheskoe Upravelie) (Unified State Political Administration) who defected to the West in 1929. His memoirs appeared in Berlin 1930, *O.G.P.U. The Russian Secret Terror.* New York 1931. P. 16. See also *Central Asian Reivew.* Central Asian Research Centre 66 Kings Road. London 1956, Vol. IV P. 198.
18. Ibid. P. 16
19. Kunitz, O.Cit. P. 131.
20. George Vernadsky. *A History of Russia,* Vol. III: the Mongols and Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951, P. 302. See also Caroe, Op.Cit. P. 123.
21. *Central Asian Review* (A quarterly review of cultural developments in six Muslim Republics of the Soviet Union) Vol. VII. Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group. 1959. No. 3 P. 243.
22. Ibid. P. 243.
23. Pipes, Op. Cit. P. 257.
24. Ahmad Zeki Velidi Toghan, *Bugunku Turkili Vey akin Tarihi* (Modern Turkistan and its current History), Istanbul: 1942-7, P. 437 quoted in Caroe Op.Cit. P.114.
25. *Central Asian Review,* Op.Cit, P. 243.
26. Caroe, Op.Cit. P. 124 Mention 24 Companions of Enver, while in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* Vol. II,

New edition., London 1965. P. 700, these figures are 30 and in *Central Asian Reivew,* Op.Cit. P. 243 only 25.

27. Chokaev, Op.Cit. P. 286.
28. Kunitz, Op.Cit. P. 131-2.
29. Ibid. P. 132.
30. Mir Said Alim Jan, *Hizen-ul-Malul Bukhara.* Urdu Translation by Qaddus Sahbi, *Bukhara Kaa Jumhori Inqilab* (Democratic Revolution of Bukhara) Haider Abad Deccan 1944 PP. 36-37.
31. Caroe, Op.Cit. P. 124.
32. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam.* New edition Vol: II, London 1965, P. 701. See also *Central Asian Review* Op.Cit.,P. 244.
33. Pipes, Op.Cit. P. 250.
34. Said Alim, Op.Cit, P. 37.
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*CHAPTER V*

## DISINTEGRATION OF BASMACHI MOVEMENT

**What dust will rise from one horseman?**
*(Pashtu Proverb)*

Basmachism did not perish with Enver Pasha, but with his death the political backbone of the movement was broken, and uneasy coalition of liberal *jadidists,* Conservative Muslim leaders, and independent mountainous tribesmen, which the magic of Enver's name had inspired, disintegrated. Hopeless and discouraged Basmachi bands waged guerrilla warfare and underground activities against Bolsheviks.

A "National Liberation Movement" is an armed political struggle, taking the form of a guerrilla war because of disunity and initial military weakness of the insurgents. According to Mao Tse-Tung, "guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish, if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation,"[1] such was the case of Basmachis who lacked not only military strength but also the sense of organisation and unity.

From the autumn of 1922 Soviet troops poured into the Basmachi areas. After a portion of the government had been formed under Faizullah Khoja-Oghli (Khojaev) with

Abdul Rauf Fitrat* as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Bukhara. These two men, who had stayed in Bukhara to preserve what they could of its independence, sought aid from all sides. Informal discussions with Turkey and Afghanistan led to no positive results, and the Turkestani leaders remained all alone against the assaults that they soon had to face.

Famine swept through Central Asia again in 1922 and 1923. Epidemics of typhus and malaria raged through Ferghana, wiping out entire villages and driving the survivors to flight. Soviet investigators reported in the winter of 1923 that 400,000 people, nearly half of the population of the region, were starving and that the number of famine victoms was increasing.[2]

The Bolsheviks took advantage of the situation and in the winter of 1923 the Regional Commission to combat Famine distributed 13,633 short tons of wheat, 3,250 tons of rice, and 2000,000 rubles (1923 value). Prior to this, Turkestan had received no help. Even the spontaneous shift from cotton to food crops did nothing to relieve the crisis. Regardless of its own urgent needs, Central Asia was compelled to supply the Central Provinces of the R.S.F.S.R.** with grain during the famine years.[3]

In Ferghana, the Red forces cordoned the towns and prevented contact between country-side and towns. Corn and food grains were imported to the towns, but the Basmachis and the poor peasants in the country-side suffered acute famine. The Soviet authorities offered the peasants corn on condition that they used it only for their own food and that they planted cotton. The peasants agreed because

*Abdul Rauf Fitrat (1886-1938) was an Uzbek Nationalist, writer and Prominent *Jadidist* scholar.

**R.S.F.S.R, Rossiiskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Federativnaya Sovetskaya Respublika (Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic).

of hunger. The Basmachis were deprived of their food supplies and had to extort corn by force from the peasantry. With this new Soviet method Basmachis lost their strongest weapon, the support of the local population and the movement deteriorated into banditry.

In such confusion deposed Amir Said Alim began to look around for some one of equal stature to take charge of the Basmachis. His choice finally fell on Haji Sami Bey, better known as Salim Pasha.* He was elected commander-in-chief in East Bukhara, and started a desperate campaign for unity among his much depleted forces.

Haji Sami had neither the magnetic personality, nor the prestige, nor the military talents of his predecessor. He sent emissaries to Ishan Sultan, who had withdrawn to the Darvaz mountains and on his refusing to fight, captured him and put him to death.[4]

The Basmachi Chieftains, especially Ibrahim Bek, refused to accept Haji Sami as their commander-in-chief. His military plans were ignored, his orders disobeyed.[5] So Haji Sami took Ibrahim Bek prisoner and compelled him to serve the cause, and found a way to make the intellectuals and the tribal fighters join together in the campaign.[6] Actually Ibrahim Bek had been attacked by the Russians after Enver's death, so ultimately he agreed to join Haji Sami. Kurshirmat joined Haji Sami with his seasoned Ferghana troops, which were the nucleus of Sami's small force.

The Red forces forced Basmachis even further east and north into the mountains and inspite of vigorous partisan action could make no impression on the over-whelming mass of the Soviet army. Kurshirmat defeated and left for Afghanistan at the end of 1922.

*One of Eever Pasha's friends and colleagues.

Hard pressed by the Red forces Sami Bey escaped toward river Panj. There on the steep shore of the turbulent Panj, addressing a vast crowd of Tajik peasants-men, women and children gathered from the surrounding villages, Salim Pasha (Sami Bey), mounted on his beautiful white horse, delivered the following impassioned message:

"Oh, brave and good Tajik People. Enver Pasha and I were the messengers of Allah. You know not why you have lost your pious Amir. Nor do you know why we were the victors before, and are the vanquished spirit have appeared in your midst, man who submit not to authority, man who attack the very foundation of the holy law. Angered with you, Allah has taken from you with a host of infidel *jadids* and Bolsheviks. We were victorious when you obeyed our call and followed the ways of Islam. We are being beaten, because your sons are being lured away by those evil people who scoff at our holy *shariat** and at ancient right of property. I am going now to join Enver, who is among the faithful in heaven, surrounded by houris and ineffable pleasures. I am going there. And if you took wish to join us in heaven, bridle your sons, respect the holy law, fight for the *Shariat* against the Bolsheviks, the *jadids,* the infidels."[7]

On concluding his speech, Haji Sami spurred his white hourse and hurled himself into the abyss below, into the roaring, gray waters of the Panj. Joshua Kunitz says, "for a moment his head appeared above the water, and then it was gone."[8]

Haji Sami suffered a crushing defeat in May, 1923 badly wounded and escaped on 23rd June to Afghanistan.

*Muslim canonic and common law.

Zeki Velidi Toghan reproached him, saying "he had been too confident when Enver was still alive, and had now lost heart. The answer was full of dignity: "My heart is with me, but I am wounded and cannot ride"[9] Toghan who was fighting with Akhil Bek's group, left them to escape to Europe at the end of 1922.[10] After much hard fighting Akhil Bek was killed in May 1923. Other Basmachis from this area were either crushed or deprived of a commander, the Basmachi splintered into small local groups.

In July 1923 the Red Army pushed in to Karategin and on 17th captured Garm. From here they mopped up the remnants of the Ferghana Basmachis who had retreated.

The death of Haji Sami and the Red Army's occupation of three important Basmachi strong holds in Matchi, Karategin, and Darvaz, forced the frightened Amir and his chieftains to exert every ounce of energy to consolidate their forces for further resistance and for regaining the confidence of the peasant masses without whose active support no serious struggle against the Bolsheviks was possible.[11] Under the circumstances, the Bolsheviks adopted a liberal policy towards Central Asia.

In March, 1923 the first conference of southern Central Asia's republic's the Turkestan A.S.S.R., Bukharan Peoples Republic and Khwarazm Peoples Republic, was held. It laid down a Common Economic Policy for the participating states and organised to this end a Central Economic Council.

The twelveth Party Congress held in April 1923 again* considered the national question this time from the practical point of view. It characterised three aspects of the dire heritage of Tsarism in the national question: (i) survivals of great power Chauvinism, (ii) economic and cultural inequality of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. and (iii) survivals of nationalism, which in some cases developed into local Chauvinism (as an example the Congress resolution indicated the Uzbek Chauvinism in Bukhara and Khawarazm against the Turkmen and Kirghazes).[12] To fulfill their policy Bolsheviks arrested Sultan Galiev** in April or May 1923 on the order of J.V. Stalin. His case was discussed at a special Conference of representatives of minorities (Fourth Conference with responsible workers) that gathered in Moscow in June 1923. Sultan Galiev's alleged crime was to have formed a conspirational organisation in the North Caucasus and to have sought, with the aid of Muslim and Turkish nationalists, to form a pan-Turanian Eastern International. His movement apparently had sympathizers in Central Asia. He was reportedly in correspondence with Ryskulov, the Kirighiz Communist leader.[13] Stalin in a speech delivered at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the U.S.S.R. on June 10, 1923, spoke about the deviations of Sultan Galiev and his accomplices. This

*In March, 1921, the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered the national question and decided "to help the toiling masses of the non-Russian Peoples to catch up with Central Russia" by developing their Soviet National Statehood, preparing and training their own personnel for the administrative economic and juridical apparatus and promoting culture and education. Especially important was the decision to abolish the actual national inequality" which rested on "historically formed economic inequality."

**Sultan Galiev (Mir Sayyed Sultan Ali Oghlu) (1895-1930) was Tatar Muslim Communist.

was the period when the Bolsheviks were flirting with the national feelings of the non-Russian Peoples, and the words of the then Commisar of Nationalities* are worthy of quotation:

> ". . . . . I see nothing particularly reprehensible in Sultan Galiev's exercises in theory. If Sultan Galiev had confined himself to the ideology of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, it would not have been inspite of the veto laid on it by the resolution of the Tenth Congress of the Party on the national question, and that we might confine our exercises in ideology and in the establishment of contacts with leaders of the Basmachi with Validov (Toghan) and others, it becomes absolutely impossible to justify Basmachi practice on the grounds of an innocent ideology."[14]

Richard Pipes says, "Skrypnyk** present at the conference asserted that Sultan–Galiev's actions were symptoms of a grave disease affecting Communism, a disease caused by the failure of the Communists to carry out their national programme and particularly by their unwillingness or inability to check the growth of Great Russian Chauvinism in the Soviet Party and State apparatus."[15] Soviet critic I. Zenushkina says, "It is clear from this (above) that R. Pipes places opposition within the party on the same level with counter revolutionary movements, moreover, his interpretation of each form of "opposition" does not reflect their true natures."[16] He further says, "the Basmachi movement in

*Among the Commissariats established after the Bolsheviks accession to power was the Peoples commissariat for the Nationalities. It was headed by Stalin and existed untill July, 1923.

**Ukrainian Communist.

Central Asia, like Petlyura's* movement in the Ukraine, was the form taken by the struggle against the revolution waged by the over thrown classes, who sought to make use of national feelings to broaden their social base"[17]

In October, 1923 the Fourth Congress modified the consititution of Khwarazm Republic, depriving "parasite" elements of the right to vote, and a year later, the fifth Congress decided, under Red Army pressure (later described in a highly coloured and perhpas suspect account),[18] to transform the people republic into a Socialist Republic which be integrated in the Soviet federation. Other new measures including the nationalization of *wakf* lands, were brought into to break the power of the beys, clergy and landlords. This is said to have led the bourgeoisie and clergy to turn to their former enemy, Junaid Khan for help and secret preparations for an uprising are alleged to have been made.[19]

In the beginning of January, 1924 the population of Uzbek "rayons**" of Pitnyak, Khazarasp and Khanki, and the Turkmens of Sadyvar sent a delegation to Khiva demanding the abolition of certain taxes, the closing of Soviet schools and the reopenning of the old *Mektebs** and *Medresas*,** and the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from Khawarazm. The behaviour of the delegation was so provocative that some of them were arrested and the rest left Khiva. An open revolt then broke out and the Uzbek rebels were

*S. Petlyura a Ukrainian, self made man and energetic adventurer. Rada or Soviet was under the control of V. Vinnichenko and S. Petlyura from December 1918 untill February, 1919.

**Regions.

*Traditional Muslim elementary schools.

**Traditional Muslim Seminary or College.

soon in control of the Pitnyak-Khazarasp areas and advancing on Khiva. At the same time Junaid Khan's bands, (with whom the rebels are said to have into contact), appeared in the western part of Khwarazm and also advanced on Khiva, and Junaid took charge of the revolt.

According to Nepesov the encirclement of Khiva began on 10 January, 1924 and ten to fifteen thousand people took part in the uprising. Among the Basmachi leaders, he says, were several Russian and Teke White Guard officers as well various *Ishans** and Mullahs who declared Junaid's Basmachis "fighters for the Muslim faith."[20] Kozlovskiy says, "the attack on Khiva came at the end of January by a Basmachi force of 15,00."[21] At that time there were 785 regular troops of the Khwarazm Government scattered in various towns and rayon Centres of the republic and only 200 Red Army men in Khiva itself. About 3,000 men were, therefore, hastily mobilized from party, Komsomol** and trade Union, organisations and also from the European population "who were threatened with death to a man if the town fell."[22]

After Junaid's attempt to storm Khiva failed, he organised a regular siege and Khiva was cut off from rest of the world. Within the town dozens of people were arrested for organising anti-Soviet agitation and unreliable elements

*Ishan-Confessor, preceptor in Muslim religion usually holding no official clerical office.

**Komsomol (league of communist youth) performed two functions. As a quasi-party organisation, patterned structurally and organisationally after the party, it was required to master the teachings of Marxism—Leninism, to assist the party in the execution of its programme and directives, and to train the future cadres from which the party would replenish its ranks. As a mass organisation, its task was the organisation of Soviet youth and the education of the later in the spirit of Communisim and of service to the Soviet regime.

were disarmed, but even with the help they received from Red army and local forces from elsewhere in Khwarazm, Khiva could not last long without help from outside the Republic. This came with the despatch of a Red Army cavalry column from Chardzhour towards the end of January. Covering 90 versts* a day, the column had its first encounter with Junaid's forces near Sadyvar. But the decisive engagement took place near Pitnyak on 29 January where, after 14 hours of bitter fighting, the Basmachis retreated under cover of darkness leaving about 300 dead and many weapons in the battle field. When Junaid heard of this defeat, he lifted the siege of Khiva and consequently Red Army cavalry column entered on 4th February.

During the first half of February various other towns were recaptured, some for the second time. Junaid retreated with 1500-2000 horsemen to the well of Balykly, but was driven from this position after a fierce engagement at the end of February. Pursued by cavalry and planes, and losing men in battle and through desertion, Junaid retreated further and further into the desert.[23]

In August, 1924, Abdurakhmanov** had declared that: "the formation of independent republics and autonomous Oblasts*** is a step towards the establishment of a single state of toilers of Central Asia. Through national delimitation to international unification of the toiling masses of Central Asia, to the creation of a Central Asian Federation —this is the slogan of our party."[24] But in September 1924, Vareikis, the non-Muslim Secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party announced that: "the

*2/3 miles (approximately).

**The Secretary of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee.

***Russian Province or Subdivision of a government—general.

idea of forming a federation, although it has a large number of adherents among the party members has been considered as premature by the higher organs of the party.'[25]

No other reason for not forming a federation has ever been advanced; but it is obvious that such a plan savoured too much of 'ganging up' to suit the Soviet authorities. The actual task of aligning the frontiers of the new national units naturally fell upon the territorial Commission*, which completed its work in less than a year and submitted its recommendations in September, 1924. These were formally approved by the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party in October and the formation of the new republics and oblasts officially proclaimed.

Soviet authorities gave concessions to win back the support of the populace. The agricultural tax was drastically reduced, a large number of officials were removed from office, and 214 persons illegally arrested during the uprising were released. At the same time the *Mektebs, Medresas, Qazi* courts** and other traditional institutions were tempra-rily restored.[26] The joint Uzbek-Turkmen uprising of 1924 was the last time that Junaid posed a serious threat to the Soviet regime in Khawarzm, though the outcome can never have been in doubt given the overwhelming superority of the Soviet forces.

In October, 1924 the Cental Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. voted to establish two Socialist Republics: Uzbekestan, including the Central part of old Bukhara, the Southern part of old Khiva, and the regions of Samar-

*It is significant that no report of this Commission's work was ever published either in the contemporary press or in literature published subsequently.

**A Judge (Muslim) court.

kand, Ferghana, Amu Daria, and Sir Daria formerly included in the guberniia* of Turkestan, and Turkemenistan, which regrouped the Turken regions of Western Bukhara, Khwarazm, and the former Transcaspian region. Voted also were two autonomous republics: Tajikistan with the mountainous regions of former Bukhara having an Iranian-Speaking Population.

In such a period no one was more aware of the need of winning the masses than Ibrahim Bek, who had by this time become the leader, not only of the Uzbek, but also of the Tajik Basmachi forces. Adopting and distorting the Bolshevik method of agitation and propaganda among the masses, Ibrahim, with the fervid assistance of the clergy and the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia, showered the country with proclamations, manifestoes, promises; threats, imprecautions. He also organised an excellent system of espionage. Every where, in each city, in each village he had agents—*Mullahs, Kulaks,*** traitorous Soviet officials-who kept him informed of every intention or plan of the Soviet authorities.

From an attitude of antagonism or neutrality, the poor and middle peasants turned against Basmachis and by 1923 there was a large and well functioning organisation of poor and middle peasants—the peasant's union—that was doing a great deal of work in crystallizing the peasants hatred for the beys, the *Kulaks,* the *Mullahs.* Life in Eastern Bukhara was so precarious that whole region had become completely depopulated. Peasants abandoned their homes and sought refuge in the mountains. About 43000 peasant families with stock, cattle and implements fled to Afghanistan. As

*Russian Province.

**Wealthy peasants.

a result of the disturbed conditions, the sown area in Eastern Bukhara was reduced by 72 percent, the cattle by 60 percent, the population by 25 percent.

Basing themselves on the *Shariat,* some *Mullahs* maintained that "if the land of one man is taken from him and given to another, the latter exposes himself to the wrath of Muhammad (peace be upon him) if he either consumes or sells the products of that land." Other *Mullahs* proved by citations from the Prophet that Allah has not given you anything, how can you expect more man to give you?" Other *Mullahs* appealed to poor peasants sense of honour "How could you bear feeding on robbed land?"[28]

The authority of the Koshchi* grew as a quasi-administrative and political organ of Soviet control in the villages. By the spring of 1924 it had gained control over the committees of peasant mutual aid and had extended its influence to the cooperative movement in Central Asia. In the former instance, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Turkestan in December, 1923, transferred all committees of peasant and socialized mutual aid with their funds from the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Social Security to that of the Koshchi.[29]

Acting on the basis of this decree, the Koshchi established Mutual aid divisions. Membership in them was independent of membership in the Koshchi, but the divisional chairman were required to join the Koshchi and the sections were compelled to present their acts to the Koshchi for confirmation.[30]

*Koshchi (Union of Toiling Peasants) a peculiar peasent organisation which correspondend in some respects to the committees of the poor that had sprung up in Central Russia at the height of the revolution.

The official encouragement of the extension of Koshchi activity into every important aspect of rural life were aimed at one specific goal-preparation of the Central Asiatic countryside for a sweeping land reform and for a complete reversal of traditional agrarian relationships. The Soviet Government utilized the Koshchi as the primary tool to weaken the traditional bonds of village unity and to drive a wedge between the masses and customary leaders. The Basmachis opposed land reforms and tried to sabotage the plans and programmes of Koshchi.

To weaken the position of Basmachis, Soviet authorities took every care to neutralize the opposition of the rich by respecting their property rights and to win the support of the clergy by sparing their religious sensibilities. Religion was either left severely alone or shown every sign of difference. Bolshevik tolerance finally reached such a point that some of the Muslim divines became pro-Soviet. Assured of the government's readiness to over look past 'sins', Basmach bands, one after another, began to surrender their arms and return to their villages.

A Tajik collective farmer, who in 1924 had been a Basmach under Ibrahim Bek says, "Ibrahim Bek's prestige fell so low that he adopted trickery and magic to preserve a semblance of authority with the masses."[31] He further says, "once when things appeared particularly hopeless for our band, Ibrahim Bek in the presence of a couple of hundred mutinous followers, rose from his gold-embroidered carpet and slowly and solemnly advanced toward a tall lonely tree. He fell on his knees and pronounced a long and devout prayer. Then he rose and, muttering some thing to himself, put his ear to the trunk of the innocently restling tree. The performance lasted about half an hour. The face of Ibrahim was so austere and so concentrated that a great awe fell

upon the people. When everything was wrapped in dead silence, Ibrahim (his eyes burning with an intense flame) turned to his men and in a ringing voice announced: I have just spoken to the Amir and the head of the English army. They have given me their word of honour that within a few days they will send here a countless number of cavalry and infantry. The mutinous brignads were subdued."[32]

I do not think Ibrahim Bek practiced witchcraft just because his position was weak. In fact he knew the psychology of his people. He knew they were superstitious and their hearts could be won over through the ruse of witchraft. He also knew that for want of material resources he was not in a position to meet people's material needs. So to make up for this deficiency he used witchcraft and religion as a strategem to distract people from the Bolsheviks slogans promising material well-being. Thus he succeeded in strengthening his position once again by the end of 1924.

In 1925 Ibrahim Bek attacked the Bolshevik troops in eastern Bukhara. For twenty five days there were constant counter attacks and carnage. But in one direction the said *Mullah* Ibrahim Bek emerged victorious. As a booty he got some *plaimouth* guns, eighteen thousand rifles, three lacs cartrigdges, five hundred bayonets, two iron-clad motor (Tanks) and two aircrafts from which certain machine-guns were recovered.[33] According to Zeki Toghan in 1925, following groups of Basmachis were active in Turkestan:

a) Umer Ali *Laskerbasi* with 300 followers in Quba Suburb of Ferghana.

b) Kara Bek *Leskerbasi* with 200 men in Altiariq Suburb of Khokand.

c) Turdu Bek with 200 supporters in Esfere.

d) Tas Mohammad, the brother of Kursirmet with 500 people in Beljuvanda.

e) Ibrahim Bek Lokai with 200 people in Vakhsh,

f) Temur Bek with 100 followers in Karatagda suburb.

g) Hussen Bek with 200 people in Karsh and Gugasda.

h) Mohammadumca with only 50 people in Karategina.[34]

In 1926, there were 11 bands of 19 to 39 men active in Turkmenistan, mostly in the Tashauz district.[35] Junaid Khan occupied a number of Carvan routes and wells in the desert and extorted from each Carvan one-fifth of its goods and one fifth of each herd.[36] He also continued his raids but by now he lost his popularity. At one stage Junaid decided to make his peace with the Soviet Government and sent his representative to the First All Turkmen Congress offering his submission.[37] This was granted on the condition that he engaged in agriculture near Kunya-Urgench. But unable to bring himself to do this or perhaps, as Toghan says,[38] because he found that the Bolsheviks sought to capture him, Junaid Khan took up arms once again.[39] In December 1927 at the age of about 70, he made another raid and suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the Red Army, losing two of his sons in this skirmishes.

The years 1923-27 in the life of Basmachi movement were the years of disunity, disintegration, confusion, hunger and depression. The Basmachi chieftains were tired and getting old. The National Liberation Movement took the form of banditary. On the other hand Bolsheviks adopted peaceful methods to crush the movement and because of the advanced material resources and new scientific methods they succeeded to press Basmachi chiefs like Ibrahim Bek and Junaid Khan but failed to crush and annihilate the movement completely.

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28. Ibid P. 178.
29. Park, Op.Cit., P. 149 quote Chanyhev, *"O Soiuzakh*

*'Koshchi' '' SOVETSKOE Stroitel, Stvo,* Nos. 4-5 (1962), P. 125.

30. Ibid, P. 149 quote Itsyna, *"Bedniatskie organizatsii no Soviet skom, Vostoke i ikh Zadachi,"* Sovetskoe Stroitel Stvo, Nos. 2-3 (1925) P. 255.
31. Kunitz, Op.Cit. P. 147.
32. Ibid, PP 147-148.
33. Mir Said Alim Jan, *Hizen-ul-Malul Bukhara,* Urdu Translation by Qaddus Sahbai, *Bukhara Kaa Jamhori Inqilab* (Democratic Revolution of Bukhara) Hadir Abad Deccan, 1944 p. 41.
34. Ahmad Zeki Velidi Toghan, *Bugunkii Turkili (Turkestan) Ve yakin Tarihi,* Istanbul Turkey 1924-1947 P. 470.
35. Kozlov, T.S., *Krasnaya Gvardiya i, Krasnaya Armiya V Turkmenii,* Ashkhabad, 1928 P. 35.
36. *Central Asian Review,* Vol. XIII No. 3 London 1965 P. 225 quote *Istoriya Turkenenskoy S.S.R.,* Tom II. Ashkhabad, 1957, P. 305.
37. Kozolvskiy, Op.Cit., P. 67. He is probably referring to the Ist Congress of Soviets of the Turkmen S.S.R. in 1925.
38. Toghan, Op.Cit. P. 470.
39. Ibid. P. 470.

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*CHAPTER VI*

## AFGHANISTAN AND THE BASMACHIS

**"To vindicate Afghan honour I have girt sword to My waist, of this age I am the Man of honour Khushal the Khattak."** (*Khushal Khan Khattak*)

The growth of Afghan Nationalism was a natural and historical phenomenon in 20th Century in North Western Province of India and Afghanistan. But above all, Afghanistan found in the persons of Amir Amanullah Khan and his foreign minister Mahmud Tarzi (1866-1935), a talented Mohammadzai, the architect of its destiny. His Sirajul *Akhbar Afghaniyah* (the lamp of the News of Afghanistan)*, depicted world situation, it burnt with passion for Afghan freedom, lost since 1880.[1]

The socio-political ideas of the Afghans, particularly of the 'Young Afghans'** were shaped to a considerable extent by a number of out side events and intellectual currents. The Russo-Japanese war, the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, the constitutional movements in Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and China (1906-11), the spread of Pan-Islamism,

*Journal published biweekly from October 1911 to January 1919. Mahmud Tarzi (stylist) was the editor and chief contributor.

**A group of educated Afghan nationalists as "Young Turks" "Young Bukharans" and "Young Khivans."

the Italo-Turkish (1911) and Balkan wars (1912-13), the arrival of Turko-German Mission in Kabul**, World war I, the Russian Revolutions, and the proclamation of Wilson's Fourteen points each had great impact on Young Afghans. They were also profoundly influenced by the great wave of Muslim revivalist modernist thought that was sweeping India and the Middle East during these years.

Maulana Mahmood-ul-Hassan a prominent leader of Indian Khilafat movement went to Makkah, negotiating action with Enver Pasha.[2] The other two leaders, of Khilafat movement, Dr. Ansari and Mohammad Ali Johar during their visit of Europe sent message to the leaders* of *Jamiat-e-Ittihad-va-Tarakki* (Turkish Party of Union and Progress) and invited them to come to Afghanistan and help Indian Muslims in their struggle against British rulers.[3] Maulana Obaid-ullah Sindhi and Barakat-ullah had since 1915 established themselves in Afghanistan.[4] As sympathetic with the Khilafat movement, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, emigrated to Afghanistan during the *Hijrat* movement. In 1919 Abdul Ghaffar Khan had actively promoted the Afghan cause and it was reportedly on the advise of Amanullah that he had returned to his homeland. There he continued to follow Amanullah's activities with sympathy, and during the civil war he attempted to help the Afghan ruler by stooping the flow of supplies to Bacha-i-Saqao.[5]

*Jamiat-e-Sirtee-Milli* (National Secret Association) was formed out of trusted influential persons, *sardars,* teachers

**In September 1915 Turko-German Mission headed by Oscar Nieder Mayer and Kazim Bey arrived in Kabul. This Mission was sponsored by the Ottoman war Minister Enver Pasha, and was armed with credentials from the Sultan and letter from the Kaiser.

*The three leaders were, Jamal Pasha, Enver Pasha and Talhat Pasha, the Triumvirat of Young Turks.

etc. in Afghanistan. This political association (group) and latter the "Young Afghan" party had dual objects of achieving independence for Afghanistan and constitutional rights for the Afghans.[6] British India was seething with discontent and crisis. Various incidents and political instability aroused a violent protest in India, which forced the government to compromise with the situation. So it was a better chance for independence of Afghanistan. *Ghaza* (holy war) was the cry when Amanullah asked his country men in a ceremonial court meeting of the elders in April 1919 after reading out to them the British atrocities in India. This was the first war waged by Afghanistan with British India, thenceforth she had been the victim of aggression. Amanullah thus saved in this war not only the head on his shoulders but the crown on his head too.

Written to Amanullah on November 27, 1919 V.I. Lenin called for trade and friendly agreement's "for a joint struggle against the most rapacious imperialistic government on earth –Great Britian." He also encouraged Amanullah to continue pursuing Pan-Islamism as a goal.[7] Refering to Afghanistan as "the only independent Muslim state in the world" he indicated in Phraseology that has familiar ring in view of Soviet references to Turkey, that the Afghan people confronted, "the great historic task of uniting about itself all enslaved Mohammeden peoples and leading them on the road to freedom and independence."[8] "Amanullah and Mahmud Tarzi", says R. Stewart, "had been trying to keep Afghanistan balanced in the influence of, not two, but three different factors. Two of these, Russia and Great Britain, were forced on them by geography, the third Amanullah chose from his heart."[9] Amanullah was religious minded since his childhood and as true Muslim had a sense of mission of protecting Islam. One of Tarzi's attraction for his was the intellectual attitude they shared towards religion. But Amanullah was

alarmed that the countries whose state religion was Islam, (which made them Islam itself) were being threatened by the atheist Bolsheviks, inspite of promises, were taking over the small Muslim Khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Ferghana, while the Empire of Turkey (home of the Caliph) had lost a war and was about to be the subject of a treaty which would probably dismember her. On behalf of these nations Amanullah Jeopardized his new friendship with the British and Bolsheviks alike.

After successfully asserting Afghanistan's independence in the Third Anglo-Afghan war (March to July 1919), Amir Amanullah began to demonstrate an interest in his newly independent northern neighbour—Bukhara, primarily for its value as a buffer against Russia, but also, perhaps, as a member of a league of Central Asian Muslim States under Kabul's leadership. Even after his accession to the throne, an attempt was made to improve Afghanistan's relations with neighbouring Bukhara. In this connection, the Amir's mother addressed a long letter to Mir Said Alim Khan (The Amir of Bukhara), in which she argued that renewed Muslim solidarity was essential to the peoples of Bukhara and Afghanistan, as well as to the rest of the Muslim world. In this regard, Afghanistan had demonstrated its good will and sincerity. She wrote: "Amanullah had made his treaty with Russia conditional on Russian recognition of independence of Bukhara."[10] Traditional policy of Afghans* going back to the days of Ahmad Shah Abdali and to prove himself as champion of Pan-Islamism, Amanullah took credit at least

*In 1762, in response to an appeal from the chiefs of the Kazak tribes and from the ruler of Khokand for help against the expedition of Ch'ienglung-later Emperor Ch'ienglung, r. 1792-1810, who had threatened to attack Samarkand and Tashkent, powerfull Ahmad Shah Abdali, r. 1747-73, sent a force to the defence of Tashkent.

tacitly, for securing Russia's commitment to the independence of Bukhara and Khiva. A letter (July 16, 1919) from Government of Soviet Turkestan to Amanullah shows, Amanullah Khan's interest in the Bukhara. Soviet Turkestan government wrote: "as His Highness (Amanullah) expressed sympathy with Bukharan Muslims and his hope about peaceful solution of dispute and unfriendly terms between Soviet Turkestan and Bukhara, we are trying our best to solve the problems peacefully. But the attitude of Bukhara was discouraging and unfriendly. . . . The last attack of Bukharan Turkman's on the boat in which there were N.Z. Brown and Afghan diplomatic staff. Such like acts create suspicion between Bukhara, Afghanistan and us."[11]

In July 1919 Alim had requested material support from Amanullah, who responded in October by sending to Bukhara "Sixty military instructors, half a dozen experts in arms production, and six cannons."[12] But according to Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, help was sought by Said Alim during the last days of Amir Habibullah Khan (father of Amanullah). Amanullah accepted the request during his own reign and sent few soldiers with four cannons and two elephants.[13] I. M. Reysner quote from S. Gins berg that as, early as 1919 the Afghans were also in contact with the anti-Soviet Ferghana Basmachi's. S. Ginsberg writes. . . "In the first of December 1919 an Afghan delegation visited Mohammad Amin (Madamin ) after having reconciled him with Irgash and the other leaders."[14] Aid was sought from Great Britain and Afghanistan, the former, on the advice of Colonel Etherton, hesitated, but Madamin Bek in a visit to the Afghan delegation in Turkestan in November obtained a promise of support from the latter."[15] The same delegation had talks about setting up in Ferghana a constituent assembly with the cooperation of Afghanistan and renouncing of all sympathies with the British (By Mohammad Amin). To this

confusing message Mohammad Amin replied that he wished to be rid of the Bolsheviks, but Afghanistan seemed to be co-operating with the Bolsheviks and he sent a letter to Amanullah, requesting him to announce exactly what his policy was. A member of the party carrying the message to Kabul was a secret double agent in the employment of the British Council in Kashghar.[16] Immediately there spread word among the Bolsheviks that Afghans were conspiring behind their backs. Under urgent orders from Tashkent a special Bolshevist guard had been placed in Bandi-Sultan, as it was feared, Afghans might injure water supply and in the Panjdeh area, the Afghans are said to be leaving hurriedly for Afghanistan for fear of arrest and confiscation by Bolsheviks. R.R. Zuyer gives a somewhat different version of this event, "the Afghan representative insisted. . . . . .on Mohammad Amin giving him a letter for the Amir of Afghanistan with the request that the Amir should receive Turkestan and in particular Ferghana, under his mighty hand. For this he promised 500 rifles and 1800,000 cartridges.[17] These overtures to the Basmachi's Reysner ascribes to the fact that "the possibility of extending their territory. . . . appeared as the simplest way out of their internal economic difficulties" and further remarks that these were "very feeble attempts and that in fact Afghan policy was limited. . . . by the weakness of her material resources."[18] Communication between Kabul and Moscow in the conditions of the civil war were difficult in the extreme. Bravin, the first soviet Ambassador to Kabul, seems to have been coolly received by the Amir and not long afterwards he was assassinated. LT. Col. F. M. Bailey in his book *Mission to Tashkent* says of Bravin that "he advised his government to take advantage of the weakness of Afghanistan after the war with us (i.e. third Afghan war) and to demand the cession of certain

Frontier's posts and districts which were of strategic advantage to Russia."[19]

Nikulin in his article entitled "Afghanistan-i-Angora" writes of the Afghan reaction to the first Soviet advances: "Even in relation to the dis-interested moral support of the RSFSR there could be seen suspicion and distrust, the result of centuries of political seclusion and of the aggressive policy of Britain."[20]

When in September 1920 Bukhara had been captured by the Red Army and Amir Said Alim fled to Afghanistan. Wherein he entered into the service of the British and conducted furious counter revolutionary activities. Through his secret agents in the government of the Bukharan Peoples Republic, he tried to undermine Soviet rule. He purchased arms in England and had then smuggled into Soviet territory. Letters from Amir Said Alim Khan, genuine and forged, promising arms and money, if he came back to his people, were spread by the thousands. In one such letters, perhaps forged, the Amir wrote:

> "My monarchical greetings to all. . . be they Nogais Uzbeks, Tajiks or Soviet Employees. . . ., I and my friends are greatly grieved and are doing everything in our power to lighten the burdens of the terrible misfortune that has be-fallen you and to help you in your struggle against the Bolsheviks. . . there is no reason to doubt our final victory. I have had conversations with the Europeans who live in Kabul and who have taken an interest in our affairs. They have promised to sell me rifles at the price of one sheep per old rifle and two sheep per new one. They also promised to aid our armies by sending five hundred air planes, which are due to arrive here any moment. Also inform my people that the Soviet government is at present in very bad

straits. It has been attacked by the English, French and Chinese armies, which are already near Moscow. Just hold out a little while longer. The end of the Bolsheviks is near. Let every one join the armies of Islam, always bearing in mind that the field of a holy battle lies on the road to Paradise. Believe that everything I say is the holy truth."[21]

Early in 1922 Alim Khan wrote in a letter to Adam-bek, chieftain of Basmachi band: 'We hope the Great British Emperor will give us aid, and promises have been made on that side."[22] In a message to Basmachi bands operating on Soviet territory the uncle of the former Amir informed them that complete understanding had been reached with the British government and that in the early spring of 1922 they would arrive with troops, guns and planes via Shunganan, Chitral and Darvaz. The Amir himself with troops and a battery was moving from Kabul towards Shirabad.

Secretly the Afghans sent men and ammunitions to help against the Bolsheviks. Individuals and groups of volunteers from British India and Afghanistan crossed the Afghan-Russian border in support of the Basmachi. Nadir Khan was appointed Afghan commander in the north and instructed to assist the Basmachis without directly involving his own Country. Nadir directed their operations from a spot close to the Afghan–Russian frontier. In 1922, Amanullah secretly corresponded with Enver Pasha, and sent his best troops to his northern frontier to await developments. "Enver had upto a thousand Afghans volunteers. . . and the supply of the Basmachi forces with fire arms was in part carried out from Afghanistan. . ."[23]

Amanullah much troubled, met privately with Francis Humphrys* and asked Britains aid for Bukhara. Britain who

*British minister at Kabul.

had refused the Amir of Bukhara, refused the Amir of Afghanistan.[24]

The Russians demanded the withdrawal of the Afghan forces from the border zones, and asked for and received declaration of non-interference from Amanullah, who had met with General Mohammad Nadir Khan at Khawak pass to discuss the situation. Nadir Khan failed to convince Amanullah that the Afghans should take a wait—and—see position on the Central Asian revolts. But with the death of Enver Pasha in August 1922, for sometime Amanullah Khan had been disturbed by the obvious growth of Communist power north of the Amu-Daria, and he now decided to abandon all thought of expansion in the north and to concentrate as before on the east and south.

At the end of 1925 the question of the Basmachi's arose again over a border incident which for short while caused tension between the Afghan and Soviet governments.* In November 1925 the Island of Urta-Tugay was occupied by Soviet troops, who drove out the Afghan garrison. Afghanistan protested and the Soviets agreed to submit the issue to a joint Commission, which subsequently awarded the Island to Afghanistan.[25]

During March 1926 PRAVDA VOSTOKA produced a series of editorials blaming the Afghan government for not dealing with the Basmachi's who were still troubling Soviet territory. On 10th March the editorial said: "It seems to us that the Afghan government knows as well as we do what the Amir of Bukhara is doing at present. . . . if they do not, we can tell them that the Basmachi bands are pillaging the peasants and sending the fruits of the pillage

*The Frontier agreement of 1873 had not made it plain whether Afghanistan's Northern boundary was the Thalweg or one of the banks of the Amu-Daria river.

to Kabul where the Amir lives, in order to help in the up keep of his *harem."*

The amicable settlement of the Urta-Tugay incidents was held up as an object lesson to the Afghan government: "if the little incident over the question of the ownership of a little Island in the Amu-Daria shows our pacifism and our desire to maintain friendly relations with the Afghan people, it seems to us that the Afghan government should draw conclusions from it."[26]

Since the Afghans continued to take advantage of the Basmachi revolt against Soviet authority, the Soviet government on August 31, 1926 at Paghman, entered into a treaty of Neutrality and non-agression with Afghanistan, by which each contracting party agreed to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the other and an agreement which established an air service between Tashkent and Kabul. This pact, according to Soviet interpretation put an end to the frequent raids into territory on the part of Afghanistan sympathizers with the Basmachi movement, and also marked a new step in strengthening friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan.[27]

In July 1928 Amanullah returned from his tour of Europe and introduced a series of reforms to modernize Afghanistan. In mid-September Amanullah's position was challenged by an influential group of *Mullahs*.* Dis-satisfaction was widespread and in November 1928 a rebellion broke

*The Mujadadis of Shorbazar, their leader Sher Agha (Fazle-Umar) in self exile since 1926 in India was preaching against Amanullah. His brother Gul Agha (Sadiq Mohammad) obtained 400 signatures of the theologians against Amanullah and headed towards Khost to stire a rising. He was arrested. (Dr. Mohammad Anwar Khan. The First Constitution of Afghanistan (reprint winter, 1978 P. 531).

out among the Shinwari tribe of eastern Afghanistan. The rising spread and in December a bandit from Northern Afghanistan, Bacha-i-Saqao (son of water carrier), captured Kabul in January and proclaimed himself Amir.

The British role in the revolt was not clear, but Amanullah's out spoken anti-British attitude and his acceptance of Soviet technicians made him a prime target for overthrow by the British. Accorting to Dr. Mohammad Anwar Khan: "Rebellions against Amanullah were British inspired."[28] The Comintern and the O.G.P.U. (Soviet Secret Police) favoured supporting Bacha-i-Saqao revolt as a social one which had "sprung from the people", and that "his power was based on the peasants whose champion he was". The commissariat of foreign affairs argued for the support of either Amanullah or Inayat-ullah (Brother of Amanullah) on the ground that Bacha, a Tajik would not be accepted by the Afghans. He might (Tajik) disseminate anti-Soviet propaganda among the Tajiks of Central Asia and possibly encourage pro-Basmachi political activities in the region.

Reysner says in 1929 that Bacha's movement was a peasant rising and that "peasant rising even though developing under the leadership of reactionary clergy would be a danger to their neighbour, colonial India." He again in 1954 describes Bacha simply as "the stooge of the British*". A favourite Soviet theory held that Bacha had been planted in Afghanistan by the British in order to establish a close alliance with Amir Said-Alim and Ibrahim Bek. The goal of such an alliance was either the rekindling of the Basmachi revolt in Central Asia or the preparation of an aggressive move against Tajikestan.[29]

George Aghabekov, the major source of this information, asserts that the Politburo decided to take the advice of the

*Central Asian Review. IV, London 1956. P. 178.

foreign affairs office and champion the cause of Amanullah.[30] Even shortly before Amanullah's final defeat his ammbassdor in Moscow, Ghulam Nabi. . . .crossed the Oxus at the head of a small force, almost certainly equipped and reinforced by the Soviet Government. But the North was bitterly hostile to Amanullah, and the Soviet Government was not prepared to back their fancy. . . further than Mazar-i-Sharif.[31]

Whether from encouragement from the new ruler—as Soviet sources allege—or from the generally anarchic situation in Afghanistan, or whether from native opposition to the Soviet collectivization drive in the Soviet Union, Basmachi raids from Afghanistan into Soviet territory grew bolder in the early months of 1929. PRAVDA of 10th May reported that Bacha-i-Saqao had held a national assembly at which were present the ex-Amir of Bukhara, the Basmachi Chief Ibrahim Bek and a certain number of Turkmen Chiefs hostile to the Soviet Union. IZVESTIA of 10th May, 1929 and PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 26th May published the rumour that Bacha-i-Saqao had promised the Amir his complete support from an offensive against Tajikistan and meeting at Kabul at the end of February between the Ex-Amir of Bukhara and the Basmachi Chiefs.[32] So the symbol of the proletariat had become a friend of their most deadly enemy among Kings, the Amir of Bukhara.

On March 19, 1929 Nadir Khan challenged Bacha to submit the question of the legitimacy of his claim to national *jirga* to be made up of all the Afghan tribal Chieftains[33] and then launched an offensive against Bacha, defeated him and in October 16, 1929 accepted the throne of Afghanistan.

During the collectivization drive between 1930 and 1936 the Tajik S.S.R. saw a rebirth of the Basmachi movement. Numbers of peasants joined rebels in the mountains. As a consequence in 1933, Nasratullah Maqsum, president

of the republic, and Abdur Rahim Hajjibay-Zada, his prime-minister were accused by the Central Committee of the communist party of the Soviet Union of having "lacked Vigilance" and of bearing responsibility for the agricultural failures.[34] Moreover, they were convicted of harboring national, chauvinistic, and anti-Russian feelings.[35] Some of these insurgents fled to Afghanistan. Also, in 1937 a second purge liquidated what was left of the national leadership. President of the republic Shotemar, and Prime-minister Rahimbay-Zada, were accused of "national deviations" of being "Trotskyites" and Bukharinites.[36] Among their most prominent associates, the minister of public education, Hassan-Zada, and three secretaries of the Tajik Communist Party disappeared.[37]

Similarly in 1938 in Moscow, Fazullah Khoja-oghli* and Akmal Ikram-oghli (Ikramov) First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, were convicted in a show trial of "the Trotskyite and Rightest bloc" and executed on March 13, 1938 along with N.I. Bukharin** and A.I. Rykov.[38]

With the rise of Mohammad Nadir Khan to the throne of Afghanistan, the Russians lost the favoured position they had partly developed under Amanullah. The Afghan government, in an effort to demonstrate its goodwill, concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1931, and like Turkey, showed marked sympathy for the Soviet viewpoint at the Disarmament conference in 1932.[39]

*The First President of Bukharan Peoples Republic and who had once presided over the Central Executive Committee of U.S.S.R.

**Nikoli Ivanovich Bukhrian was Russian Bolshevik.

Before the signing of a new treaty of neutrality and non-aggression in June 1931, the activities of Ibrahim Bek* threatened to disrupt peaceful relations between the two countries. While Ibrahim Bek waged a guerrilla war against the Soviets, using hit and run tactics, always falling back to sanctuary across the Afghan border, Nadir Khan and his brother were busy in pacifying south Afghanistan.

There were rumours that Great Britain was backing Ibrahim Bek, intending to utilize him in the creation of a buffer zone between Soviet Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The zone was to be settled by Ibrahim's followers, and he himself was to be the ruler of Britains choice."[40]

The king's brother, Sardar Shah Mahmud, led a force across the snow-covered Hindu Kush by way of the Khawak Pass against Ibrahim Bek. He was defeated and was forced to retreat to the North, where for three and a half months he had complete sway over the Karategin and Badakshan provinces. But he could not withstand the pressure of Nadir Khan's troops.

Early in April, 1931 a fierce battle on the banks of the river Panj left Ibrahim Bek's forces completely smashed. "When his warriors and their families and cattle tried to cross the Panj to the Soviet side" writes Joshua Kunitz, "they were attacked by the Afghans in the middle of the river. Hundreds were massacred. Women and children and cattle were drowned. Those who managed to cross were received by the Soviet authorities with serious misgivings."[41]

On June 23, 1931, the Basmach Chieftains Ishan-Isakhon, Ali-Mardan-Datkho, Tashmet Bek, Gaib Bek, and

*In June 1930 the ex-asperated Soviet army crossed the Amu Daria and followed Ibrahim Bek for about forty miles, "in hot pursuit" the troops failedto capture the Basmachi leader, but succeeded in stunning the Afghans by this frontier violation.

others were taken captive by Bolsheviks. Ibrahim Bek and the pitiful remanants of his bands had been captured by the collective farmers of the Khodzhi-Bul-Bulan and Ishkhabad villages in collaboration with the volunteer detachment commanded by Mukum-Sultanov.*[42] Ibrahim Bek was executed in the same month (June 1931) by Bolsheviks.[43]

Nadir's decision to adopt a policy of non-intervention in Soviet Central Asia indicates his grasp of real politic. Because the roads through the Hindu Kush remained virtually impassible, northern Afghanistan, a region whose population was ethnically tied to Central Asia was isolated, and the Afghan Government had neither the financial means nor the military might to cope with revolts that might be fomented there under the banner of national self-determination and cultural autonomy.[44] Though discouraged by Nadir, the Basmachi's and other emigre elements from Turkestan continued to enjoy the support of the Afghan religious circles.

Following a policy of Nadir the Hashim Khan** government took steps to satisfy the Soviet Government that the Basmachi's and other emigre elements from Turkestan would be prevented from engaging in anti-Soviet activities. Some of the prominent anti-Soviet leaders were "encouraged" to emirgate to Turkey or Europe.[45] During World War II and as late as 1949 some refugees (Uzbek, Kirghiz, Kazak etc) fled to Afghanistan and Northern Areas of Indo-Pakistan from U.S.S.R. However with refugees some groups of Soviet Provocateurs crossed the border into Afghanistan. Soviet Uzbeks tried to proselytize Afghan Uzbeks; Soviet Tajiks,

*Commander of Volunteer Detachment.

**Hashim was paternal uncle and Prime Minister of Zahir Khan.

Afghan Tajiks, Soviet Turkomans, Afghan Turkomans. "The Afghan counterparts turned in their surprised Soviet-oriented fellow tribesmen to Afghan authorities."[46]

Even as recently as February 13, 1956, PRAVDA revealed that in the summer of 1955 "a band of diversionists" crossed the Cental Asiatic border in an attack on the Soviet Union.[47] Lastly to the Soviet's the Afghan-Bukharan and the Afghan-Basmachi cooperation presented both an actual and a potential political and military threat to the triumph and consolidation of Soviet rule in Turkestan. They were in constant fear of an Anglo-Afghan rapproachement and the possibility that Britain might lend both political and financial support to confederacy of anti-Soviet nationalist and pan-Islamic forces.[48]

Both Soviet Union and Britain were trying to use Afghanistan as a spring board of activities against one another. The Soviet Union supported anti-British Muslim Nationalists of India, while British supported the anti-Soviet Basmachis.

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## REFERENCES AND NOTES

1 When Abdur Rehman (1880-1901) ascended the throne of Afghanistan with the British support, surrendered to them control of his foreign affairs in lieu of an annual subsidy of £ 80,000.

2. Maulana Mahmood-al-Hassan was arrested in Medina by Sharif Hussain and handed over to the British who interned him at Malta.

3. Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi, *Kabul Mae Satt Sal* (seven years in Kabul) Sind Sagar Academy, P. 116.

4. Maulana Sindhi and Barkatullah remained active in Kabul and played vital role in its independence and were asked to leave Afghanistan in 1922. Barkatullah left Afghanistan sometimes in late 20's and joined by Mehandra Partab migrated to the United States and died in San Francisco.

5. V. Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (1880-1946)* Califorinia 1969, P. 328. Sir Percy M.Syke *"Afghanistan:* the Present Position. London 1940, P. 158. Mohd. Yunus, *Frontier Speaks,* Lahore, 1942, pp. 141-42. K, Shridharani "The Frontier Gandhi" *Asia,* September, 1941 P. 469. In part Nadir's coolness can be attributed to Red Shirts Progressive ideas and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's close ties with Amanullah, Nadir had reason to suppose that Movement might be used against the Afghan monarchy and Afghan interests. But really Nadir did not want to become involved in a military conflict with the British, and he did not want to see the tribal belt made into an ideological and political base for a movement that might easily turn against the Afghan throne.

6. Hashmi, *Aghaze junabshe Mutaliba-e-Azadi-ha-e-Isasi Dar Afghanistan Dar Ruba-e-Qaran Beestam* PP. 192-198.

7. According to M.N.Roy, Lenin saw in colonial liberation Movement led by the national bourgeoisie an objective, historically progressive revolutionary force. In this context, even Pan-Islamism was seen as a revolutionary movement and thus deserving of the support of the world communist movement. The success of Kemal Ata-Turk in Turky was considered to be of ultimate benefit to the Bolsheviks. See M.N. Roy, Op.Cit PP. 390-411, 538. Stalin regarded the struggle of the Afghan Amir (Amanullah Khan) for independence of Afghanistan is objectively a "revolutionary struggle in spite of the monarchical out look of the Emir and his followers, for it weakens disorganises, and undermines imperialism" M.G. Reiser, *Afghanistan,* Moscow 1946 P. 27.
8. Louis Fischer, *The Soviet in world Affairs,* 1, P. 286 See also, Ivar Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (1917-1958)* Washington P. 69.
9. Rheatalley Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan (1914-1929)* New York 1973. P. 116.
10. For the Text of this letter, see Arthur Ranson's article in *The Manchester Guardian,* August 5, 1921 and L-Asie Francaise, November 1921, P.P. 420-21.
11. *Mnasabat-i-Afghanistan Wa-Itihad-i-Showarvi (1919-1969).* Afghanistan P. 7-8.
12. Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924.* Harward University Press 1968 P. 280.
13. Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, *Afghanistan dar Masser-e-Tarikh,* Kabul P. 786-787.
14. S.B. Ginsberg *"Basnachesgov, V. Fergana Novy-i-Vostok Nos.* 10-11, 1925, P. 190.
15. P. T. Etherton. *In the heart of Asia,* London 1925. P. 230.

16. R. Stewart, *Fire in Afghanistan.* New York 1973 P. 116-7.
17. *Central Asian Review* Vol. IV 1956, London S.W.Z.P. 172.
18. Ibid. P. 172.
19. Ibid. PP 197-198.
20. Ni Kulin article *"Afghanistan-i-Angora"* Novyi Vostok No. 2 of 1922.
21. Joshua Kuntiz, *Dawn over Samarkand Rebirth of Central Asia.* Calcutta India, 1943 P. 140-141.
22. *The Truth about Afghanistn (D.F.E.R.)* Novosti Press Agency Publishing House Moscow 1981 P. 24.
23. *Central Asian Reivew,* London 1956, P. 174.
24. Stewart Op. Cit. P. 208.
25. The official version as published in *IZVESTIIA* of 5th March 1926 said that URTA-TUGAY had belonged to the emirate of Bukhara and ought to be a part of the newly formed Tajik autonomous region. Occupied by Afghan's during the civil war in Bukhara, the Island had become a haunt of brigands. The previous November a group of 300 Tajik refugees returning home had landed on the Island and had come in conflict with the Afghan Post. Having armed the Post the Tajiks had driven out the Afghans, and, with the object of restoring, order, the Russian Post on the other side of the river had intervened and occupied the Island. According to Faizullah Khoja (*PRAVDA VOSTOKA* of 10th June 1926), the Island had been the subject of an exchange of notes between the governments of Afghanistan and of the Republic of Bukhara: but nothing had resulted from this. With the development of military operations against Basmachis, however, the Island had become a strategic point of the first order of the provisioning of the Basmachis and as a passage in to Tajikistan.

During one of these operations detachment of the Red Army assisted by local volunteers had pursued the Basmachis on to the Island and had occupied it.

26. *Central Asian Review* Vol. IV 1956 London, P. 177.
27. *Noveishaya Istoriya Stran Zarbezhnogo Vostoko,* 1,227 See M.N. Podznakom Islam. *"Novyi Vostok,* Vol 10-11 (1925).
28. Dr. Mohammad Anwar Khan, New Political Elites vis a vis Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, *"Pakistan"* Journal of the Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Autumn 1980, No. 2 page 31. The Indian, French and German Press affirm and *PRAVDA* of 20th December 1928 said: Official Afghan sources of information. . . . Categorically confirm that a very suspicious role has been played by the famous British 'specialist' on oriental affairs, the adventurer T.E. Lawrance. He under the name of Tom Shaw worked against Amanullah Khan.
29. V. Gregorian in his book *"The emergence of Modern Afghanistan,* California 1969, P. 279 quote from *PRAVDA* and *IZVESTIA,* May 10, 1929.
30. George Agabekov. *O.G.P.O: The Russian Secret Terror.* New York, 1931. PP. 159, 164-66.
31. W.K. Frazer Tytler, *Afghanistan. A study of Political development in Central and Southern Asia.* London 1967 P. 218.
32. *Central Asian Review,* Vol. IV 1956 London. P. 179
33. Gregorian, Op.Cit. P. 283.
34. Edward Allworth . *Central Asia. A Century of Russian Rule.* Columbia University Press. New York and London 1967 P. 263.
35. Ibid. P. 263.
36. Ibid. P. 263.
37. Materialy K. *Istori Tadzhikskogo V Sovetskii Period* (Stalinabd Tadzhorizdt 1947) PP. 120 F.

38. Allworth Op.Cit. P. 263.
39. A section of the non-aggression part that anticipated a ban on activities in one country by organisations hostile to the other seems to have been rigorously observed by the Afghan government. Though the emigres from Turkestan who had settled in northern Afghanistan were allowed to remain in Afghanistan, where they had a good deal of public sympathy as persecuted Muslims, they were transferred to the southern provinces and their activities were curtailed.
40. Kunitz Op.Cit. P. 220.
41. Ibid. P. 220.
42. Ibid. P. 302.
43. Dan Fisher Article 'Los Angeles' Times. April 6. 1980. Reprinted with permission fromL.A. T. Colyright 1980 Los Angeles Times.
44. Gregorian, Op.Cit. P. 332-33.
45. Ibid. P. 375, Castagne, *"Soviet imperialism,"* P. 703.
46. Louis Dupree *"Afghanistan.* New Jersey 1973 P. 512.
47. IVAR Spector, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (1917-1918),* University of Washington Press. P. 72.
48. In the aftermath of the Third Anglo-Afghan war, Trotsky had written to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (September 20, 1919) that the truce between Afghanistan and England may "Wholly rebound against us, "That England is actively at work uniting Persia, Bukhara, Khiva and Afghanistan against Soviet Turkestan. It would be incrediable if she were not to do so" See Jan M.Meijer, ed, *The Trotsky Popers,* 1917-1922, London, 1964 P. 673.

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## CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have discussed how Basmachi movement emerged under the banner of the defence of "Khokand autonomy", how it turned immediately after the destruction of Autonomous Government into chaos of popular risings throughout Soviet Central Asia and ultimately how the movement fizzled out after long strides.

The ideal of Turkic unification lay at the root of every anti-Soviet movement in Western Turkestan. Similarly it found expression in the Khokand Autonomous Government, which was liquidated by Tashkent Soviet and with this Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism succeeded in asserting themselves with greater vigour in the Basmachi Movement.

By an unstable combination of "nationalism" which stressed unity in the name of race and religion, the Basmachis were temporarily able to cut across internal divisions and unite the diverse elements of heterogeneous society in a war for "national" liberation against the Bolsheviks. With the arrival of Enver Pasha in Central Asia in 1921 and his assumption of command of the Basmachi forces the movement achieved greater unity and popularity and succeeded in winning recruits from every-where. However the unity achieved was imperfect and the movement failed in its ultimate objectives. The failure can be seen in the following causes:—

Firstly, it was unable to completely over-come factionalism, tribal strife, and the tensions between liberal *Jadidists* and conservative anti-Soviet forces. Therefore, the emergence of a strong, centralized leadership for the rebel movement, so necessary for the success of a guerrilla war, remained absent in the case of the Basmachi Movement.

Secondly, there was no political centre that could organise the spontaneous strike and provide it with a definite political ideology. The westernized intelligentsia of western Turkestan, which had formulated the nationalist ideal for Turkestan, and whose power reached its Zenith with the establishment of the Khokand Autonomous Government, was unfortunately numerically insignificant and remained alienated from the general public they claimed to represent.

Thirdly, there were various shades of opinion among the Nationalists and the intelligentsia. The Pan-Islamists always thought that the Muslims of Russia, Turky, Afghanistan etc., were a united single nation and it should act as such. This concept was foreign-oriented. Both Afghanistan and Britain were the chief propagandists of this concept. Turkestani writers like Toghan and Hayit emphasize that the Basmachi Movement was, "Pan-Turkic" rather than Pan-Islamic, because it fought for a political group's cause rather than for the revival of traditional Islam. To the *Jadidist* both Islam and the nation remained basically one and the same thing. The *Qadimist* Basmachis were fighting rather for the mode of life of their forefathers, for the tribal social order and the Islamic faith. They were not interested in independence or autonomy. They were interested only in preserving the influence of the priesthood over the Muslims in Turkestan.

As a result of such political and ideological confusion, each Basmachi chief eventually became interested only in seizing some territory, proclaiming himself a *Bek,* and ruling the land according to his own will. Those Basmachi leaders, who achieved the greater fame were neither intellectuals nor the reformists but a bunch of *Qadimists* led by Irgash, Kurshirmat, Ishan Sultan and Ibrahim Bek etc, who refused

to go by any obligation that harmed their individual interests. Such petty rivalries among the Basmachi chiefs, the intellectualls, the *Jadidst* and *Qadimists* as well as tribal conflicts created a state of anarchy which destroyed the movement altogether. Lacking common ideology, unity, discipline, charismatic leadership and appropriate weapons the movement was destined to collapse. Thus the people were deprived of the necessary motivation, and direction to achieve their goal and again a state of hopelessness was created which demoralised the public in general. It shattered their faith in local leadership and national institutions.

It is also on record that during 1922-1924, the Soviets assumed a conciliatory attitude towards Islam with the result that they succeeded in winning over the *Mullahs,* who came out in open support of the Soviets, thus sanctifying their authority. Coinciding with such *Fatwas* was the Soviet propaganda which influenced a large number of young men who were convinced that there was much in common between Islam and Communism. Consequently they joined the communist party and raised an army (The Tatar Brigade etc.) and collaborated with the Soviets.

The Soviet economic policy (N.E.P.) was conciliatory and accomodating which promoted rapid material recovery in the Central Asia. Calm and peace was general demand of the day. the opposition leaders were exhausted and therefore the movement died a natural death.

No substantive moral or material aid reached the Basmachis from outside. Amanullah Khan in the first instance encouraged the Basmachis but later under Soviet pressure he dropped support and adopted a neutral attitude towards the Basmachis. Nadir Khan not only forced Turkestani refugees to leave Afghanistan but killed a large number of them.

A serious set back came to the Basmachis in June 1919 when England withdrew her forces from Trnascaucasia. This ended for ever any hope of British active support to the Basmachis.

Lastly, the Indian Nationalists for their pro-Soviet attitude failed to advance any help to the Basmachis. They were fighting the British and looked for help and succour to the Soviet.

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## Biographical sketch of Enver Pasha (1881-1922)

Enver Pasha, a Young Turk soldier and statesman, was born in Diwaanyolu (Istanbul), on November 22, 1881. His father was Turkish, his mother Albanian and he had a Circassian grandmother. After completing his secondary schooling, Enver entered the military academy (Mekteb-i-Harbiyya) in Istabul, completing both the regular officers training course and advanced general staff course. He stood second in his class on 5th December 1902 as a general staff captain and was posted to the third army in Macedonia. In September 1906, he was assigned with the rank of major to third army, headquarters in Manastir. There he joined, as member No. 12, the *Othmanli Ittihad Ve Terakki Djemiyyeti,* the conspirational nucleus of the Young Turk's movement.

Enver achieved early fame, since he and Major Niazi Bey were the first to raise the standard of revolt of the "Committee of Union and Progress".[1] In july 1908, Enver, now one of the recognised leaders of the insurgents, left the government service and led a band of *Fedais* (devoted one) through the Macedonian mountains, and won over village after village to the revolutionary cause. He took a prominent part in the Tripolitan campaign of 1912. At the on-set of the Balkan war, he returned to Constantinople in 1913, where he was active in overthrowing the cabient of Kemal Pasha for capitulating to the Bulgharians. In the spring of 1914 Enver married an imperial princess.

1. Sir Edwin Pears, Life of Abdul Hamid, London 1917. P. 285

The out-break of the Russian Revolution in 1917 created new opportunities for Pan-Turkish movement in the Turko-Moslim areas of Russia. Russian might vanished, and half-independent states sprang up in the Caucasus, and new foreign forces appeared in this region: Germans, British, Russian Reds and their White opponents.[1] Although Enver Pasha was personally absent from the Caucasus in 1917 to 1919, it was through his directives that the Azerbaijan Turkish military preparation were started. Enver participated in the famous Baku Conference in September 1920. After Talat Pasha's assassination (15th March 1921) he was most prominent leader of the 'Union and Progress' in exile. He arrived in Bukhara in October 1921. In November Enver left Bukhara to join the Basmachi's and was killed on 4 or 5 August, 1922 by Soviet forces.

Enver Pasha was short of stature and slender of waist, with wide-set fiery eyes and an up-pointed, well-groomed moustache. He had great personal courage, boundless energy. This true patriotic son of Islam was the champion of Muslim cause and light of liberty and independence for the oppressed Muslims of that time.

1. C. W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets. London 1957. P. 152.

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## Biographical sketch of Zeki Velidi Toghan

It would be no exaggeration to say that the entire Bashker national movement of the year 1917-1920 was to a large extent the product of Zeki Velidi's efforts. Ahmat Zeki Velidı (also known as Ahmat Zeki Valido'v) was born on December 10, 1890, in the village of Kuzen (Southern Urals) in Bashkiria and died in 1970 in Turkey. His father Ahmad Shah was an *'imam'* and a teacher and managed a religious school.[1] As a village boy in the Ural's Toghan was ambitious to become a person of international reputation. This ambition and his "drive against all obstacles, is a dominant feature of his charismatic personality."[2] After teaching at the superior theological and pedagogical institute of Kasimiye in Kuzen, he represented the Muslims of the province of Ufa in the 1916 Russian Duma. He was active with organisational work among the Muslims of Turkestan. When the decision was made on November 17, 1917 to form an autonomous Bashkirian state, Zeki Velidi came in to prominence as a leader and mainstay of the short-lived republic of little Bashkira in the Urals.[3] In 1917 he was a member of the bashkirian Central *Shura* (Council) and a member of the Bashkirian *Kurultai* (National Assembly). In the summer of 1918, in an agreement with the Committee of the constituent Assembly, he started the organisation of Bashkir national troops. Following the defeat of the

1. H. Jansky, Ahmet Zeki Velidi Toghan, Zekivelidi Toghan and his works (a pamphlet reprinted from Zeki Velidi Toghan'a Armagan) Istanbul: Maarif Basimevi, 1955, P. 17.
2. C. W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets. London 1957. P. 218.
3. Ibid. P. 218.

Kolchak (white) army, the government of Bashkiria made peace with the Soviets and for 15th months tried the experiment of working to preserve their autonomy under the Bolsheviks. When this failed he escaped to Bukhara. A Soviet source, however claims that Toghan was a member of the communist party and a member of the Bashkir Revolutionary Committee, where he advocated an extreme nationalist policy. Because of his extreme nationalistic ideas and policy he was excluded from the committee, and with a group of Bashkir nationalists he went to Turkestan, aiming at the organisation of a separate Eastern Communist Party. He spent three years in the vicinity of Bukhara in an attempt to organise resistance to the re-establishment of Russian rule and was in contact with Enver Pasha and the Basmachi movement. In 1922 he withdrew to Afghanistan and then to Turkey, where he attained academic distinction as a Professor at Istanbul University.[1] At the age of 65 Toghan is considered by his contemporaries to be a controversial figure. He has devoted his life to the cause of Turkism, has written profusely and has played an intimate role in its modern history.[2]

1. C. W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets. New York 1957 P. 219
2. These observations are based on conversations with Turk leaders and personal impressions gained in an interview with Toghan in Instanbul in June, 1955 (C. W. Hostler).

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## Biographical sketch of Junaid Khan (1860-1938)

Junaid Khan was born about 1860 as Gurban-Mamed (or Muhmad Qurban). He was a member of the Juneyd clan of the Yomut Turkmans which centred on the *aul* of Bedirkent in Takhta.*rayon.* Early Soviet source emphasize that Junaid did not belong to the Turkman nobility and was no more than a mere shephered who made his way to the top by successful pillaging. But Nepesov and others, on the other hand observed that Junaid was the son of a rich Turkman feudal lord, Khoja bay. Nepesov further says, although Junaid was illiterate he long held the post of *Kazi* and *Mirab** in his *aul.* Then, at the beginning of 1912 he gathered an armed band under his leadership and looted several carvans in the desert. As his success and number of followers increased, he acquired the title of "Sardar" and later Junaid Khan, after the Yomut (Juneyd) clan to which he belonged.[1]

Junaid seems to have been involved in the widespread Turkmen disturbances of 1912-13 and 1915, but his exact role is not clear. After the fierce clashes between the Yomuts and the Khan's retainers at Akderbent in June 1915, at the beginning of 1916 it was the turn of the Uzbeks to demonstrate against Isfendiar. After the death of two young Uzbek and Kara-Kalpak girls, who had been forcibly taken to the Khan's *harem,* hundreds of out-raged Uzbeks, with the Bek of Khodezheyli at their head, advanced on Khiva to demand the abdication of the Khan and even Russian citizen-

*Official incharge of the irrigation system.

1. Nepesov G., Iz Istorii Khorezmskoy revolyutsii. Tashkent, 1962 P. 64.

ship. The revolt collapsed when their leaders were arrested by the Tsarist garrison and the rest dispersed to their homes.

On 10 and 11 February 1916, Junaid's bands attacked Khanki, Gurlen and Urgench, and Junaid had himself proclaimed Khan of Khiva. Junaid forces then advanced on Khiva and blockade the small Russian garrison. The town was entirely in the hands of the Turkmens from 13-15 February 1916, during which they killed three ministers and looted the city, and Junaid exacted a ransom of 60,000 rubles from the Khan for sparing his life. Meanwhile General Galkin, who was already on his way to Khiva with a punitive detachment to give the Turkmens "a severe lesson", was nearing the city and Junaid's men withdrew, having offered virtually no resistance to the Tsarist troops and having declined to take on Galkin's column. Pursued by Galkin, Junaid himself fled first to the Karakum and then to Perisa and Afghanistan. By way of retribution Galkin's expedition imposed a huge indemnity on the Turkmens and during the next two and a half months burnt down whole *auls* and massacred their inhabitants. On the Khan's orders he also executed the bek of Khodzheyli and the other of the Uzbek uprising.

In early September 1917, Junaid Khan returned to Khwarazm from Afghanistan and immediately set about reasserting his authority over such rival Turkmen clan leaders as Shammi-kel and Gochmamed Khan (Koshmamd Khan).

In January 1918 Zaitsev* and his remaining forces with-drew from the Khanates, as arrived in the beginning of September 1917. This left the Khan and the unarmed and unorganised Uzbeks at the mercy of Junaid Khan who immediately established a virtual dictatorship which lasted untill February, 1920.

*The Cossack Col. Zaitsev was Military Commissar of the Russian Provisional Government in Khiva.

Red Army troops entered Khiva at the end of January 1920 and at the beginning of February the Khan abdicated and a *young khivan* Provisional Government was set up.

The over-throw of Junaid marked the beginning of the Basmachi movement in the Khwarazm oasis. He was the leader of Basmachis and the King of Karakum desert, but lastely defeated by Soviet troops in 1928, fled to Persia and then in 1929 to Afghanistan where he died in 1938.

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## Biographical sketch of *Mullah* Ibrahim Bek

*Mullah* Ibrahim Bek was the most gifted and daring of all the Basmachi leaders in Eastern Bukhara, indeed, the whole of Turkestan. He was a member of Issa-Khoja of the Lokai tribes.

The son of rich *Kulak,* Ibrahim while still a youth, had squandered his father's wealth and had taken to horse stealing as a means of replenishing his fortunes. He was most satisfied with such ugly business. Seeking military glory, he entered the service of the Hinos Bek, where he soon attained the rank of captaincy. It was at this time that "Ibrahim fell in love with the rich widow Dona Gull."[1] But she declined his fervent suit, saying that she would consider him only if he became Bek. Ibrahim resolved to become Bek. The October Revolution provided him this opportunity. As a military leader and an extra-ordinarily gifted organiser he gathered around himself a large band of devoted and well armed followers. Within a short time his band attracted wide attention. Because of his great services to Amir Said Alim the young chieftain soon became a candidate for the high office of Keeper of the Royal stables".

After the Amir Said Alim's departure to Kabul, Ibrahim's star continued to rise. The tribal chieftains acclaimed him as their leader, signifying their great admiration by tossing him (according to tradition) into the air on a white woolen carpet and proclaiming him Bek. Soon he married Dona Gul.

1. Joshua Kunitz, Dawn Over Samarkand Rebirth of Central Asia. Calcutta (India) 1943 P. 127.

He quickly extended his authority over other Uzbek tribes. Under his banner disunited Uzbek bands in Lokai and even in Kulab consolidated into a formidable anti-soviet force. By December 1921, there were about twenty thousand active Basmachis under Ibrahim's command. They besieged Dushanbe and forced Red Army to retreat along the Baisun shirobad-Termez line.

In 1931 he was defeated by Nadir Khan, King of Afghanistan near river Panj, imprisoned by Soviet Tajikistan authorities and then executed.

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